


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Germany

and

NATO



JOHN A. REED Jr.

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US Navy Photo

Service caps of NATO military officers

Germany and NATO

JOHN A. REED Jr.

1987

**NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Fort Lesley J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-6000**

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William A. Palmer, Jr., of Cheltenham, MD, copy-edited the manuscript for this book under contract DAHC32-87-A-0015. Renee Loeffler, System Analytics of Virginia, Inc., indexed this book under contract DAHC32-86-A-0016. Lewis Sorley of Azonics, Inc. proofread page proofs of this book under contract DAHC 32-87-A-0034.

NDU Press publications are sold by the US Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 787-3238 or write to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Reed, John A., 1932-

Germany and NATO / John A. Reed, Jr.

p. cm.

Bibliography: p.

Includes Index.

1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization—Germany (West) 2. Germany (West)—

Armed Forces. I. Title.

UA646.5.G4R44 1987

355'.0332'43—dc19

87-22895
CIP

First printing, December 1987.

To Nancy, for her support, understanding, faith, and love ...

And to John, Libby, Jeff, and Jamie—with hope that the peace and stability engendered by NATO and by Germany's firm place in the Alliance will help promote a better future for all the World's children.

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Foreword

The Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1955. By joining the Alliance, Germany recognized that its own security and the general security of the West are interdependent. Yet, because the German nation remains divided between West and East, national reunification continues as one of the Federal Republic's long-range objectives. While NATO member states must constantly weigh the requirements of Alliance security with respect to broader national objectives, Germany faces unique problems reconciling its national goals with those of the Alliance.

In this book, John Reed explores the German perspective on NATO. By relying on membership in NATO for national security, Reed argues, Germany is supporting broad regional security and deferring reunification for the short term. Reed concludes that Germany has become a leading advocate for a strong NATO, promoting, in particular, institutional progress and Allied cooperation.

Reed's positive interpretation of Germany's role in and importance for NATO may reassure those concerned by the so-called national or "German" issues. We can all appreciate—as this book argues—that one of the highest priorities of both Germany and NATO must remain the safeguarding of the principles of democracy, justice, and freedom through mutual defense.



BRADLEY C. HOSMER
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, US AIR FORCE
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Preface

In May 1985, Germany marked 30 years of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, perhaps the most successful defense alliance the Western World has ever known. In NATO, the German Federal Republic has found the security needed to rebuild an economy shattered by the defeat of 1945 and to recast the German body politic along democratic lines.

Concurrently, inclusion of the geographically diminished German state within the Western Alliance has served to allay the fears of those nations—east and west of the inner-German border—who have been victims of German aggression twice in this century. Bonding the Federal Republic with its Western Allies also has removed much of the urgency from the perennial "German Question."

By opting for security within NATO, Bonn's political leaders effectively ruled out any possibility of early German reunification—a state of affairs certainly not displeasing to Soviet and East European leaders.

This study examines Germany's experience in seeking security through membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. Beginning in the ruins of post-1945 occupation, it follows Konrad Adenauer's efforts to regain sovereignty and his skillful use of the Federal Republic's military potential to win concessions from western leaders who wanted German troops to help check the spread of communism in Europe.

After considering the nature of Germany's security needs, I discuss the planning and organization of the Federal Republic's new democratic armed force, the *Bundeswehr*, and equipping and manning the newly raised units.

The central portion of the book draws heavily on my personal experience in dealing with German and NATO issues on a day-to-day basis over the past decade, particularly during the

dramatic "years of the missiles" (1982-85), when I observed the street demonstrations and heard the diplomatic rhetoric from the American Embassy in Bonn. Here, I consider the nature of German security policy, discuss how that policy has changed as NATO strategy and doctrine have evolved, and analyze the problems NATO doctrinal and weapons issues have created for Germany.

In this connection, I pay particular attention to peculiarly German factors or domestic considerations that color Bonn's attitudes toward issues of keen Alliance concern. The implications and ramifications of allied attempts to apportion more equitably the common defense burden—often at Germany's expense—figure prominently.

Finally, I examine the extent to which NATO, after nearly 40 years, is able to satisfy Germany's basic security needs, and consider whether the Western Alliance has the vitality and flexibility to accommodate German needs for the foreseeable future.

Based on the experience of the past 30 years, the extent to which one can continue to answer these two questions in the affirmative may be critical for both European stability and World peace.

* * * * *

A number of friends and colleagues offered invaluable help and support during the two-year period between this study's conception and birth. Several stand out:

General (Ret.) Ernst Paulsen, German Army, who offered periodic encouragement and generously shared his personal experiences and insights on formation of the *Bundeswehr*; Lieutenant Colonel Klaus Arnhold, German Army, whose critical review of an early draft helped clarify several key issues; Dr. Fred Kiley, Director of the NDU Press, and Dr. Joe Goldberg, Professor of Research at the NDU Press, whose insight and professionalism cleared my path of underbrush; and my editor, Ed Seneff, whose industry, enthusiasm, and boundless good cheer lightened my load considerably.

To you and all others who had a part in this book, I am deeply grateful.

Abbreviations

ABM	antiballistic missile
ATBM	anti-theater ballistic missile
Benelux	Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg
CDI	Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative
CDU	Christian Democratic Union Christian Democrats
COMINFORM	Communist Information Bureau
CSU	Christian Socialist Union Christian Socialists; political party in Bavaria (<i>Bayern</i>) allied with the CDU
DM	<i>Deutsche Mark</i>
DOD	Department of Defense
EAD	Extended Air Defense
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EFA	European Fighter for the 1990s
ERW	Enhanced Radiation Warhead ("neutron bomb")
ET	Emerging Technologies
FDP	Free Democratic Party Free Democrats
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FY	fiscal year

GDR	German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GLCM	ground-launched cruise missile
GNP	gross national product
IAU	infrastructure accounting unit
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force
LRINF	Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Force
LTDP	Long-Term Defense Program
MLF	Multilateral Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPG	Nuclear Planning Group
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
R&D	research and development
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
RSI	rationalization/standardization/interoperability
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars")
SPD	Social Democratic Party/Social Democrats
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU	Western European Union

Chronology

1946

30 July

United States and United Kingdom consolidate German Occupation Zones

1947

12 March

Truman Doctrine proclaimed

5 June

Marshall Plan announced

1948

17 March

Brussels (Western Union) Treaty adopted

24 June

Berlin Blockade begins

1949

4 April

North Atlantic Treaty signed

6 May

Berlin Blockade lifted

8 May

German Basic Law (constitution) adopted

23 May

Federal Republic of Germany proclaimed

1950

25 June

North Korea invades South Korea

27 October

Theodor Blank named Federal Security Commissioner

1952		
27 May		European Defense Community Treaty signed
1954		
23 October		Paris Agreements on Germany signed
1955		
5 May		Germany joins NATO
6 June		FRG Defense Ministry formed
7 July		<i>Bundeswehr</i> conscription approved
16 December		North Atlantic Council approves nuclear arms for NATO forces
1956		
20 January		<i>Bundeswehr's</i> "birthday"—First volunteers assembled
1961		
13 August		Berlin Wall erected
1966		
14 December		NATO Nuclear Planning Group established
1967		
14 December		Harmel Report approved NATO adopts Flexible Response strategy
1968		
14 November		EUROGROUP established

1972

26 May

"Basic Treaty" signed between the FRG
and the German Democratic Re-
public

1979

12 December

NATO approves dual-track INF moderni-
zation plan

24 December

Soviets invade Afghanistan

1983

23 March

President Reagan delivers SDI speech

22 November

Bundestag approves Pershing II and
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile de-
ployment

Germany **and** **NATO**

EUROPE



Road to NATO

IN THE COMFORT OF LONDON CLUBS or Parisian drawing rooms, English and French gentlemen often tend to equate a given year with the success of the grape harvest and the quality of the wine produced.

In these terms, 1949 was a very good year.

The flowering season virtually was unmarred by late frosts, rain and sunshine alternated in ideal measure, and the harvest took place under ideal conditions that held high promise for a vintage of great note. Wine producers, merchants, and consumers could take justifiable satisfaction in the vintage and its future prospects.

Western European Security Needs

Elsewhere, however, the course of events had been much less favorable, and the outlook was highly unsettling. European economies remained dislocated or, in extreme cases, shattered in the aftermath of the Second World War. Even the victors in that struggle had emerged badly bruised, their factories and cities scarred or destroyed and treasuries exhausted in the struggle against the totalitarianism of Nazi Germany and its allies.

The vanquished still lay in ruins—factories silent, farmlands fallow, and ruined cities crowded with refugees whose presence aggravated the already grave shortages of housing, food, fuel, and transport.

Nevertheless, hope existed. Motivated partly by altruism, and partly by fear that despair might lead the Western Europeans to seek radical solutions, the United States began a number of economic and military programs designed to promote European recovery. But results were uneven and improvement was slow. Because nearly a third of Italian and French voters backed communist candidates in local and national elections during the immediate postwar years, pessimists feared that the Left might come to power peaceably in key Western European nations. We know in hindsight that communist electoral strength already had peaked in both countries, but, to many, the danger that a 1948 Prague coup could be repeated in Paris or Rome seemed all too real.

Internationally, the situation was no less alarming. Although the Soviet Union had suffered grievously at the hands of the Nazi *Wehrmacht*, the Red Army emerged in 1945 as the major land force in Europe. In the years following Germany's surrender, Moscow maintained large numbers of troops in Eastern Europe, using them as a principal instrument of Soviet policy.

In contrast, the Anglo-American Allies—whose forces in Europe totalled some five million at war's end—demobilized rapidly, retaining only about 900,000 men under arms, compared with the Soviet Union's five million. As the political atmosphere cooled, this force imbalance between the increasingly antagonistic former allies came to be perceived in Washington and elsewhere in the West as a serious and growing problem.

Even those western troops in Europe were not deployed as a real defensive force. Most of them were occupation troops, administering national zones in

occupied Germany, overseeing denazification, dismantling remnants of Germany's war industries, and seeking to establish the basis for eventual economic, political, and social recovery and rehabilitation. As Moscow increased its efforts to bind Eastern Europe and its German occupation zone closer to the Soviet politico-economic system, the Western Allies began to consider occupation problems collectively, and to develop concepts and procedures for reconstitution of a German state.

The Soviet Union hoped, and West Europeans feared, that the imbalance of military power could be translated into political advantage. The early record was ambiguous. Communist takeovers of governmental power in Poland and Czechoslovakia doubtless were made easier by the presence of Soviet troops and the absence of any national military counterweight. At the same time, western nations successfully met and resolved the 1948-49 Soviet challenge to West Berlin through politico-military actions (although the Soviets clearly "pulled their punches," choosing not to escalate the crisis by exploiting all assets at their disposal).

Western military leaders recognized limitations inherent in the European forces' imbalance and pressed for some sort of action to redress the situation, but their voices had little effect amid Europe's economic and social chaos. Even though a number of western leaders voiced concern that the East's military edge might serve to tip the local political balance, few saw any overt danger of Soviet military aggression.

Political-Military Threat from the East Notwithstanding the force imbalance described above and the admonition of military leaders that this imbalance should be redressed promptly, few West European statesmen saw any real urgency in the matter, for national priorities

generally reflect national perceptions of threats and benefits. Military defense was viewed as part of the larger whole of national recovery and accorded a priority lower than physical, social, or economic reconstruction. Political leaders acknowledged, and paid lip service to, the fragility of West European defenses but, for the most part, applied available resources elsewhere. Most western leaders saw the US nuclear arsenal—numerically limited and imperfectly understood as it may have been—as the ultimate guarantor of their security. National defense efforts therefore could wait.

Slowly, however, this situation changed. Most institutions which the victorious allies set up to manage post-war activities in Central Europe were functioning badly. Soviet-American cooperation—without which effective four-power administration of Berlin was impossible—had broken down. Moreover, Moscow met the bold thrust of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (1947) by establishing the COMINFORM (Communist Information Bureau), an organization designed to fight “American imperialism” and to coordinate political activities of the communist movement in Europe. With Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland (1947), and Czechoslovakia (1948) firmly in the Soviet camp, Europe rapidly divided into two opposing blocs.


Finally, the successful August 1949 explosion of a Soviet nuclear device cast a long shadow across the widespread, if naive, assumption that US nuclear weapons would continue to be a unique and unchallenged deterrent to Soviet military adventurism.

Faced with a growing politico-military threat, but constrained by national financial priorities, West European leaders turned to a traditional method for balancing the strength of a superior military power, one that William of Orange had perfected three centuries earlier to check the ambitions of France’s Louis XIV: A defensive

alliance, now fully countenanced and sanctioned by the newly minted United Nations Organization. In January 1948, after a number of informal discussions among European capitals and across the Atlantic, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin proposed that the Western European nations join in a mutual security undertaking, based on the 1947 Anglo-French accord and designed to promote internal security of the member states and a common defense against external aggression.

With the 1948 Czechoslovakian coup d'etat as a stimulus, representatives from France, Great Britain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands met in Brussels soon thereafter, and agreed to form a Western Union for mutual aid and assistance. An attack on any party to the treaty was to be viewed as an attack on all. The Brussels Treaty (see appendix A), which laid the groundwork for the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (NATO), called for member countries to create a common defense system, and provided for a Commanders-in-Chief Committee under the chairmanship of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery of the United Kingdom. An implicit assumption of the Brussels signatories was US willingness to provide military aid for Western Europe's military forces.

Forging a Single Mutual Defense System As the European Allies moved toward a collective security arrangement, US leaders considered how they might help forge a single mutual defense system for North America and the democratic nations of Western Europe. The spring 1948 Berlin Crisis and the progressive Soviet blockade of the former German capital added urgency to the matter. Secretary of State George Marshall and his State Department colleagues, aided by key allies in the Pentagon, undertook a major campaign of education and



National Archives

Dean Acheson, US Secretary of State, confers with Sen. Tom Connally (D-Texas) (left) and Sen. Arthur Vandenberg (R-Mich.) in 1949. They discussed the forging of a mutual defense system for North America and the democratic nations of Western Europe.

persuasion in the Congress to overcome reservations among Members who continued to believe that Europe's problems should not become our own.

Ultimately, congressional objections were surmounted by the cogent arguments of the Truman administration and the skillful management of Senator Tom Connally (D-Texas) and Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-Michigan); on 11 June 1948, the Senate endorsed the concept of US membership in regional collective self-defense arrangements (the Vandenberg Resolution).

During the summer of 1948, representatives from Canada and the United States, and members of the Western Union negotiated a comprehensive defensive alliance, under which an attack on any signatory would be considered an attack on all. They then invited

Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to join.¹ After appropriate national deliberation, all accepted the invitation, and leaders of the 12 governments signed the North Atlantic Treaty (see appendix B) on 4 April 1949 in Washington. NATO—the most successful defense alliance ever formed—had been born.

Deliberation over the North Atlantic Treaty took place against the backdrop of the first major East-West political crisis that gripped postwar Europe—a Soviet blockade of West Berlin, which began on 24 June 1948 and continued until the following May. Allied cooperation in supplying the beleaguered city by massive airlift underlined the western capitals' growing commitment to counter Soviet challenges with concerted action. The airlift's success in relieving what appeared initially as a virtually hopeless situation had far-reaching effects in the West, fueling the efforts of those members who sought to forge a western mutual security arrangement, and demonstrating that the Atlantic Allies could, by working together, successfully resist Soviet politico-military pressure.

Concurrently, the 1948–49 Berlin Crisis showed western military leaders how few conventional options they possessed and how much they needed a rapid build-up in Atlantic military capabilities. Finally, successful resolution of the crisis left western leaders with the conviction that innovative and superior technology (in this case the use of an airlift to overcome a tight surface blockade) could be the key to offsetting an unfavorable conventional force imbalance.

Postwar Germany— Pariah or Prodigal?

Viewed from the perspective of the late 1980s, the North Atlantic Treaty has been one of the key documents

in modern history. The Alliance to which it gave birth has grown progressively stronger, evolving along lines not always clearly foreseen by its signatories, but nevertheless fully consistent with its spirit.

NATO began more as a political instrument than a military one, satisfying the needs of member nations for allies, without requiring extraordinary national military measures. Indeed, even after the Berlin blockade exposed the West's relative military weakness, none of the Allies appeared ready to sacrifice other priority needs to create strong NATO defense forces. Secretary of State Dean Acheson reported to the US Congress after the May 1950 North Atlantic Council meeting that, despite the "total inadequacy" of western defenses, Council members were unanimous in seeing no sense of urgency to create a balanced allied defense force. Furthermore, although what Harland Cleveland in 1970 called "the transatlantic bargain" has proved to be a good bargain for NATO partners, member nations joined in an undertaking that failed to consider a number of basic security questions.²

Among these loose ends were the status of Germany, the problem of forming a new and viable German political entity, and the role this new German state might play in evolving western security arrangements.

The Allies After 1945 The period following Germany's surrender in May 1945 was exceedingly difficult for the German people and the victorious Allies, whose antagonisms began to surface as German resistance collapsed. The Potsdam accords established three Allied Occupation Zones, under which the former German Reich was to be administered. At the same time, provisions were made for an Allied Control Council, in which zonal policies were to be coordinated and decisions made on all German matters. So that all major western nations


could take part in the German occupation and be represented on the Control Council, a small French zone subsequently was carved from the British and American portions. (See map of postwar Allied Occupation Zones of Germany on page 12.)

In practice, the Allied Control Council was ineffective as a governing body, and the occupying forces administered their respective zones with a great deal of independence. This independence was most noticeable in the Soviet Zone, where the USSR's policies reflected Moscow's priorities of transferring all available industrial equipment (and later Soviet Zone industrial production) to the Soviet Union, and promoting the political fortunes of the local communist party and its leftist allies.

Nominally charged with coordinating policies and resolving zonal differences, the Control Council was hamstrung from the beginning by the requirement that its decisions be unanimous. Its only real accomplishments lay in formulating "negative measures"—for example, dismantling Nazi restrictions on individual and corporate freedoms—and in such matters as reestablishing international postal service and interzonal telephone and telegraph service, and reconstituting labor courts and work councils.³

Proposals designed to establish constructive and coordinated policies for the four zones, or to return various administrative functions to German control, usually were vetoed by the Soviets or, with increasing frequency, the French military governor—reflecting a deep and enduring French fear that anything but a weak, loosely federated Germany inevitably would threaten France's security and challenge its primacy in Western Europe.

On one topic in particular—German reparations—Moscow and Paris agreed fully and sought to make the Control Council serve their interests. France's goals and rationale were clear. She had been defeated, occupied,



Postwar Occupation Zones in Germany

Source: Atlas of World War II, New York: The Military Press, A Bison Book, 1984.

exploited, and humiliated by Nazi Germany. Further, the Germans had reneged on massive reparations levied on them by the Versailles Treaty. France believed that Germany should be made to pay—by removal of factories, expropriation of coal production, and, if possible, through French control and exploitation of the Saar and Ruhr industrial regions. In 1945–46, French political leaders virtually were unanimous on this point. Charles de Gaulle was not the only Frenchman determined to make France the senior partner in any West European arrangement that emerged in postwar years.

Moscow's resolve to secure reparations from a supine Germany was no less intense. Marshal Josef Stalin had pressed at Yalta and Potsdam for war reparations totalling some \$10 billion. While no precise figure was established at either conference, the principle was accepted by key western leaders. Once the fighting stopped, Soviet occupation forces promptly removed large quantities of every type of industrial equipment—often entire factories—captured undamaged. Moscow's inability to absorb much of this equipment, large quantities of which were left to rust along railroad sidings and in storage yards, led to a subsequent Soviet decision to leave factories in the occupation zone and take industrial products as reparations, a practice regarded by the United States and the United Kingdom as a violation of the Potsdam agreement.

The Soviet Military Commandant also sought to obtain large-scale industrial reparations from Germany's industrial heartland in the British-occupied Ruhr, and to a lesser extent from the more heavily agricultural US Zone. As the Soviets were entitled to one-sixth of surplus plant capacity of western zones,⁴ US and UK officials reluctantly cooperated. Factories were inventoried, removal schedules were established, and some equipment was shipped to the East. As Soviet actions in Eastern and

Central Europe became increasingly hostile, western leaders slowed this process.

They halted it entirely after 1949, when leaders of the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) protested the incompatibility of the policy with goals of the European Recovery Plan. By that time, Soviet activities in Europe left little doubt that Moscow had less interest in acquiring Germany's industrial infrastructure than in creating a climate conducive to the growth of the Communist Movement by denying West Germany the means to meet its basic needs.

Fortunately, the West was sensitive to this danger, and took steps to foreclose it. Unfortunately, western actions provided Moscow with a justification for blocking access to the Soviet Zone, as well as a rationalization for noncooperation in the Control Council.

With US and British representatives effectively foreclosing the possibilities of further reparations from Western Zones, and the Soviets erecting barriers to western access and influence in the East, the Control Council lost vitality, and the gulf between Eastern and Western Europe widened. Indeed, after the July 1946 Byrnes Proposal to promote German recovery by combining occupation zones, and the June 1947 announcement of the Marshall Plan, British and American policies on Germany and West European recovery were on a collision course with policies being pursued by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. As the months passed, Europe would be divided militarily, politically, and economically, with a truncated German state playing a major role in each grouping.

Despite repeated calls for a unified Germany, the USSR excluded Western Allies and western influence from East Germany after 1946, becoming progressively less cooperative in the Allied Control Council, whose members, General Lucius Clay reported, were going through only "meaningless motions."⁵

By 1947, the Soviet Military Commandant had become little more than a mouthpiece for Soviet propaganda. Thereafter, four-power policy discussions gave way to blunt denunciations and demands. The Control Council adjourned acrimoniously on 20 March 1948, never to meet again. The attempt to control and govern Germany as a single—albeit militarily divided—entity had failed.

Germany after 1945 As the intra-allied struggle evolved, German concerns lay elsewhere. Most Germans were occupied with more basic matters. Wartime devastation and the final collapse of central governmental control left a defeated Germany totally in the hands of its conquerors. Bereft of organization, lacking most basic services, short of transport and communications, and unable to distribute adequately the few stores and commodities still available, most Germans simply struggled to survive day-to-day.

As General Clay, named in 1945 as Deputy US Military Governor in Germany, toured the Western Occupation Zones, he reported to American leaders the "frightful destruction" in most cities of the former Reich. In Berlin, for example, he wrote,

Shortage of fuel had stopped the wheels of industry. Suffering and shock were visible in every face. Police and fire protection had broken down. The city was paralyzed There were about 3,000 breaks in water mains. Large quantities of untreated sewage had to be discharged into canals, creating additional health hazards, and only 23 of 84 sewage pumping stations were in operation. In the borough of Steglitz it was estimated that out of 14,000 homes, 3,260 had been destroyed, 3,200 were uninhabitable, and in the remaining 7,500 which were considered habitable, 10,000 out of 43,000 rooms were seriously damaged.⁶

Postwar Germany had lost the farmlands annexed by Poland and access to foodstuffs from the European countries Germany had occupied. As a result, even where the distribution system worked, little food was available to the Germans. Although occupation commanders established an official daily minimum ration of 1,240 calories, this level rarely was achieved. The average daily ration in Berlin late in 1945 was only 800 calories; even in the Ruhr coalfields, whose production was essential for German and West European recovery, food shortages were so widespread the UK authorities had to divert large quantities of foodstuffs from Commonwealth suppliers for the German miners, at a major cost to Britain's own recovery efforts. Only in Bavaria was the populace able to subsist without imports. The Rheinland and Ruhr—home of nearly half of all West Germans—were almost totally dependent on external assistance.⁷

The food shortage was only one postwar problem to beset Germany. Miners working on empty stomachs produced little coal, and much of that extracted was exported to France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. German industrial production was at a standstill: Little investment capital was available to help rebuild damaged factories, and operating facilities either lacked the coal and raw materials needed for production, or were earmarked for dismantling and removal under the reparations program. Moreover, Germany's transport infrastructure—roads, railways, and canals, as well as many of the vehicles and boats that normally used them—was badly damaged.

The housing shortage was so acute that even partially damaged houses were at premium. In addition to finding shelter for their own homeless, Germans in Western Zones and occupation officials had to contend with problems of accommodating the 10 to 12 million ethnic Germans uprooted by the fighting or expelled from their homelands as boundaries of Eastern Europe were

redrawn. A further problem was finding adequate food and shelter, at least temporarily, for some 100,000 non-Germans displaced by the war.

Reflecting on this situation shortly before taking office as West Germany's first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer understood the plight of some seven million Germans driven from their homes in the East. More than three million of them eventually made their way to the already-overcrowded British and American Zones, creating what he considered an intolerable housing situation. Adenauer wrote,

The famine years of 1946-47 have done enormous damage in both the physical and the ethical respect. The food situation has improved considerably within the last year (1948) but is still far from satisfactory. Cases of tuberculosis have risen from 53.5 per 10,000 in 1938 to 127.5 in 1948. . . . Before 1933 there were 20 to 22 cases of venereal disease for every 10,000 persons. In 1948 the figure was 51.74.

For Berliners we have particularly reliable statistics. In 1947 mortality there was roughly 29 for every thousand of the population. Births amounted to 10 per 1,000. Infant mortality in the second quarter of 1946 exceeded 135 per 1,000. Compare this with New York, for instance, where it is 10.1 per 1,000.⁸

Bumpy Road Toward Recovery Problems in the British, American, and French Occupation Zones doubtless were extremely serious but, in truth, they never were grave. Western Allies had at their disposal the resources, military power, and political acumen necessary to confront and solve problems of the West Zone Germans. All that was required was a willingness on the part of the western occupiers to do the job. National attitudes and priorities differed significantly, however, and progress was uneven and slow in coming. In the end, the

assertion of US influence and leadership—prompted in large part by Soviet attitudes and actions in Eastern Europe—proved decisive.

The German political and military collapse in 1945 coincided with major shifts in political leadership in Britain and the United States. The appearance of new faces—with new attitudes and ideas—at allied meetings called to address postwar policies and arrangements impeded allied efforts to occupy, de-Nazify, and reform Germany. In the West, dawning realization that the Soviet Union intended to impose State Socialism in the areas controlled by its army also served to complicate the situation.

Among the western victors, only France appeared to hold unequivocal views on Germany's future. The French made no secret of their intention to extract their "pound of flesh" in the form of industrial reparations, economic control of the Saar, and, if possible, a say in the future of the Ruhr. Paris recognized that some sort of German state eventually would have to be organized, but it was determined to press for as small, weak, and decentralized a Germany as could be arranged.⁹

Above all, France wanted to ensure that no German national entity would ever again become a military threat to its western neighbors. These goals led France often to adopt positions in the Allied Control Council contrary to positions taken by Britain and the United States, effectively blocking progress on a number of important issues.

Although British policy certainly was less vindictive, it was less clear. The newly elected Labour Government, headed by Clement Attlee, shared the American view that Germany should be stripped of its war-making potential, but not blocked indefinitely from playing a normal, constructive role in European affairs. The Attlee government also appeared more comfortable than the French in giving the West Germans a greater degree of centralized control. In addition, London recognized the financial and



National Archives

Housing project initiated in West Germany under the High Commissioner's program for refugees. Apartments were interspersed among those occupied by Germans to hasten assimilation in 1961.

economic drain of administering its zone and was delighted to accept the proposal of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that the British and American Zones be combined to promote German economic recovery. General Clay and General Sir Brian Robertson—US and UK Military Commanders respectively—cooperated closely and resolved virtually all differences that arose in their official capacities.

US attitudes and policies toward Germany were more complex. Initially, these attitudes and policies represented an amalgam of views. Some Americans thought the Allies should occupy Germany, quickly try and punish those responsible for the atrocities of the war, establish a democratic government, and then withdraw.

Others, like Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, would have dismantled the German state industrially and condemned it to perpetual second rank as a lightly industrialized agricultural nation. Under a compromise US policy, industrial reparations were given priority initially over economic recovery. German industry was inventoried and surveyed for possible dismantling. Nazis and their collaborators were identified, rounded up, registered, examined, and—if appropriate—tried for their “offenses against humanity.” Many former Nazis and their collaborators were barred from public employment or political activity. At the same time, low-level democratic activity was encouraged as a first step toward reconstruction of a popularly elected German government.

As the occupation continued, however, economic and social problems festered as allied military administrators wrestled with Europe’s continued turmoil. Little by little, policymakers in Washington became convinced that the fate of all Western Europe was hostage to German economic recovery. Unless America helped Germany and other European nations reconstruct themselves, the United States would play into Moscow’s hands by creating a climate of disillusionment and desperation, in which the incubus of communism could grow.

Marshall Plan Nearly a year elapsed between the war’s end and the US decision to promote German recovery as the engine for reconstructing the economies of Western Europe. But once that decision was taken, Washington moved quickly to clear away as many impediments to recovery as possible and to provide necessary resources. Secretary of State Byrnes began the process in July 1946, when he offered to merge the US occupation zone for economic purposes with that of any other power desiring to cooperate. Britain, anxious to be


rid of occupation support costs then running some \$80 million annually, promptly accepted the US offer. France and the USSR expressed some interest, but demanded conditions that would have made the arrangement unworkable. Accordingly, Britain and the United States set up a bizonal economic organization to promote greater complementarity and better cooperation, as well as sufficient scope for industrial viability. Byrnes announced the US decision to recast its occupation policy in a 6 September 1946 address in Stuttgart. He said,

Germany is part of Europe and recovery in Europe, and particularly in the states adjoining Germany, will be slow indeed if Germany with her great resources of iron and coal is turned into a poorhouse.¹⁰

The winter of 1946–47 in Europe was unusually severe. Fuel still was in very short supply. Industries still operating were forced to shut down; houses and schools were without heat. Food again ran short, impelling President Harry S. Truman to ask former President Herbert Hoover to survey Europe's food needs and organize an emergency relief program. The severity of the weather greatly retarded progress on the newly initiated bizonal industrial export program.

Nevertheless, the joint Export-Import Agency set up by the United Kingdom and the United States helped promote exports worth \$225 million in 1947 and \$600 million in 1948—fully justifying expectations for bizonal fusion.

A comprehensive European Recovery Plan was begun after Secretary Marshall's June 1947 Harvard speech, in which he proposed financial assistance for European recovery efforts. Although the Secretary of State stressed that the program would be directed "not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos," the incompatibility of the US concept of



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Herbert Hoover, former US President, delivers an address on "The Menace of Communism" during a visit to Berlin in 1955, after being honored by the Berlin government. Seated is Dr. Walther Sobreiber, Mayor of Berlin.

economic cooperation with centralized economies in the East led Soviet Foreign Minister V.M. Molotov, reluctantly joined by his Polish and Czech colleagues, to walk out of the Paris conference called to consider the US offer.

Officials of the 16 nations that remained nevertheless drafted a proposal acceptable to the US Congress, which voted funds to make the so-called Marshall Plan possible. The Western Occupation Zones were to be included in the program; Moscow's walkout ensured that the Soviet Zone would not participate. The line dividing Germany was becoming sharper.

The Marshall Plan was developed against a backdrop of worsening East-West relations. The usefulness of the Allied Control Council was at an end. Periodic meetings

of the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers became progressively stilted and polemical. The March 1947 meeting in Moscow was unproductive, and during the London meeting at the end of 1947, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov became so shrill and insulting that Secretary Marshall concluded that no communication was possible and terminated the session.¹¹

Thus, by March 1948 both forums for discussing German problems—the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Allied Control Council—had ceased to function. Actions soon were to replace words.


Toward a West German Government As the international situation deteriorated, US and British officials in Germany moved to give a political dimension to bizonal economic fusion. Central to this effort was a decision to increase German administrative control by the mid-1947 creation of a 52-delegate Economic Council, which would adopt bizonal ordinances to govern economics, transport, finance, communications, food supply, and agriculture. An executive committee of *Land* (State) representatives was established to implement the Council's decisions.

Although France had opposed virtually all the US-UK steps that served to return authority and responsibility to German hands, deteriorating East-West relations together with the inevitability of German economic recovery and political reconstruction now led Paris to revise its course. After obtaining economic and security concessions and assurances from Anglo-American representatives and German leaders, the French agreed to cooperate in establishing a new West German State. *Bizonia* became *Trizonia* in June 1948 and, in August, *Land* representatives were asked to elect a Parliamentary Council to draft a Basic Law (or provisional constitution) for a new West German State.

Moscow reacted sharply to the administrative and political actions in the Western Zones. In March 1948, Soviet authorities blocked US military traffic to West Berlin in protest over steps being taken to establish a West German government. By June 1948 all western rail traffic into the city was blocked, ostensibly in response to the western *Deutsche Mark* currency reform. The Soviet Military Commander left no question, however, about the real reason for the blockade. The "technical difficulties" (that had closed down traffic), he told General Clay, would continue until the West abandoned its plans for a West German government.¹² (See map on page 25 for postwar Allied Occupation Zones in Berlin.)

American ingenuity, allied cooperation, the courage and resourcefulness of the people of West Berlin, and the determination of the people who mounted the incredible Berlin Airlift blunted and ultimately defeated this audacious Soviet move. During 1948-49, the United States and its Allies demonstrated conclusively their resolve not to be pushed from Berlin, and Berliners showed by courage and sacrifice their determination to remain free. By the time the Soviets solved their "technical difficulties" in May 1949 and lifted the blockade, the Airlift was supplying more than was needed to sustain West Berlin's basic requirements. Western morale received a badly needed boost.

As the Berlin drama unfolded, steps leading to formation of a West German government continued apace. In September 1948, a Parliamentary Council met in Bonn to prepare a constitution for the new German state. Concurrently, western military governments drafted a new occupation statute under which occupation forces would operate after elections were held and a German government assumed responsibility for internal affairs. After long and often heated discussions among the delegates (and between them and occupation officials), a Basic Law



(Source: Atlas of World War II, New York: The Military Press—A Bison Book—1954)

Postwar Allied Occupation Zones in Berlin

was adopted on 8 May 1949. It was submitted to the allied military governments, who approved it on 12 May—by coincidence, the day the Berlin blockade ended. (See map of Germany on page 26.)

The Federal Republic's gestation period was short. All parties agreed that Berlin must remain the real capital of Germany if and when the German people were politically reunited. This agreement improved the attractiveness of the small Rhenish university town of Bonn, which was selected as West Germany's temporary capital. Delegates apparently feared that if either Frankfurt or Hamburg were named Germany's provisional capital, they might come to rival Berlin in size or importance. A general election was held on 14 August and, to the surprise of most observers, Konrad Adenauer's newly organized union of Christian Democrats (CDU) and Christian Socialists (CSU) won a plurality.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY



Adenauer had no interest in forming a "grand coalition" with the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which had been expected to win the election but lost narrowly to the upstart CDU/CSU coalition. Adenauer, the Christian Democrat leader, who had been Mayor of Cologne during the Weimar Republic, rejected such an arrangement. His reasons were largely economic, for the SPD leadership favored government control of German industry, whereas the CDU/CSU and its economic spokesman, Ludwig Erhard, believed a free market economy held greater promise. Adenauer therefore looked to the right for coalition partners and found them in the Free Democrats (FDP) and the German party, which held the balance of power. Theodor Heuss, the FDP leader, was given the largely ceremonial post of President of the Republic; Adenauer was to be Chancellor.

On 15 September 1949, Konrad Adenauer was confirmed by a single vote in the *Bundestag** as the Federal Republic's first Chancellor. This slim margin was to prove deceptive. Adenauer retained the chancellorship for 14 years, skillfully managing western powers and political allies and opponents, and tenaciously pursuing

*The *Bundestag* is the lower and principal chamber of the FRG's Parliament. Its members are elected to four-year terms and normally include 496 deputies, plus 22 representatives from Berlin, who vote only in procedural matters. The chancellor (prime minister) heads the executive branch of the federal government. The cabinet, consisting of the chancellor and the federal ministers, usually is referred to as the government. The duties of the president (chief of state) are largely ceremonial. The real power is exercised by the chancellor, who is elected by and responsible to the *Bundestag*. The chancellor cannot be removed from office during his four-year term unless the *Bundestag* has agreed to a successor. The legislature has powers of exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction (with the *Länder*) in fields specifically enumerated by the Basic Law (democratic constitution). The *Bundestag* bears the major responsibility of government. The role of the *Bundesrat* is limited, except in matters concerning *Land* interests, in which it can exercise substantial veto power. The population of West Germany in the 1983 census was 61,543,000, including some 4,600,000 non-Germans.

what he saw to be Germany's basic interests. During the period, Germany recovered and prospered economically, regained political and social respectability, and achieved a position of major importance in the Atlantic Alliance and in the European Community.

Adenauer's Foreign Policy Goals Konrad Adenauer was a Rhinlander. Although the Cologne of his birth had been part of Prussia since 1815, he was strongly anti-Prussian and looked westward for Germany's salvation. Adenauer saw in European integration a possible way to dilute the nationalistic fervor that, he believed, lay at the root of Europe's geographic division and political squabbles.

Despite his attraction to the European concept, however, Adenauer remained an unshakable German patriot. He sought to promote German interests at every turn, and worked indefatigably to restore German respectability and sense of national worth. The chancellor sought to reconstruct and rehabilitate Germany—politically, economically, and psychologically—and to cleanse the German soul. But Adenauer also viewed German rehabilitation as an engine for achieving a democratic, integrated Europe that eventually could take its rightful place in the world order.

Some commentators have seen Adenauer as the quintessential politician of the possible, a man who imaginatively exploited the international security situation and internal developments in West Germany to promote economic recovery, strengthen democracy in the Federal Republic, secure national sovereignty and respectability, and further both European integration and German participation in the institutions being formed.

Others have been less charitable, viewing "der Alte" as narrow, conservative, and intellectually lightweight—

"The Great Simplifier." For example, Rudolph Augstein, publisher of Hamburg's *Der Spiegel*, West Germany's largest-circulation daily newspaper, claims that Adenauer was taken in by the French. The French, he wrote, ingeniously found a way

to promote reconciliation between Germany and France while at the same time taming the Federal Republic.¹³

Augstein regarded France's motives for promoting a united Europe as essentially negative, directed against Germany and its reunification.¹⁴

Other contemporary observers agreed with him, at least on reunification. C.L. Sulzburger of *The New York Times* reported that French diplomats saw no possibility that Moscow would permit East Germany to reunite with a Federal Republic that was anchored firmly in NATO and the European community.¹⁵

While Adenauer insisted that the reunification of Germany merely had been postponed, most observers felt that, by joining West Germany to the West, the choice had been made.¹⁶

Adenauer's critics castigated the Chancellor for abandoning reunification in favor of the Western Alliance. One suspects that the old man would have conceded privately that, were he forced to choose one or the other, he would have opted for the latter entity, the Western Alliance. Adenauer distrusted the irrationality of nationalism, considering it a dangerous throwback to the past.

He almost certainly would have rejected the charge that he was duped by France, however. The weakness of the Chancellor's position vis-a-vis France (which opposed his strongest argument—early rearmament) left him few options. Nevertheless, if Germany were "tamed" by the terms of Franco-German reconciliation, Adenauer appears to have made virtue out of necessity, using French

obstinacy to tame those Germans he wished to domesticate, to cleanse the German soul of the stains of Prussian militarism.

The New Germany and Western Security

Moscow's agenda for securing her western borders by establishing a belt of socialist buffer states was completed by the founding, in March 1949, of a German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany), where a provisional single-party government took office in October of that year.

This newly erected East European satellite belt formed the backdrop for a series of major western security debates that began late in 1949 and culminated more than half a decade later with admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO. During these years, the new Allies focused on two major topics:

- 1) Raising and organizing the military forces needed to meet the eastern threat against which the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were directed.

- 2) Accommodating in western security arrangements the German Federal Republic that had been organized in the Western Occupation Zones and pointed toward political and security alignment with the West.

The 1948-49 politico-military confrontation over Berlin had highlighted the vulnerability of the western position in the former German capital, as well as the meagerness of the conventional military options available to western leaders in the face of more numerous, better-equipped Soviet forces. Still, relative complacency continued to dominate Western Councils until mid-1950, when the North Korean attack across the 38th parallel

into South Korea and the sharp reverses suffered by the US-led United Nations defense force shocked the Atlantic nations into action.

NATO Preparedness and Germany The Korean attack, wrote John J. McCloy, former US High Commissioner in Germany, "brought Europe to its feet."¹⁷ Even the most complacent Europeans were forced to face the parallels between problems of a divided Korea and problems of a divided Germany. This new thinking represented a major change, for few western leaders previously had expressed any concern that Western Europe was gravely threatened militarily. Doubtless, a conventional force imbalance existed, but the risk of war seemed slight as long as US nuclear forces weighed in the balance. Although the August 1949 Soviet atomic test had signalled the end of US nuclear monopoly, the US weapons arsenal was expected to continue supreme for the foreseeable future, deterring any Soviet armed thrust westward.

What did concern western leaders most was the creep of non-democratic socialism westward and the danger that the Czech takeover might not be the last. These concerns had prompted the policy shift permitting German economic recovery, the Marshall Plan, and formation of the European and Atlantic security alliances. Until mid-1950, however, these alliances were essentially political in character, designed more to discourage any expectations Moscow might entertain of intimidating individual West European nations than to defend against an unlikely Soviet military assault.

After the Korean attack, such assumptions appeared questionable. The confident belief that US nuclear weapons would deter any attack was replaced by apprehension that Korea could be repeated in Germany.



US Air Force National Archives

Berliners at Tempelhof Air Base in Berlin watch airlifts by C-47s and C-54s during "Operation Vittles" during the Berlin Airlift in 1948. An Air Force first lieutenant from Stockton, Calif., initiated his own "Operation Little Vittles," in which he dropped candy tied to handkerchief parachutes.

Clearly, the NATO partners had to meet the growing Soviet threat to Western Europe by beefing up their weak and ill-equipped forces. Since US troops and equipment were being moved to Korea and probably would not be available to reinforce Europe in case of Soviet attack, the Allies needed another source of manpower to supplement European units. For many observers, including the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officials in the US Government, the answer seemed clear: West Germany.

Some Allies shared the US view that Germany was the logical source of new defense units for the West. Britain, Belgium, and Holland endorsed this concept. Winston Churchill, whose finest hour was spent organizing western defenses against Nazi Germany's aggression,

told the European Council that the West needed German rearmament. Few Frenchmen could be found among these enthusiasts, however, for what Washington desired, Paris abhorred. Stanley Sloan, a US expert on Atlantic affairs, notes that Franco-American disagreement over Germany's future underlay virtually all allied security debates between 1949 and 1955. During this period, France was preoccupied with preventing German rearmament and with placing political constraints on Germany's sovereignty, while the United States was fixed on its own priority of using Germany to balance the power of the Soviet Union in Central Europe.¹⁸

German industrial recovery, rearmament, and membership in NATO were elements of the US approach. All these elements were odious to the French, who searched urgently for alternatives. Paris focused its energies on finding ways to incorporate a revived Germany into supranational entities, in which French influence could dominate.

Once Washington decided that German rearmament was required for western defense, it moved to break France's resistance to German rearmament and NATO membership in ways designed to minimize strains on the fragile Alliance. A key element in this approach involved stationing of additional US combat troops in Europe, a step long sought by the French. On 9 September 1950, President Truman offered to send a substantial number of US combat troops to Europe to man Europe's forward defense lines. Implicit in the offer was the need for reciprocal European action that would secure German participation in western security arrangements. Washington called on the Allies to take similar actions to strengthen their forces, and pressed the French government for its agreement to German rearmament, to make the proposed US troop deployments acceptable to the Congress.

The North Atlantic Council met twice in September 1950 to discuss implications of the Korean attack for Europe. The Council adopted a "forward strategy" for defense of Europe as far to the east as possible, and agreed to consider the political and military participation of the German Federal Republic in NATO. Still, the French resisted.

Paris tried to seize the initiative, which rapidly was passing to proponents of German rearmament. The French suggested creation of a European Defense Community (EDC), with a European army in which German troops could take part. This proposal, commonly called the Pleven Plan after the French Premier who proposed it, was designed to limit German forces to small units that would be fully integrated in a European force and under the command of other (presumably French) officers. Approved in principle by the National Assembly on 24 October 1950, the Pleven Plan was the basis for consideration of German rearmament until its ultimate rejection by French legislators in August 1954.

German Attitudes While NATO leaders agreed that German military participation was essential, and the United States and France sparred over terms of German rearmament, the Bonn government played a cautious and calculating game. Konrad Adenauer, shrewd and resourceful, was keenly aware that public opinion in the Federal Republic had been shaken by the events of 1933-45 and would be biased strongly against rearmament. Nevertheless, Adenauer knew the value of German manpower and military skill to the Western Alliance. He also was aware that western military leaders wanted Germany in NATO and needed German troops for NATO's defense. Field Marshal Montgomery, Chairman of the WEU's Commanders-in-Chief Committee,

had stated as early as 1943 that support of the German population, use of the Federal Republic's terrain, and availability of German troops were vital for European defense.¹⁹

The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and their allies in the American Congress also believed that German armed forces were needed to balance Soviet might in Europe. The German Chancellor realized that the prospect of rearmament could be a powerful weapon for obtaining goals he had set for himself and the new Germany. In this respect, Adenauer clearly used NATO's military needs to Germany's advantage.

The more insistently the United States and its military allies called for German rearmament, the higher Bonn's price became.

When the matter finally was resolved in 1955, with the Federal Republic's membership in NATO and its commitment to raise a 12-division, 500,000-man *Bundeswehr* (Federal Army), German statesmen could compliment themselves. They had exploited rearmament and related issues so successfully that virtually all restraints on German sovereignty had been removed and the Federal Republic was accepted as a full and worthy member of NATO, a coalescing Europe, and the wider international community.

This accomplishment was a triumph for Adenauer, who realized in it his principal foreign policy aims.

Problems of German Rearmament

By 1949, officials in the Pentagon had begun to press for a German military role in western defense. Initially, European politicians were cool, sometimes even hostile, to the idea of German rearmament. As the international



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West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (center, seated) signs the Nine-Power Agreement on German Sovereignty and Rearmament at historic Lancaster House in London on 3 October 1954. With him here, at left, is British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and French Premier Pierre Mendes-France. West Germany came into NATO as its 15th member through this final act, drawn up by the Nine-Nation Foreign Ministers Conference.

situation evolved and the Cold War grew more intense, however, many military planners acknowledged the desirability of rearming Germany, and most recognized its inevitability in the wake of the Korean attack. Similarly, most western politicians concluded by mid-1950 that they no longer could ignore the need for German armed forces to help defend NATO on the Federal Republic's eastern border, where the Alliance appeared most likely to be challenged. Accordingly, western statesmen set about devising ways to secure tightly controlled and carefully limited German rearmament.

Adenauer was not among the early supporters of German rearmament; his experiences, and those of the

German people in the Second World War, were still painfully fresh. Rearmament also promised to be politically divisive. Knowing that the overwhelming majority of Germans opposed rearmament, the Chancellor was reluctant to support so unpopular an issue.²⁰

Lothar Ruehl, a German journalist who was to become State Secretary for Defense in the government of Helmut Kohl (October 1982), recorded Adenauer's rage at the 1949 London Conference, when the Chancellor saw clearly that the Federal Republic of Germany eventually would be compelled to raise an army and take part in western defense.²¹

This outburst notwithstanding, however, the Chancellor shrewdly recognized that the need for German units gave him important leverage in dealing with the Allies. If German troops were a requirement for western defense, Adenauer was determined to extract as high a price as possible for raising them. He soon began to play the high-stakes rearmament game in earnest. In a wide-ranging December 1949 interview with a reporter from *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, the Chancellor reiterated his opposition in principle to German rearmament. He said that if no way could be found to avoid rearmament, he favored establishing a German military contingent within a European army.²²

Adenauer's use of such interviews to float "trial balloons" and circumvent allied control of the Federal Republic's foreign relations gave the Chancellor's statements particular interest. A clarifying statement from Bonn drew further attention to the topic and set European capitals abuzz. Field Marshal William J. Slim, Chief of Britain's Imperial General Staff, reacted with characteristic candor. The General said that he considered Germany the most valuable and dangerous nation in Continental Europe. While he regarded Germany's rearmament as a matter for politicians and statesmen, if they

agreed to go ahead, Slim felt certain the Federal Republic could effectively rearm.²³

Accidentally or intentionally, Adenauer had lighted the fire beneath the pot of German rearmament. The crafty Chancellor was to stir that pot with great effect during the ensuing five years. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense, for many months proponents of German rearmament, needed little persuasion.²⁴

The State Department and the White House took much longer in coming to that view. Indeed, Secretary Acheson told the Congress in June 1950 that US policy still called for German demilitarization. "There is no discussion of doing anything else," he said. "That is our policy and we have not . . . revalued it."²⁵

The Korean War forced the United States to adopt a new course of action. Active, in-place military forces were needed in Europe to give credibility to NATO's bold concept of mutual security, with the common undertaking to defend allied territory. As the new Allies met during the summer of 1950 to consider possible military responses to the communist threat in Europe, Washington lost hope that the Europeans could balance the US financial and strategic contribution by providing the bulk of ground and tactical air forces needed to defend Europe.

The European Allies simply did not have the money or manpower to do the job. Moreover, many American policymakers—reportedly including President Truman himself—remembered France's military collapse in 1940 and questioned French reliability under fire.²⁶

Others considered the Germans more anticommunist than the French, and saw the Federal Republic's participation in western defense as necessary and potentially decisive. General Lucius Clay, in his 1950 Godkin lectures at Harvard University, proposed that the Allies



National Archives

Field Marshal Sir William Slim (left), senior NATO Military Advisor, and Chief of the British Imperial General Staff, confers with General George C. Marshall, US Secretary of Defense, during a meeting of Defense Ministers of the 12 member nations of NATO in November 1950.

bind Germany into the western defense system, and let the Federal Republic contribute appropriately to the common defense.²⁷

Harry Truman was of a like mind. In his pithy memoirs, the President recalled the rationale for his decision to press for German rearmament. The Germans, he wrote, inhabited

the very core of Europe Without Germany, the defense of Europe was a rearguard action on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. With Germany, there could be a defense in depth, powerful enough to offer effective resistance to aggression from the East.

The logic behind this situation is very plain. Any map will show it, and a little arithmetic will prove what the addition of German manpower means to the strength of the joint defense of Europe.²⁸

In early September 1950, the United States proposed a comprehensive plan for a NATO build-up that included increased US force levels in Europe, a combined defense force under a Supreme Commander, and a German military contingent as an integral part of this combined force. In making this offer, Secretary Acheson emphasized that American willingness to retain and reinforce US military units in Europe was contingent on European agreement that Germany be rearmed as a matter of urgency.

Clear as the logic of German rearmament may have appeared in Washington, this step still was not fully accepted by many of the Allies. The conferees equivocated, welcoming what Acheson offered but resisting what he demanded in return. To many Europeans, memories of German aggression and atrocities were still too fresh and vivid for logic to replace emotions. The French Defense Minister, Jules Moch, clearly was in the latter group: His son had been captured while working with the French Resistance and was executed by the Nazis. Moch's distaste for German rearmament was shared by a number of high-ranking French officials, whose emotional antagonism toward Germany was to prove a major hurdle.

But other, more basic reasons existed for France's opposition to the resurrection and rehabilitation of Germany, signified by the proposed rearmament and induction into NATO of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lucius Clay suspected that French intransigence reflected less an alleged concern over future German aggression than "an acute fear of the economic and political competition promised by a recovered (Germany)."²⁹

France's West European primacy was in peril, and Paris worked feverishly to find a way to subsume German rearmament in some European entity where it could be controlled by France.

In October 1950, the French unveiled a counterproposal for German participation in NATO defense, the so-called Pleven Plan. A clever concept designed to rearm the Germans without rearming Germany, the plan included an extra-national Special European Force under a European Minister of Defense, with its own command and staff structure, but controlled by the Supreme Allied Commander. All European Allies would contribute units at the battalion level. Germany would participate, but would not be allowed to organize a General Staff nor have a Defense Ministry or armaments production industries. If implemented, the arrangement would have relegated the Federal Republic to second class status. Secretary Acheson considered Pleven's proposal "hopeless."³⁰

For many months, the plan effectively blocked US efforts to obtain German cooperation, on the basis of equality among West European nations. The reaction of many Germans to the Pleven Plan was predictably negative. Kurt Schumacher, the Social Democratic leader, denounced the proposal, rejecting as well any consideration of German rearmament. German public opinion was firmly opposed to the concept: A 1950 news poll found more than 67 percent of all respondents opposed to rearming or to military service.³¹

Asked why they felt so strongly, the people polled cited the likelihood that Germany would be the battlefield in an East-West clash and the negative implications that rearmament carried for eventual reunification. "The French aversion to arming the Germans," observed *The New York Times*, "appears to be matched only by the German aversion to being rearmed."³²

Konrad Adenauer, however, was less troubled by the European Defense concept, although he rejected those aspects that implied a less than equal role for the Federal Republic. The French plan appealed to the Chancellor's Europeanism, and he saw it as a way to regain national sovereignty, defend the inner-German border, and further broaden European integration.³³

Adenauer also feared that Soviet Marshall Josef Stalin might contemplate using a script in Germany similar to that employed in Korea—sending East Zone “police” across the zonal border to “liberate” West German territory. Were this to occur, the Soviets would not appear to be the aggressor and the United States might be reluctant to use nuclear weapons against the USSR in retaliation.³⁴

As something less than a nuclear response would be needed, the Chancellor had asked the High Commission to let him raise a 150,000-man defense force to meet this contingency. Plevén's subsequent proposal for a substantial European Defense Force that included German units struck Adenauer as even more desirable.

During the fall of 1950, the North Atlantic Council moved rapidly toward making NATO a true military alliance by adding Germany's weight to the military balance. During the summer, the Council of Europe had voted overwhelmingly to create an integrated European Force in which the Federal Republic was expected to take part. Washington left no doubt that it considered German rearmament the key to an effective allied defense of Europe; with the unveiling of the Plevén Plan, the French seemed to have accepted the concept of German military participation in European defense.

Konrad Adenauer—practitioner of what Martin Hillenbrand, former US Ambassador in Bonn, has termed “Chancellor Democracy”³⁵—thought and spoke for the government of the Federal Republic of Germany. Convinced that German security could not be assured

without some sort of German participation in western defense arrangements, the popularly elected patriarch began to play a larger role. Adenauer told the Allies that he would reject out of hand any formulation that failed to accord the Federal Republic full equality with its European neighbors, but he agreed to the French concept as a basis for negotiation.

When this response became known in Bonn, it aroused a public furor. The Social Democrats denounced Adenauer in the *Bundestag*. Other parliamentarians, including Interior Minister Gustav Heinemann, had deep misgivings. Although Heinemann ultimately resigned from the Cabinet and found a seat with the opposition in the *Bundestag*, Adenauer succeeded in persuading most of his colleagues and a majority of the West German people that the threat from the East demanded action and that German security could most effectively be assured through cooperative military arrangements with the Federal Republic's West European neighbors and their American Allies.

Negotiation of the EDC was arduous and protracted, complicated by governmental instability in Paris and an increasing French preoccupation with colonial unrest. Although the undertaking finally aborted, when the French Assembly failed to endorse it, the process itself was of great importance. By 1954, when the EDC died, rearmament and German participation in western defense had been accepted by most West Germans. NATO political leaders and military planners began to look for a German military contribution to the allied defense force (NATO force goals adopted at Lisbon in 1952 included 12 German Army divisions). The Bonn government erected a skeletal defense establishment, under the direction of Theodor Blank, to oversee creation of a new, civilian-controlled citizen army.

So complete was the shift in attitudes in the Federal Republic and in neighboring West European nations that, after the collapse of the EDC, UK officials (principally British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden) were able to preserve the Allies' hard-won gains. An imaginative substitute arrangement was put forward, specifying the following elements:

- Retention of British forces in Germany, as long as might be necessary.
- Enlargement of the WEU, to include Italy and the Federal Republic. (The FRG agreed not to produce atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, and certain types of armaments, not to establish a General Staff for its armed forces, and to forgo a military role independent of the Alliance. See appendix A.)
- Full sovereignty for the Federal Republic.
- West German membership in NATO.

By providing security and equality for the Germans, limiting German rearmament in specific areas, giving France reassurance of continued British troop presence, and assuring NATO and US military planners of the availability of German military units, the British proposal met the basic needs of all key parties.³⁶

Late in 1954, the Eden package was discussed in Paris by representatives of principal Western Allies. Agreement was reached with surprising ease, and a comprehensive accord was signed on 23 October 1954.

The Federal Republic of Germany became a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on 5 May 1955.

Germany and its western neighbors had come far in the first postwar decade. Europe had rebounded from the exhaustion and devastation of 1945 and, assisted by Marshall Plan aid, was well on the road to economic and political recovery. Germany's industrial heartland had been grafted to the West, and the latent threat of a German



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The automobile of British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden turns into the columned entrance of the Allied Control Authority Building on 25 January 1954 for the first session of the Four-Power Meeting of foreign ministers.

nationalistic renaissance was blunted by admission of the Federal Republic into the Atlantic Alliance. In this process, the new German Chancellor had played the rearmament card with great skill, trading Germany's potential military contribution to western defenses for a renewal of national sovereignty and equality with the Federal Republic's Atlantic Allies.

Important questions remained unanswered:

Could Germany rearm effectively and accommodate easily to a subordinate role within the Atlantic bloc?

Would the Western Allies be able to handle the challenges they faced?

Was the Alliance flexible enough to accommodate military and political changes that the future might bring?

And would the Atlantic Alliance continue to meet the security needs of Germany and its new Allies over the longer term?

Although NATO's record in the past third of a century is by no means unambiguous, it suggests strongly that a confident and positive response could be given to most of these questions.



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West Germany Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (center) casts his vote as the lower house of the West German Parliament approves the Paris Treaty on 27 February 1955. The treaty included rearmament of West Germany for the Atlantic Alliance against communism. With the Chancellor here are Heinrich van Brentano (with glasses), leader of the Christian Democratic Party in Parliament, and Gerhard Schroeder, Minister of the Interior.

Germany in NATO

WITH ITS 1955 ADMISSION TO NATO, the phoenix-like rebirth of West Germany after 1945 appeared complete. In the intervening decade, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)—

Regained virtually full sovereignty.

Rebuilt its industrial machine—with a major financial boost from the United States and an influx of labor from the East.

Regained the right (and undertook a commitment) to raise a national army that would form the backbone of Western Europe's conventional defense force.

And assumed a leading role in planning what many hoped would become a United Europe that could take its place among the Superpowers.

Each of these achievements, however, was incomplete.

Efforts to realize them fully would prove to arouse controversy and, at least in the short term, fall short of success. The quest also would expose inconsistencies between the Federal Republic's goals and its priorities that would complicate policymaking and security relations with Germany's NATO allies in later years.

Taken together, the 1952 Bonn and 1954 Paris Agreements restored full sovereignty to the FRG. Not all Germans applauded, however, and critics charged that this achievement was badly tarnished by concessions made to



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Welcoming a new unit of the recently formed West German army, the *Bundeswehr*, two girls distribute flowers to officers as troops march into the town of Niederstein on 13 September 1956.

secure it. Much of the criticism came from West Germany's Social Democrats (SPD), whose opposition to the Adenauer government and its policies had embittered *Bundestag* debates over German membership in the European Defense Community.

This opposition was to flare again over organization and manning of the *Bundeswehr*.*

*The Federal armed forces, including Germany's army, smaller air and naval forces, and other military or quasi-military services, such as the territorial army, an independent border patrol, and a coast guard. Approximately three-quarters of the officer corps of the *Bundeswehr*, but fewer than one-third of its noncommissioned officers, are career soldiers.

The New German Ally

The SPD's objection was not really to rearmament *per se*. Rather, the Socialists opposed the end for which Adenauer had exploited the rearmament issue: Recovery of West German sovereignty in firm political and military alignment with Western Europe and the United States. The prospect of an integrated Europe led by France and the FRG was too catholic and too conservative for the anti-clerical, Protestant-Humanist-oriented Social Democrats.

Equally important, alliance with the West virtually extinguished any remaining chance for early reunification of the two Germanies. Since 1949, the SPD had become the keeper of the flame of reunification, partly from conviction, partly to preclude extremist parties from exploiting the issue. Practical considerations also may have applied: Social Democracy historically found much of its strength in areas now under East German control. Without reunification, cynics contended, the prospects for the SPD electoral majority that so far had eluded the party in the West were not bright.

For Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his Christian Democratic and Free Democratic colleagues, German reunification should not have been at issue. All parties listed unity as a goal. Indeed, the Adenauer government included unity among its major foreign policy aims.¹

As time elapsed, however, the stated government strategy, alliance with the West in order to seek unity from a position of strength, began to wear thin. After the Soviet nuclear test in 1949 showed that the USSR, too, could harness the atom, skeptics began to question the soundness of the Chancellor's reunification policy. As the USSR acquired nuclear weapons and began to develop increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, the bankruptcy of basing German policy on an assumption of heightened western military strength became increasingly clear. Yet

Adenauer neither altered his approach nor acknowledged the failure of his reunification policy.

According to most commentators and historians, Adenauer sacrificed whatever chances of reunification that may have existed by deciding to seek redemption and national recovery through association with the West. The Federal Republic may have gained "respectability and purpose" through NATO, but, to most observers, this decision foreclosed any hopes for early reunification.²

The New York Times and other western journals commented in the 1950s that Adenauer's promotion of the European Economic Community (EEC) implied the "more or less permanent disunity of Germany."³ If, in the test of time, these judgments prove correct, those observers who pay more than lip service to the goal of reunification will be justified in considering the price of sovereignty and membership in western military and economic organizations high indeed.

Economic Recovery West Germany's rapid economic revival, the *Wirtschaftswunder* presided over by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, was less controversial and, until recently, a continuing success story. In the six months following Erhard's West Zone currency reform in 1948, industrial production rose by 50 percent; in 1949, production in the newly formed Federal Republic increased another 25 percent. By 1954, the FRG's gross national product (GNP) had increased another 200 percent, and German living standards had eclipsed standards reached in 1938. Within a decade, West Germany was to become the world's third largest industrial power and second leading exporter.⁴

Some critics have tried to deflate this major Adenauer/Erhard accomplishment, contending that Germany was allowed unfair advantage over its competitors through

disproportionate Marshall Plan aid, artificially low security expenditures, and a fortuitous "brain gain" from the East.


In fact, German aid under the Marshall Plan was substantially lower than that given France and Britain, and occupation costs paid by the Germans were only slightly less than defense expenditures of France and the United Kingdom during the pre-NATO years.

Doubtless, a number of factors—several of them coincidental and unlikely to last—combined to help produce the German miracle:

- World product demand was high.
- Unionization in Germany was less extensive than in competitor nations, and labor costs were relatively low.
- High unemployment and the influx of relatively well-trained workers from the East did provide a ready pool of skilled labor.
- Government tax policies encouraged investment, while banking policies promoted and sustained it.

All these factors were important. The indispensable ingredient for the dynamic German export economy of the 1950s and 1960s, however, was the hard work and dedication of the West German labor force. Pride, determination, ambition, patriotism, and industry combined to make the German worker an object of wonderment to foreign observers. Professor Arthur F. Burns—distinguished US economist, Government official, and Ambassador (1981–85) to the Federal Republic—recalls a visit to Frankfurt early in the 1950s, during which he was able to sleep only fitfully due to the constant noise of a population working round-the-clock to rebuild and remake Germany.⁵

The Erhard boom continued with only minor slow-downs for nearly two decades. Since the mid-1960s, Germany's economic performance has tended to reflect international business cycles, although anti-inflationary government policies have tended to cushion declines and, concurrently, to restrain rebounds. This return to a more



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Foreign Ministers of six participating nations take part in the signing of the Schumann Plan Treaty on 18 April 1951. From left here are Paul van Zeiland of Belgium, Joseph Bech of Luxembourg, Joseph Keurice of Belgium, Count Carlo Sforza of Italy, Robert Schumann of France, who proposed the plan, Konrad Adenauer of West Germany, and Dirk Strikker and Jan va de Bruik of the Netherlands.

normal state of economic affairs has limited the resources available for government programs, where heretofore national security spending was relatively unrestrained—a situation that has had major implications for security policies and forces options.

European Integration Konrad Adenauer described himself as an “Atlanticist.” He defined German security in unequivocal Atlantic terms that still remain dogma for the Federal Republic. But the old Chancellor also was a convinced “Europeanist.” His embrace of the European Iron and Steel Community, the so-called Schumann Plan, his espousal of a West European Army under the European Defense Community (EDC), and his support for European

economic and political integration were not merely devices employed to regain German sovereignty and to promote domestic economic recovery.

Adenauer saw European integration as an end in itself, one in which German self-respect and purpose could be regained without the concomitant rebirth of extreme German nationalism.

Although the German Chancellor and his fellow Europeanists laid a firm foundation for closer collaboration in the future, the wave of Europeanism was undercut by a backwash of French chauvinism and British insularity that frustrated and embittered proponents who thought Germany's sacrifices—unity, nationalism, and independence of action—had been unnecessary and ill-advised. To be sure, a reasonable, perhaps superior, substitute for the EDC had been found with German participation in NATO; Britain and others eventually would join an increasingly less cohesive and purposeful EEC.

But the opportunity to build a United Europe that could stand as a political and economic equal to the Soviet and American superpowers appeared to have passed. Perhaps the ideas of the great European integrationists—Konrad Adenauer, Jean Monnet, and Paul-Henri Spaak*—

*Jean Monnet, businessman and financier, became Minister of Commerce in the first French Provisional Government in September 1944 and was in charge of France's plan for modernization and equipment. Monnet had served as deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations in 1919-23, and was chairman of the Anglo-French Coordinating Committee in London in September 1939. Paul-Henri Spaak served almost continuously as Belgian Foreign Minister from 1938 to 1949 and was Foreign Minister again in 1954-57 and 1961-66; he was Premier three times, 1938-39, 1946, and 1947-49, and was Vice Premier from 1961 to 1965. He and Belgian Premier Hubert Pierlot set up a Belgian government in exile in England during World War II. Spaak served as first President of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1946 and was NATO Secretary-General in 1957-61.

were ahead of their times; perhaps others will emerge to pick up the torch of Europeanism and carry it forward.

Regardless, the imprint of the European movement remains strong in the formulation of West German security policy. Europeanist factors are evoked regularly in discussions of possible German disengagement and reunification, of increased Western European security autonomy from the two superpowers, or of a strengthened, co-equal European pillar in NATO that might be fostered by West European political coordination and cooperative economic and arms procurement policies. In many such exchanges, one senses a general feeling that the present European situation is not immutable, and an expectation that western economic and security arrangements will evolve over the longer term, along lines that early European visionaries would have endorsed.

Rearmament For most Germans, rearmament and NATO membership virtually were a single issue, involving as they did a decision to cast the Federal Republic's security lot with the West and to forgo whatever slim chance may have existed for immediate reunification. For Adenauer and his fellow Europeanists, limited rearmament and membership in the Atlantic Alliance were fully consistent with the goal of regaining German sovereignty, self-respect, and purpose within a larger West European or Atlantic context.

Foreclosing the possibility of immediate reunification was a lesser concern to this group. Rearmament complicated relationships within the governing coalition, however, as many of the Free Democrats were less European minded and therefore more reluctant to endorse a course of action that many feared would postpone German unity indefinitely. Resistance to rearmament and membership in the Western Alliance also was strong among those

individuals who had held high rank in Hitler's military forces. Many of the old Generals had been reared in the East and were concerned that the steps Adenauer proposed would seal the division of the former Reich and preclude any possibility of recovering Germany's "Lost Territories."⁶

Social Democratic opposition, based principally on the SPD's deep concern over reunification, also reflected a conviction of many Socialists that, as long as Germany was being occupied, responsibility for its defense lay with its occupiers.

The underlying rationale for the SPD's undifferentiated rejection of the Adenauer government's foreign policy had limited electoral appeal. Although most Germans had little enthusiasm for rearming or for joining either the EDC or NATO, they saw that Adenauer's policies, particularly in the areas of economic reconstruction and restoration of national sovereignty, were making real progress. Many felt that rearmament was the price Germany would have to pay for their ultimate success.⁷

The Christian Democrat-led government also profited from intensification of the Cold War, which persuaded many skeptics that policies and programs of the intensely anticommunist Chancellor were most likely to assure West German security.

A lengthy gestation period also made the idea of German rearmament more palatable. Nearly six years elapsed between Adenauer's 1949 comments on a possible German military contribution to an integrated European force and the Federal Republic's 1955 admittance into NATO. Protracted discussions of a variety of schemes—such as the Plevan Plan, the Swafford Plan, and the EDC—and the lengthening shadow of the eastern military menace helped focus the debate and give it urgency.⁸

In the end, a growing majority of West Germans came to support rearmament, recognizing it as a prerequisite for

regaining full sovereignty and as dues to be paid for membership in the Western Alliance.

Numerous reservations remained close below the surface, however, complicating formation of the new German armed force—the *Bundeswehr*. Although a skeletal Defense Ministry had been functioning since 1952 and, as foreseen in the 1954 Treaty of Paris, plans had been drawn for a rapid build-up to 500,000 men and 12 divisions, complications immediately arose. Hard questions had to be answered about conscription, financial and manpower priorities between the *Bundeswehr* and Germany's booming economy, and controls and roles of the new citizen Army.

Not all the answers proved satisfactory, however, and some of these matters have concerned allied politicians and military planners in one guise or another throughout the Federal Republic's participation in NATO.

Planning the *Bundeswehr*

The logic of the Adenauer government's acceptance of rearmament is clear. The political leverage it gave the Chancellor in dealing with the High Commission and with allied leaders is unquestioned. Nevertheless, in virtually all walks of German life, the concept met strong resistance; this resistance lessened only gradually and still retains significant strength, particularly among German youth. In the early 1950s, memories of war and defeat were still too recent and too vivid for most Germans to contemplate reconstruction of Germany's armed forces. The German military was discredited by association with Nazism and its crippling defeat in 1945. Moreover, US and British efforts to demystify the army and stamp out militarism in the Western Occupation Zones had found a receptive audience and enjoyed unusual success.

Not surprisingly, therefore, Adenauer's endorsement of German rearmament triggered a ground swell of pacifist revulsion that swept rapidly through the Federal Republic. "*Ohne mich!*" ("Count me out!") was the catchword for many Germans, especially youth who feared that they could become "cannon fodder" in a hot East-West war.

The subsequent abrupt reversal in US policy toward Germany after the Korean attack caught allied occupation administrators by such surprise that antimilitaristic re-education was not halted until well after US leaders began calling for German rearmament. Further, the Western Allies made no concerted effort to "sell" rearmament to the German public, apparently expecting the Federal government and Germany's former military leaders to take the lead. The military elite, however, was divided on the proposition and reluctant to speak out.⁹

This reluctance possibly was a blessing in disguise, for many Germans distrusted the military as a group and would have discounted military elitist views. "The soldier," wrote one close observer, "has become a dubious social type."¹⁰ A German news survey conducted late in 1950 found 67 percent of those polled opposed to rearmament or to service in the military.¹¹

Although Adenauer considered the *Ohne mich!* movement a spent force by mid-1951,¹² it proved unusually hardy. The "antiarmers" were highly vocal during the 1953 *Bundestag* debates over approval of the EDC Agreement. Moreover, after France balked over the EDC in 1954 and the Paris and London Agreements were hastily substituted, German opposition to rearmament flared once again.

Gordon Craig, the eminent American historian, noted the impossibility of traveling through West Germany in 1954-55 without being impressed by the extent and breadth of antimilitaristic feeling across all political and

religious spectra. Craig ascribed such views partially to memories of the Second World War and Nazism, as well as past experience with the German military as a "state within the state" that had blocked social progress, stifled democracy, and encouraged reckless foreign policies and a series of disastrous wars.¹³

Adenauer's sensitivity to past abuses by Germany's autonomous military caste and its military machine led the Chancellor and those planning the new *Bundeswehr* to construct a democratic citizen army, firmly under civilian control and ultimately responsible to the *Bundestag*. Such precautions did much to dissipate public resistance to rearmament and to Germany's membership in NATO. Eventually, these precautions also helped restore a measure of public respect for those who chose to pursue military careers.

The leading proponent of military reforms was Count Wolf von Baudissin. Although the Count's military experience had been cut short by his capture early in World War II, his ideas appealed to those Germans who sought a clear break with the past. While traditionalists scoffed at Baudissin's concepts and at the *innere Fuehrung* (inner leadership) based on values of a democratic and constitutional order with which he sought to imbue citizen-soldiers, their dire predictions of failure do not appear to have been realized.

Dienststelle Blank Late in 1950, Adenauer appointed Theodor Blank, a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) *Bundestag* deputy and former official of the German Miner's Union, as Federal Commissioner of Security. A small group of former officers and civil servants was assembled to assist him in studying German security needs and in drawing up plans for a new German military establishment. Two former generals, Adolf Heusinger and Hans

Speidel, headed the military policy group in *Dienststelle Blank*, the Federal Security Office that was to form the nucleus for the new German Defense Ministry. These two men played major roles in organizing the *Bundeswehr* and, after Germany joined the Atlantic Alliance in 1955, became the first German officers to hold major NATO commands.

After negotiation of the European Defense Treaty in 1952, key members of the Blank office moved to Paris, where they worked with US and allied officers to plan the integrated European force envisioned in that arrangement.¹⁴ The German contingent maintained a low profile, exhibiting none of the hauteur that often characterized German military delegations before 1945.¹⁵

French Reject EDC When the EDC was rejected by the French National Assembly in August 1954, the German contingent returned to Bonn, where it began developing plans for a national German military force.

Much of the early work of Blank and his colleagues was more broadly philosophical than military. The Blank group sought to create a wholly new type of German military organization, fully responsive to political control, reflecting the democratic principles of its citizen-members, and shorn of the dehumanizing aspects of earlier models. This new organization was to be manned principally by conscripted citizen-soldiers, supplemented by longer-serving volunteers. Equally important, reform helped make military service acceptable to most Germans and restored the military profession to respectability. Most important, military personnel would retain their civil rights, be encouraged to think for themselves, be rewarded for personal initiative, and be educated broadly—not only in technical specialties but in political matters that would help officers and enlisted men alike develop a sense of duty and responsibility.

Manning the *Bundeswehr*

Adenauer's exploitation of rearmament had won the Federal Republic virtually complete sovereignty, a booming economy, and renewed self-respect. But with ratification of the October 1954 Paris Agreements and membership in NATO came commitments to raise and deploy forces. The schedule developed by Germany and accepted by NATO military planners was ambitious—five army divisions were to be organized, trained, and assigned to NATO by 1957, with a total force level of 12 divisions and 500,000 men to be achieved by 1961.¹⁶

That schedule soon began to slip badly.

The Paris Agreement authorized the Federal Republic to maintain armed forces of no more than 500,000 officers and men, including conscripts and volunteers. Plans of the Blank Office, which was expanded into the Federal Defense Ministry in June 1955, called for allocation of 80 percent of *Bundeswehr* personnel to the new army, with some 150,000 officers and men manning 12 armored, mechanized, and motorized divisions. Administrative and training tasks would occupy the other 230,000 army personnel.

A *Luftwaffe* (air force) of 85,000 officers and men and a navy of 20,000 officers and men also were to be organized and equipped.

As mentioned earlier, the *Bundeswehr* was expected to be a hybrid force of volunteers and conscripts. In view of Germany's past experience with military excesses, the *Bundestag* carefully scrutinized those former officers of field grade or above (major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and general officer) who volunteered for service, as well as the conscription legislation proposed by the government to ensure that antidemocratic elements were excluded. The *Bundestag's* instrument for ensuring that officers of the new *Bundeswehr* had "proper character and a democratic

outlook" was a personnel selection board established on 23 July 1955. The board's 38 members were selected from a list of nominees "respected in public life."¹⁷

During creation of the *Bundeswehr*, the personnel board rejected more than 100 appointments at the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. Four former colonels who had served in the Blank Office before 1955 were among those excluded.¹⁸

Although the German flag was raised at NATO Headquarters in Paris on 5 May 1955, six months elapsed before the first German soldiers put on their uniforms. Volunteers came forward in smaller numbers and less quickly than the government had hoped: The first 1,000 volunteers were called to duty on 2 January 1956, but by April only 5,200 officers and enlisted men had answered the call to Germany's colors. A number of factors, such as low public esteem for military service, competition from Germany's booming economy, public outcry over NATO's nuclear exercise *Carte Blanche*,¹⁹ and a continued relaxation of East-West tensions, contributed to the poor response. As a result, the 12-division goal proved more difficult to achieve than anticipated, and government officials turned increasingly to conscription to sustain Germany's military build-up. In fact, formation of Germany's 12th division, initially expected in 1957-58, was not completed until April 1965.²⁰

Conscription To the Adenauer government, compulsory military service became the key to the success of Germany's new citizen army. Not only would conscription swell the *Bundeswehr's* ranks; it also would provide a constant influx of young representatives of the general populace who, through transmission of their views and attitudes, would protect the military forces from isolation and prevent development of a new military caste. The



German Information Service

The Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO on 5 May 1955. The German flag is raised at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) here for the first time.

government also looked to the *Bundeswehr* as a school for citizenship, a vehicle for ending the "political unemployment" of German youth.²¹

National service, Adenauer believed, would inculcate patriotism and build an awareness in military conscripts of their responsibilities as members of a democratic society.

Early in 1956, the Adenauer government proposed legislation to authorize conscription for the *Bundeswehr*. All German males between 18 and 45 were to be liable for military service in peacetime. A conscript period of 18

months was proposed. Bona fide conscientious objectors were to be exempted from the draft, as were sons of men and women who died in the 1939–45 war. Debate on the national service proposal was heated, reflecting in part the strong antimilitaristic mood in the Federal Republic. But with the evolution of the Cold War and with changes in allied defense thinking, new factors had emerged. Unfortunately, the government appeared not to have taken several of these factors fully into account.²²

Throughout 1952–56, polls conducted in the FRG indicated that a majority of Germans conceptually accepted both the government's rationale for rearmament and the principle of a universal military service obligation.²³ At the same time, public approval of the proposed West German force vacillated widely, reflecting the temperature of the international situation, the evolution of NATO strategy, and varying degrees of satisfaction with the government's performance.

The thaw in the international political climate clearly was an important influence on German public opinion. Much had changed during the seven years between Adenauer's 1949 acceptance of German military participation in a European force and the 1955 German entry into NATO. The Cold War had peaked, Stalin was dead, and the de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe had made possible a marked reduction of East-West tension.

Abatement of the Cold War was accompanied by a shift in US views—adoption by the Eisenhower administration of the so-called defense "New Look," which reduced the goal for active US Army divisions from 24 to 14, signaled a greater reliance on nuclear rather than conventional weapons, and promised "more bang for the buck." In describing the new approach to the US Congress in January 1955, Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the US

Joint Chiefs of Staff, drew a distinction between the technological capabilities of the United States and those of its allies. Radford stated that the administration felt that NATO should have a military "division of labor," with Europe providing most of NATO's defensive ground forces.

For some reason, Adenauer and his advisers failed to assess properly the implications of these changes. Perhaps their attention was focused too narrowly on honoring Germany's commitment to raise a 12-division army by 1958 that could take its place with other units being formed by the Allies to deter attack and, if necessary, defend the Alliance along the Federal Republic's eastern border. Perhaps they underestimated the sophistication and tenacity of those who opposed the new German *Bundeswehr* and the government's conscription plan.

In any case, Adenauer and Defense Minister Blank doggedly pushed forward with their plan for an 18-month conscript term, seemingly unaware that the rationale for a rapid conventional force build-up had been undercut by circumstances, and apparently unconcerned that their key Allies, the United States and Great Britain, already had begun taking steps to reduce their own ground forces stationed on the Continent.

The government entered the conscription debates with a solid majority in the *Bundestag*, the Christian Democrats having won an absolute majority in the 1953 parliamentary elections—the only time a single party has been able to rule alone in the history of the Federal Republic. Moreover, the *Bundestag* had been virtually unanimous in its March 1956 approval of amendments to the Basic Law (democratic constitution) that provided the constitutional foundation for the *Bundeswehr*. Adenauer therefore could be pardoned for expecting the conscription bill to enjoy relatively smooth passage. Debate quickly became sharp, however, with significant opposition arising from all points of the political compass.

Volunteer Army The Social Democrats, who theretofore had opposed a professional force in favor of a "citizens' army," abruptly changed course and proposed raising only a small (200,000-man) volunteer army. This move put the SPD into uncomfortable alignment with the right-wing German Party, which also favored a traditional professional army. Fritz Erler, the SPD's defense spokesman, argued persuasively that the 500,000-man *Bundeswehr* the government wanted to build was excessive, given NATO's decision to rely on tactical nuclear weapons in the event deterrence failed and Warsaw Pact forces attacked. Erler pointed to implications of the *Carte Blanche* exercise and cited statements by General Alfred Gruenther, the Supreme Allied Commander, that a 500,000-man German force was needed chiefly to force the Soviet Union to concentrate its forces before an attack across the border, thus creating a better target for western nuclear weapons.²⁴

Despite the weight of Erler's objections, government spokesmen succeeded in deflecting most of the SPD's arguments, characterizing them as tactical moves designed to secure votes in the 1957 elections.

The Free Democrats, who recently had left the government coalition, were unwilling to support conscription legislation and abstained when the issue was put to a vote. More surprising was the reluctance of a number of Christian Democrats to support the bill fully. Prominent skeptics included Franz Joseph Strauss, the articulate and ambitious young leader of the Bavarian Christian Socialist (CSU) wing of Adenauer's party; Richard Jaeger, CSU deputy and Chairman of the *Bundestag* Defense Committee; and the tandem of Economics Minister Erhard and Finance Minister Fritz Schaeffer. Jaeger had played a key role in rearmament planning but questioned the haste with which the *Bundeswehr* was to be built, as well as the need for an 18-month conscript term.

Strauss, who had been brought into the cabinet in 1953 as Minister of Atomic Power, coveted the Defense Ministry and had been publicly critical of Blank's performance as Defense Minister since November 1955. He was to exploit the draft debate to scramble to power over the increasingly hapless Blank. Although Erhard and Schaeffer never were in open rebellion, their insistence that creation of the *Bundeswehr* not be permitted to affect Germany's economic expansion sharply limited funds available for the armed forces and forced a slower buildup that required fewer conscripts.

*Bundesrat** approval of conscription was voted narrowly (21 to 17) on 23 March 1956, with a large majority recommending a 12-month term of service. *Bundestag* consideration of the bill was more arduous. The CDU/CSU parliamentary caucus voted to support conscription, but did not recommend any term of service. Shorn of this specificity, but retaining all other proposed features, the bill was approved on 7 July 1956.

But the final act was still to come.

During the summer of 1956, Adenauer probed US and NATO thinking on defense and reassessed his domestic political needs in light of the conscription battle. Although Blank was an Adenauer loyalist, he had no independent political strength. Strauss and the CSU, however, were

*West Germany's upper parliamentary chamber, the *Bundesrat*, or Federal Council, is made up of 41 delegates of the Federal Republic of Germany's 10 *Länder* (States), and four representatives of the Berlin government, who have nonvoting status. The FRG's 10 *Länder* are Baden-Wuerttemberg, *Bayern* (Bavaria), the two ancient free Hanseatic cities of Bremen and Hamburg, *Hessen* (Hesse), *Niedersachsen* (Lower Saxony), *Nordrhein-Westfalen* (North Rhein-Westphalia), *Rheinland-Pfalz* (Palatinate), Saarland (Saar), and Schleswig-Holstein. West Berlin is under the quadrapartite administration of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and is only administratively a part of the FRG.


vital to the government. When, in September, the CSU publicly called for a "modern" army based on a 12-month draft and the *Bundestag* followed by slashing the defense appropriation request by the government, Adenauer capitulated. The Chancellor abandoned the beleaguered Blank, accepted a 12-month conscription term, and endorsed a *Bundeswehr* force reduction to 350,000 men. The *Bundestag* quickly approved the new program and on 16 October Franz Joseph Strauss replaced Blank as Defense Minister.

Organizing the *Bundeswehr*

Thus, the legal foundation for West German rearmament was complete. The Basic Law had been amended to enable a *Bundeswehr* to be created, legislation had been crafted to redefine German military concepts for the new citizen army, a federal Defense Ministry had been functioning since June 1955, and conscription had been adopted as a way to infuse a measure of civilian values and experience into the military forces and to inculcate a sense of civic duty and pride in German youth.

During legislative struggles over these measures, Adenauer and his advisers suffered a number of reverses that forced the Chancellor to slow the pace of rearmament and sacrifice the architect of the new *Bundeswehr*. Nevertheless, the government's basic program and the principles that undergirded it remained intact. The formation of Germany's citizen army now could proceed without further delay.

Personnel Build-up The first volunteers, 101 officers and senior noncommissioned officers, received their documents of appointment from President Heuss on 12



National Archives

In a brief ceremony at the Chancellory in Bonn in April 1955, Dr. James B. Conant, left, High Commissioner of Germany, deposited with the government of the German Federal Republic the instrument of ratification and approval of the Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic, and the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany. With Dr. Conant here are West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, center, and Dr. Berger, Ministerial Director of the Bonn Foreign Office.

November 1955. Included in this group were General Heusinger and General Speidel, as well as 48 field-grade officers, many of whom had been working in the Blank Office. A training company was organized on 1 January 1956; 1,500 cadre personnel for the *Bundeswehr's* first combat units were inducted in mid-January and stationed at Andernach, a small base on the Rhine River between Bonn and Koblenz. Volunteers continued to be added during 1956; their numbers were augmented by the transfer to the *Bundeswehr* of more than 9,000 men who had been serving in the *Bundesgrenzschutz* (border guard).²⁵

The first group of draftees was called up on 1 April 1957. By the end of 1957, 134,000 men were under arms.²⁶

This total fell well short of the 270,000 target set by Blank and his planners, but reflected more realistically

constraints imposed by infrastructure and equipment limitations, as well as the major educational effort needed to build a type of army dissimilar to that which previously had existed.

Franz Joseph Strauss, who moved from the Ministry of Atomic Affairs in October 1956 to assume the Defense portfolio, served as Federal Defense Minister until January 1963. During this period, he and his planners oversaw construction of the *Bundeswehr* and its emergence as the major European force in NATO. Three German Army divisions and several naval vessels were made available to NATO in 1957. By 1960, Germany had assigned 10 divisions, six air force wings, and six naval squadrons to the Alliance. An 11th division was committed to NATO in 1963, and a 12th was assigned in 1965.

Ten years after it joined NATO, the Federal Republic of Germany had met its force targets, with 12 Army divisions, 15 naval squadrons, 10 air force wings, and two *Nike* anti-aircraft battalions.²⁷

Equipping the *Bundeswehr* From the outset, the German government looked abroad for heavy arms with which to equip the *Bundeswehr*. West Germany had been forbidden to produce military goods after 1945, and its industry was fully occupied in satisfying the booming export market that was propelling the Federal Republic on a rising tide of prosperity. Further, Bonn expected the United States to provide much of the heavy equipment needed to organize its forces under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. The Germans hoped that other Allies also would donate equipment from their own stocks but, with a few exceptions, such aid did not materialize. France's preoccupation with unrest in North Africa and its Asian colonies sapped French military and financial strength. Britain's slow and incomplete recovery from its wartime

exertions made London an eager seller of military hardware, not a donor.

The US response, however, was prompt and highly positive. Soon after Germany joined NATO, a US team, headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Nash, was dispatched to the FRG to survey the situation and draw up a list of equipment requirements for a 12-division German force. This "Nash List," reviewed and approved in Washington, subsequently was presented to the Adenauer government as a US commitment of assistance for the *Bundeswehr*. Initial deliveries began on 15 May 1956. By 1961, US equipment and other types of military assistance, totalling nearly \$900 million, had been delivered to the Federal Republic.²⁸

Bonn was forced to procure all equipment items not provided by the United States and, as a matter of policy, chose to buy most of them abroad. This decision reflected the government's unwillingness to structurally dislocate German industry or divert it from consumer-oriented export production, as well as a determination to reduce embarrassingly large foreign exchange reserves and damp down the inflationary effect of rearmament at a time of high investment and full employment.²⁹

As a result, military production accounted for only 3 percent of total German industrial output in 1960, whereas more than 9 percent of Britain's 1960 manufacturing output was devoted to filling foreign and domestic military orders.³⁰

Two other factors played a large role in German procurement policy in the 1957-65 period:

First, Defense Minister Strauss wanted the major equipment he was purchasing abroad to incorporate up-to-date technology. Increasingly dissatisfied with second-hand American materiel with which the *Bundeswehr* had been equipped at its birth, he tirelessly pursued the latest technology for the German armed forces, including

"modern" equipment that would give German units a dual, conventional/nuclear capability. By introducing into Germany the latest in weapons technology, Strauss also hoped to help German industry bridge the 10-year hiatus it had suffered in arms production.

Secondly, equipment purchases by the Federal Republic in the United States and Britain served as an offset payment for troop stationing costs and helped relieve pressures in Washington to remove US forces from Germany on balance-of-payments grounds.

As the German economy cooled and stabilized in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this policy was modified. Industrial capacity again could accommodate arms production without strain. Even technologically backward sectors, such as aviation, which had been completely dismantled after 1945, and not again governmentally funded until after 1955, regained a competitive position. The Federal Defense Ministry therefore turned increasingly to German industry for its major weaponry. The *Bundeswehr's* second- and third-generation tanks, *Leopard I* and *II*, were designed, developed, and produced by the *Krauss Maffei* complex in Bavaria.

North German shipbuilders have been awarded a number of contracts for surface vessels and small submarines. Similarly, the German aviation industry played a major role in European consortia that produced the Lockheed F-104 *Starfighter* and the *Tornado* multi-role combat aircraft. The Germans also are expected to be key players in the development and production of the new European fighter for the 1990s, which could become NATO Europe's most extensive and costly cooperative arms project.

Financing the *Bundeswehr* Under the 1952 Bonn Treaty, the Adenauer government acknowledged that allied forces were stationed in Germany in part to protect

the newly organized Federal Republic. Bonn therefore agreed to pay certain costs associated with their presence. Contrary to contentions of critics who alleged that the Federal Republic was getting a "free ride" in defense during the 1950s, this contribution was not inconsiderable. In its 1955 budget, for example, Germany allocated DM (*Deutsche Mark*) 7,400 million to pay allied stationing costs, nearly 4 percent of its GNP for that year.³¹

With the expiration in May 1955 of the Occupation Statute, this contribution was reduced. The interim troop support agreement that replaced the Occupation Statute committed the Federal Republic to provide continued financial support, but at a much lower level and, the government hoped, for only a limited period. In any event, Bonn paid direct troop support costs only through 1957, at an average of DM 2,300 million annually for 1955-57.³²

Defense spending in the *Bundeswehr's* formative years was tightly controlled. Finance Minister Schaeffer and Economics Minister Erhard testified during rearmament debates that an annual expenditure of DM 9,000 million for defense could be managed without straining the economy or cutting into the new German prosperity. They talked of a "controlled experiment," in which the Federal Republic was to be rearmed without raising taxes, impeding balanced growth, or fueling inflation by "irresponsible" borrowing.³³

After some debate, the government established a defense budget ceiling of DM 45,000 million for 1955-59.

Although defense expenditures during the build-up were expected to lag initially, then mount as personnel and equipment for new units were added, the DM 45,000 million ceiling was, from the outset, far too low for the planned rate of build-up. The German press quoted American experts as saying that a total of DM 81,000 million might be needed to effect a 12-division *Bundeswehr* build-up over three years.³⁴



AP Wirephoto

Soldiers of the new West German army fail to draw even a passing glance from a mother with a baby carriage as they step out on 22 January 1956 for a field drill on the outskirts of Andernach, West Germany's first military post for the reborn fighting force.

Further, NATO guidelines called for defense expenditure of about DM 50,000 million over a four-year period to organize the German armed forces. If German defense spending were to be limited to DM 45,000 million for five years, rearmament certainly would have to be stretched out.

Most of the planning for rearmament had been done by Commissioner Blank and his Defense Office in the context of an anticipated EDC. After the EDC's demise in 1954 and the abrupt conceptual shift to an independent German Army in NATO, Blank and his Defense Ministry colleagues faced a mountain of problems that grew as the rearmament debate progressed. The Minister was charged with organizing, manning, and equipping a 12-division

force by the end of 1957. Sufficient funds were not available to accomplish this task. Further, the lead time was too short to acquire or build such facilities as barracks, maintenance shops, supply depots, warehouses, and training areas.

The Defense Ministry was not able to expand quickly enough to meet these tasks, and soon fell behind on planning and implementing the force build-up. Short of money and pressed for time, Blank asked Adenauer to postpone starting the build-up and stretch the program out from three to four years. But the Chancellor, citing overriding political and diplomatic considerations, turned him down.³⁵

In time, Adenauer was forced to yield on the pace of rearmament as well as on Germany's security leadership. The parameters of the German military build-up ultimately were established, not by the Chancellor, but by the Bavarian Trio (Erhard, Schaeffer, and Bundestag Defense Committee Chairman Jaeger), assisted by the new Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss. Not surprisingly, the Bavarians' program featured downward revision of *Bundeswehr* personnel and force goals and a significantly slowed rate of rearmament. Blank departed the Defense Ministry in October 1956 unappreciated, abandoned, and embittered.

Success of the Citizen Army No account of the *Bundeswehr's* creation would be complete without some assessment of the efforts of those who worked to create a democratic, controlled citizen army in postwar Germany. The task was difficult, for the government not only had to cope with the reservations of a distrustful Europe, but overcome the skepticism of domestic political opponents and public opinion. Additionally, Adenauer had to trim the fabric of his military commitments to fit financial and

manpower limits imposed by members of his own government.

Despite these constraints, organization and construction of the *Bundeswehr* appears one of the signal successes of the Adenauer era in Germany, an accomplishment of the same magnitude as Erhard's "economic miracle." The controlled and guided rearmament of Germany—a nation haunted by memories of some of the worst excesses associated with militarism—is a remarkable achievement.

Today, the *Bundeswehr* is a first-rate military force, consistently rated as among the best in the Atlantic Alliance, considered by many observers as the strongest conventional component in NATO's European defense forces.³⁶

The German armed forces are well-equipped, effectively manned, and well-led. The new concept of *innere Fuehrung* seems to have been accepted and absorbed without detriment to *Bundeswehr* relationships. Promoting the concept of the civilian in arms without sacrificing military professionalism, the personnel mix of volunteers and conscripts has worked well. As a result, the German soldier's self-respect has improved markedly in recent years, as has the public's view of the military as a profession. In short, the *Bundeswehr* has come to be respected, at home and abroad, as a highly responsible and capable military force.

Most negative aspects of German militarism appear to have been purged without sacrificing esprit de corps or skill. The new FRG armed forces play a role society considers necessary, at a level of defense spending most Germans judge "about right."³⁷

Moreover, *Bundeswehr* members have regained a measure of public respect considerably above the nadir of the 1950s, although still well below the exalted position enjoyed by the German military in earlier incarnations.³⁸

Germany and NATO Defense Policy

SINCE ITS EMERGENCE as a central European Nation State, Germany has been preoccupied with achieving and maintaining its national security within the narrow confines of Europe.

Earlier, the Germans were half-hearted players in the late nineteenth century game of imperialism that captured British and French imaginations, trading what the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, described as a colonial "suit of clothes for a trouser button" (strategically important Helgoland*) in an 1890 agreement. This

*Helgoland (Heligoland) is an island of the North Frisian group in the North Sea in the angle between the coast of Schleswig-Holstein and the entrance of the Jade, Weser, and Elbe rivers. The island, 380 acres in size and 184 feet at its highest, is 40 miles offshore northwest of Cuxhaven, and had a population of 2,312 in 1971. Seized by the British Navy in 1807, Helgoland was formally ceded to Britain in 1814; it was transferred to Germany in 1890 in exchange for Zanzibar and other African territories. The Germans developed it into a "Gibraltar of the North Sea," with a great naval base, extensive harbor and dockyard facilities, underground fortifications, and coastal batteries. British occupation authorities destroyed the remaining fortifications after World War II.

arrangement underscored Germany's inclination to protect itself in Europe, rather than project itself abroad. With this security focus on Europe, German leaders always have shown concern over the military and political threat Russia poses to the German nation.

With the Soviet Union's occupation of East Germany and the organization of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a communist state within Moscow's political and economic orbit, this threat has become acute.

Elements of German Foreign and Defense Policy

As a result, foreign and defense policies of all West German governments since 1949 have contained at least one constant: Opposition to the westward expansion of Soviet influence, either directly or through proxy activity. Governments and voters may differ in their assessment of the overt Soviet military threat, but beneath the activities begun under Germany's post-1966 *Ostpolitik** and the relaxation connected with periods of detente, lies a bedrock of concern over the Federal Republic's exposure to Soviet pressures or activities.

Bonn's basic policy goal—to assure Germany's security against aggression or subversion by the Soviets and their allies—enjoys overwhelming public support. Indeed, throughout the heated national debates over nuclear arms for the *Bundeswehr* or the modernization of US Pershing

*Foreign policy formulated by Willy Brandt, Social Democratic Chancellor of West Germany from October 1969 until he resigned in May 1974. The policy was an attempt to improve relations with the FRG's communist neighbors, notably the Soviet Union, Poland, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia, especially in the areas of normalization, friendship, and cooperation.



National Archives

West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt (center) watches in 1959 as a floral wreath is placed on the graves of victims of the 17 June 1953 anticomunist uprising in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The victims were buried in Seestrassen Cemetery. Relatives of the dead are seated in the background to the right. The day was observed throughout West Germany as the "Day of German Unity," a national holiday.

missiles in the Federal Republic, polls have shown that a large majority of Germans, including those who oppose any use of nuclear weapons, are ready to defend the Federal Republic from any military attack by Warsaw Pact forces.¹

To achieve this policy goal, Germany's strategy has sought to forge strong and dependable links to other Western European countries and, most important, to the United States. While European ties are important for German commerce and its economy, the American tie is vital for German security. Because it sees in NATO the best way to retain a US military presence in Europe and an American military guarantee for West German security, the Federal Republic has been the leading European

supporter of the North Atlantic Alliance. For more than a quarter of a century, all major German political parties have agreed that the Federal Republic cannot go it alone and that the Western Alliance is indispensable for German security. Bonn is determined to keep the United States in Europe and to maintain firm links between NATO defense forces in Europe and US central nuclear systems, which remain the Alliance's ultimate deterrent.

But German policymakers also must weigh other factors that, while not as vital as the US tie itself, are important to Germans and color their reactions to NATO policy and proposals to change it.

First, deterrence, not warfighting, is widely perceived in West Germany as the proper goal of the *Bundeswehr* and, for that matter, of most allied military forces. Unquestionably, maintenance of a well-armed, well-trained *Bundeswehr* serves both ends equally well—helping deter an attack, but, should an aggressor not be deterred, giving NATO commanders a formidable force to contain and defeat the attacker. Still, the psychological distinction is important, for many Germans—recognizing the difficulties of defending as densely populated and exposed a nation as the FRG—put a higher priority on keeping the peace than on winning a war.

General Ulrich de Maziere, former *Bundeswehr* Chief of Staff, underlined this point in a 1983 essay on German security. "Priority," he wrote,

should be given not so much to the question of how Germany can best be defended, but rather to the question of how . . . deterrence can best be enhanced and thereby peace in freedom be sustained.²

A number of German leaders admit privately that, if deterrence fails, their policies will have failed. Federal German territory would be the likely battlefield for any NATO-Warsaw Pact military struggle, an unthinkable prospect,

especially for those Germans whose memories of the 1940s are still vivid. (See figure 1 on page 82 for a discussion of restricted spaces and major urban communities in the Federal Republic.)

Secondly, attempts to differentiate between types of possible warfare—conventional defense or war involving the use of tactical or theater nuclear weapons—trigger different responses in the Federal Republic than in many other NATO countries. Most Germans abhor the prospect of using nuclear weapons. The same respondents who overwhelmingly favor defending the Federal Republic against Soviet attack³ oppose by at least a three-to-one margin any such defense, if it would involve use of battlefield nuclear weapons on German territory.

Other polls taken periodically during 1955–80 have asked which is more important: Defending freedom, even if it might mean nuclear war, or avoiding nuclear war, even if it means living under a communist government? War avoidance always was preferred, and by 1980 the margin of those willing to contemplate communist control had increased to two-to-one.⁴

On the basis of the foregoing polls, one might expect to find a large and responsive audience in Germany for efforts to raise the nuclear threshold. Unquestionably, such an audience does exist, but its enthusiasm has definite limits.

NATO's usual prescription for raising the nuclear threshold—providing NATO authorities with a wider range of non-nuclear options than simply the white flag—involves strengthening the Alliance's conventional forces. To a German, such improvements have real attractions, but only insofar as they serve to deter a potential adversary. During a recent discussion at the German Ministry of Defense, an American visitor asked whether Bonn agreed that NATO should increase its conventional forces to improve its options?




Figure 1. Restricted spaces and major conurbations

The Federal Republic's border with Warsaw Pact states is 1,700 kilometers (km) (1,085 miles) long—1,393 km (864 miles) with the GDR and 356 km (221 miles) with Czechoslovakia. The FRG's territory is a relatively narrow strip of land: The smallest distance between the eastern and western borders is 225 km (140 miles) and the greatest is 480 km (298 miles). Some 30 percent of the Federal Republic's population lives in a zone along the inner-German border only 100 km (62 miles) deep; 25 percent of the FRG's industrial capacity is located in this zone.

(Source: *Factbook for East and Europe*. Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, Information and Press Office, 1981.)

"Absolutely," replied a senior German defense official. "We must work to raise the nuclear threshold. But," he continued *sotto voce*, "not too far."

For many Germans, organization of a conventional defense robust enough to make warfare below the nuclear level a viable option would be a real nightmare. The experience of World War II suggests that the German society might survive major non-nuclear warfare little better than it would a limited nuclear war. The line between conventional forces adequate to deter aggression and forces capable of providing non-nuclear defense is a fine one, and few Germans would want the nuclear threshold raised so high that the world is made safe for conventional war.

As they consider German responses to US and NATO defense initiatives, observers also should be mindful of one other qualifier. Policymakers in Bonn rarely have the luxury of considering defense matters solely on their own merits. Available materiel and human resources always must be considered. Nuclear weapons have provided NATO member states deterrence and defense "on the cheap." Raising conventional units would be a costly substitute.

As a consequence, proposals that NATO enhance its non-nuclear capabilities invariably are received unenthusiastically in Bonn. Because memories of the chaotic period of monetary inflation, economic depression, and social dislocation that followed the First World War still are vivid in Germany, governments remain unusually sensitive to the possible economic and financial implications of increased defense spending. Successive German governments since 1956 have judged that the Federal Republic of Germany cannot have both guns and butter in unlimited quantities. Bonn's replies to NATO initiatives often disappoint authorities in Washington and at NATO

Headquarters at Evere,* because the German government considers maintaining a strong, healthy economy more important than diverting resources to military tasks of questionable priority.⁵

All these factors—such as Germany's basic opposition to Soviet expansion; its reliance on alliance with like-minded western nations; the perceived need to keep the United States involved at all levels of German security; Bonn's fixation on deterrence; German abhorrence of nuclear weaponry; the desire to raise the nuclear threshold "a bit, but not too far;" and the Federal government's unwillingness to hurt the economy by taking defense measures aimed principally at conveying political messages—should be borne in mind as one examines the evolution of NATO (and US) defense policies, and considers Germany's responses to both.

NATO Defense Strategy

From its inception, the aim of the North Atlantic Alliance's declaratory defense policy has been deterrence—dissuasion through cooperative planning and action of any potential aggression against territory of NATO member states. This policy has been an unqualified success, helping keep the peace in Europe for nearly four decades. Several strategies—or, more precisely, a broad strategy that has evolved to meet changing threats—have been developed to support NATO's policy objectives.

These strategies always have depended heavily on the central nuclear systems of the United States, conventional forces maintained by all Allies except Iceland, and, to a lesser degree, theater nuclear weapons and a small British nuclear force.

*A suburb northeast of Brussels, where NATO Headquarters is physically located.

NATO had little difficulty in its initial years formulating strategies to support its deterrent goals. The Alliance was, of necessity, political, almost wholly dependent on the overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States to offset an appalling but apparently nonurgent conventional imbalance in Europe. The Korean attack shattered Europe's reverie, compelling the Alliance to address its military response if an attack were to occur. In short order, steps were taken to flesh out NATO militarily and begin planning for joint defense, a process which led the Allies to acknowledge the imperative of German rearmament and, at Lisbon in 1952, to accept national force goals that looked to the creation of a 92-division defense force in Europe.

Because the threat that had seemed so acute in 1950 and 1951 seemed to recede as quickly as it had risen, this wave of allied concern quickly crested. No attack came, and Stalin's death raised the prospect of liberalization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as better Soviet relations with the Western Allies. Moreover, most western officials recognized that the Lisbon goals were hopelessly ambitious for any but a crisis situation, since none of the European members had the material resources to meet major goals without major foreign assistance.

The result of these changes was—

Abandonment of the Lisbon force goals.

Adoption in their place of more modest plans designed to build a credible deterrent/defense force in Europe with US support.

And formulation of a "new look" in US defense programs, providing "more bang for a buck" through increased reliance on "massive retaliation" and substitution of tactical nuclear weapons for some of the manpower of the US Army.

New Look Strategy and Germany Pronouncements from Washington threatening massive retaliation in the case of Soviet aggression caused hardly a ripple in Bonn, where most observers considered the concept fully consistent with NATO deterrence policy and unlikely to lead to any meaningful change in US force deployments in Europe. Even an increased reliance on small battlefield nuclear weapons, justified as a cost-effective way to offset the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe, was discussed chiefly in terms of implications for German rearmament. The new US policy and the discussion it triggered ultimately led to Adenauer's tactical decision to alter the *Bundeswehr* development plan, providing him with a convenient rationale for the subsequent abandonment of *Blank*.

The Adenauer government saw NATO's December 1954 decision to endorse the New Look strategy of the United States, including making tactical nuclear weapons available to supplement NATO's limited conventional forces, as unexceptional, the logical result of the downward revision of the Lisbon goals. This change also passed virtually unnoticed by Germany's opposition parties.

The June 1955 *Carte Blanche* exercise, designed to test new military concepts and emphasize western strength before the Geneva Summit, shocked the German public into an awareness of the devastation that the Federal Republic could suffer in a battlefield nuclear exchange. Subsequent debate tended to focus more on the relevance of German rearmament plans in a nuclear environment than on the efficacy of the new NATO strategy itself. Indeed, anyone today rereading the German rearmament debates of 1956 senses immediately the FRG's intellectual unease in pushing through the *Bundestag* a program that many of its members regarded more as dues to be paid for NATO membership than as part of a well-considered defense plan.



AP Wirephoto

Young German children sit on a pile of hay as they watch US soldiers take part in maneuvers of seven Atlantic Pact nations in an operation called "Counter Thrust" in the British Sector of Germany in September 1951.

Although many Germans were slow to appreciate the implications of the New Look for the Federal Republic, Franz Joseph Strauss, the new Federal Defense Minister, was not among them. On taking office, Strauss had moved quickly to phase back the *Bundeswehr's* buildup to accord with the reality of lagging volunteerism, a reduced draft term, and financial constraints imposed by the *Bundestag*. Strauss, who had been Germany's Atomic Affairs Minister, was convinced that the future belonged to nuclear energy and nuclear weapons. He considered the acquisition of tactical nuclear delivery capabilities by at least some of the European Allies inevitable, and believed that Germany would be considered a full partner in the Alliance only if its armed forces were nuclear capable. The

new Defense Minister therefore issued a public statement on 18 October 1956, calling for nuclear armament for the *Bundeswehr*.⁶

Chancellor Adenauer, who as recently as 27 July unequivocally had rejected any form of atomic weaponry for the *Bundeswehr*, echoed Strauss's declaration in a press conference the same day. Strauss long had been a proponent of atomic arms for the *Bundeswehr*.⁷ He had argued the proposition in private throughout the rearmament debate. His public statements consistently advocated "quality over quantity," as well as equipping Germany's armed forces with "the most modern weapons."⁸

Adenauer was slower to come to this view, although he almost certainly was aware that planning for a pentomic army division structure with integral atomic artillery was well advanced at the Defense Ministry as early as December 1955.⁹

Still, only after the Chancellor was forced to retreat on conscription and to slow the *Bundeswehr* buildup did Adenauer reassess his security policy. A number of developments had to be considered. First, the Federal Republic's contribution to NATO would be smaller and slower in coming than anticipated. Secondly, the Radford Plan then being debated in Washington threatened cuts in US forces stationed in Europe. Further, Britain had announced its plans to reduce manpower levels and rely increasingly on nuclear weapons; the French had begun shifting many units to keep order in North Africa.

Clearly, since NATO soon would have no alternative to the use of tactical nuclear weapons to contain a Soviet attack, equality in the Alliance required the Federal Republic to have a nuclear delivery capability. By the end of 1956, the Adenauer government was publicly expressing interest in acquiring nuclear arms for the *Bundeswehr*. Strauss quickly became the government's principal spokesman on the issue. To many observers, the Defense

Minister's plans to equip the *Bundeswehr* with dual-capable weapons and his call for nuclear warheads to arm them moved dangerously toward repudiation of Germany's 1954 pledge on nuclear weapons.

Early in 1957, 18 German atomic scientists, uneasy over Strauss's often impolitic statements and alarmed by the Chancellor's euphemistic reference to nuclear weapons as "modern artillery,"¹⁰ issued the "Goettingen Appeal." In this appeal, they stressed their belief that a country like Germany should reject possession of nuclear arms, and pledged not to take part in production, testing, or use of atomic weapons.

Although the government responded quickly and effectively, the Social Democrats, their eyes on the September 1957 national elections, seized the issue, trying to make political capital from it. The ensuing debate proved to be the hottest and most divisive one the Federal Republic would experience until the 1980s, but the issue backfired at the polls.

SPD officials strove to show that nuclear armament was inconsistent with reunification, but they failed to identify persuasive alternatives to Germany's NATO membership or the New Look strategy. Buoyed by reactions to the October 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary, and buttressed by the success of his economic and security policies, the staunchly anticommunist Adenauer succeeded in turning the Socialists' arguments against the opposition. Labeling atomic arms an absolute NATO requirement that Germany had to meet, and warning against "experiments," the Chancellor and his Christian Democrats won a sweeping electoral victory with a majority of the seats in the *Bundestag*.

After a debate marked by invective and acrimony, in March 1958 the *Bundestag* approved the government's plan to acquire nuclear arms. Initial deliveries of the *Honest John* rocket, Germany's first nuclear-capable system, began on 1 November 1958.

Undaunted by electoral defeat and reverses in the *Bundestag*, the Social Democrats took their case to the streets. A five-month-long "Campaign Against Atomic Death," complete with protest marches, demonstrations, and rallies, was staged in an attempt to reverse the decision. The government mounted a counterattack, arguing that atomic weapons would remain in American hands and that the Federal Republic's place in NATO, vital for Germany's security, was at stake. Debates raged everywhere, within church groups, families, businesses, and university faculties.

A second electoral test came in July 1958 in the *Länd* (State) of North Rhein-Westphalia. Voters there effectively spoke the last word in the nuclear strategy debate, giving the CDU its first absolute majority since 1949 in the Federal Republic's most populous state.

Notwithstanding the national conflagration it kindled, the German nuclear strategy debate produced a real catharsis for the Socialist Party and for German strategic thinkers. Tactics employed by the SPD's old guard, and crushing defeats the party suffered at the polls, paved the way for the emergence of a group of centrist reformers—Willy Brandt, Herbert Wehner, Carlo Schmidt, Fritz Erler, and Helmut Schmidt—who were to reverse the SPD's militantly ideological, anti-NATO policies and, after the watershed 1959 Bad Godesberg Conference, set German Socialism firmly on the path toward political respectability and governmental responsibility.

The great debate also awakened wider interest and concern in and out of government over German and NATO security policies, ending an era in which most Germans had been willing to place their trust fully in NATO authorities on matters concerning common military doctrine and strategy.¹¹



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Police restrain crowds of demonstrators in front of the seat of the West German government in Bonn. Social Democrats took their case against nuclear arms to the streets in 1958; they staged a five-month campaign of rallies, protests, and protest marches to try to reverse the nuclear arms decision.

Toward Flexible Response Given the vital importance of deterring aggression against the territory of NATO member states over a prolonged period, during which situations constantly are changing, NATO strategy must be regularly rethought and revised to maintain its validity. Not surprisingly, therefore, as NATO and its member-states sought to implement the newly adopted nuclear strategy, NATO military planners already were tinkering with the strategy in an attempt to redress certain apparent deficiencies. The chief problems, as seen from NATO Headquarters and NATO member-state capitals alike, related to post-Sputnik US vulnerability to a Soviet strategic nuclear strike.

NATO's trip-wire conventional warning force, backed by tactical nuclear weapons and coupled with US central

systems that deterred an aggressor through the threat of massive retaliation, would lose much of its credibility were the Soviets in a position to launch a nuclear counterstrike against the United States itself.

Many strategists believed the Alliance had to develop ways to deal with miscalculations or minor probes without risking escalation to general nuclear war. General Lauris Norstad, newly appointed Supreme Allied Commander, began to consider the possibility of adopting a pause or "fire break" concept, under which NATO conventional forces would be strengthened sufficiently to deal with incidents or contain minor aggression, without immediate recourse to nuclear weapons.

During such a conventional pause, the Allies would have an opportunity to restore the status quo either militarily or through negotiations.

A 1957 NATO military study examined the feasibility of this approach and the European defense improvements needed to implement it. After thorough discussion, Ministers adopted a Military Committee recommendation, MC-70, which called for additional conventional forces to support the pause concept, as well as establishing a goal of 30 active divisions in the central region of Germany, France, and Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), to make the strategy realistic. The force was to be mixed, consisting primarily of nuclear-equipped units to support the 1954 strategy, but would include enough conventional shield forces to give NATO commanders the capability to meet "less-than-ultimate threats with a decisive, but less-than-ultimate, response."¹²

German military personnel took part fully in developing the new strategy, which was fully consistent with views and concerns of Bonn officialdom. Since the Federal Republic was the only European ally then engaged in augmenting its forces in the central shield area, General Norstad's rationale was a useful rejoinder to domestic

critics, who sought to minimize the value of Germany's conventional force build-up.

MC-70 also satisfied nagging concerns in Bonn over how the Allies could deal with minor incursions without having to choose between strategic retaliation and capitulation. Most important, MC-70 reflected Bonn's goal of a meaningful "forward defense" and, by positing continued American troop presence on the Federal Republic's eastern border, promised both full engagement of allied forces in early stages of a Soviet attack, and positive nuclear coupling if such an attack could not be contained or repulsed. (See figure 2 on page 94 for a description of the Army in forward defense in the Federal Republic.)

Controlling NATO's Nuclear Weapons Increasingly, in the decade before 1966, control of nuclear weapons was at issue. Although Members of the US Congress and officials of all US administrations left no doubt in allied capitals that ultimate nuclear control would remain with the United States, most Allies felt some need to take part in managing NATO's nuclear arsenal.

Many possible arrangements were discussed, ranging from General de Gaulle's proposed nuclear triumvirate to a jointly managed multilateral force (MLF). France's decision to go its own way militarily and develop an independent nuclear force effectively foreclosed the possibility of wider nuclear sharing, however, and allied interest shifted from sharing nuclear control toward participation in common nuclear planning.

After Chancellor Erhard reluctantly had endorsed the MLF, the Johnson administration's abrupt abandonment of the concept bruised German sensibilities and heightened anxieties in Bonn that the United States might sacrifice allied interests in negotiations with Moscow on




Figure 2. The Army in forward defense

(Source: *White Paper 1983* Bonn: The Federal Minister of Defence)

nuclear proliferation. Still, written assurances that Washington subsequently gave the Federal Republic on the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty assuaged most of Bonn's fears.

In December 1966, NATO established a Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) with Germany as a permanent member, effectively resolving the nuclear control issue. Originally conceived as a consultative group, in which the

United States could give the Allies the sense, if not the substance, of nuclear planning, the NPG has evolved over two decades into an increasingly substantive body, in which allied concerns can be heard and considered.

The forum has proved useful for discussing the size and composition of NATO's battlefield weapon arsenal. Its component High-Level Group also has been helpful for discussing and studying technical nuclear matters of major political and military significance to the Alliance.

Flexible Response and German Security Policies

Adenauer and his colleagues in Bonn showed minimal concern over efforts undertaken at NATO Headquarters to refine or elaborate the Alliance's concepts of massive retaliation, tactical nuclear deterrence, limited response, or nuclear pause.

All these concepts generally were consistent with the philosophy behind the German forces build-up, resting on the twin assumptions of continued US troop deployment in Germany and a full range of deterrent coupling to US strategic systems. Additionally, none of them challenged the doctrine of forward defense, increased the threat to the Federal Republic of conventional war, or called for sophisticated new weapons that would require more money and manpower than Germany had earmarked for the *Bundeswehr*. With the election in 1960 of John Kennedy and his appointment of a group of young, skeptical "whiz kids" to key positions in the American national security apparatus, however, this situation quickly changed.

Robert McNamara, the new US Secretary of Defense, was troubled by the inflexibility of an Alliance security strategy stressing deterrence but assuming the need for

rapid escalation to nuclear weapons if fighting began in Europe. After examining the spectrum of deterrence and possible responses to aggression, with particular attention to controlling a possible nuclear war, McNamara proposed a policy of gradual or "flexible" response, which he believed would cure major ills in NATO doctrine.

McNamara's flexible response strategy recognized and sought to accommodate the shift in the East-West nuclear power balance by ending NATO's near total reliance on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and gave the Allies a range of responses appropriate to all types or levels of provocation.

In certain minor incidents, McNamara theorized, retaliation with nuclear weapons would be inappropriate; a small conventional force could handle the situation. Even in the case of a large-scale attack, NATO might respond initially with conventional forces to give the Allies time for negotiation with the attacker or for consultation before using nuclear weapons. Although controlled escalation, with "selected and limited use" of tactical nuclear weapons, could follow and a general nuclear exchange ultimately might occur, the inflexibility of an atomic nuclear response was to be discarded.¹³

Although the McNamara initiative was in many respects a logical extension of the Norstad "pause" concept that the Allies had accepted with few objections, the new American initiative created a furor in Europe. The US Defense Secretary had challenged a central tenet of NATO theology—massive nuclear retaliation by US forces in the event of communist attack. By proposing armed retaliation proportionate to the level of an attack, he also acknowledged the possibility of conventional war in Europe.

This point was particularly troublesome, for none of the Allies had met force goals established by MC-70. To raise and equip the units needed to establish the viable deterrent and defensive shield envisioned by the Kennedy administration, a major effort would be necessary.

Some historians have ascribed the American push for a flexible doctrine to Washington's desire, in the wake of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, to insulate its strategic relationship with the Soviet Union from events that could be confined to Europe.¹⁴

Others suggest that while the doctrinal shift was logical, given improvement in Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities and the increased vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack, the bluntness of its announcement was more important than its substance.¹⁵

German-American relations were not intimate during Adenauer's last years. The easy relationship "der Alte" enjoyed with US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was not maintained with Dulles's successors. The aging Chancellor was distressed over US reactions to the 1959-61 Berlin crisis, anxious over US-Soviet efforts to damp down the strategic arms race, and piqued by Anglo-American nuclear arrangements worked out at Nassau in 1962.

For its part, Washington felt that it had not been consulted adequately by its German ally before Bonn appeared to move closer to the maverick France of Charles de Gaulle by signing the 1963 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, just as Paris was vetoing British membership in the European Economic Community. Now the new US administration's apparent reluctance to implement various proposals for shared planning and control of nuclear weapons, and to deliver the dual-capable systems Bonn had ordered, further exacerbated the situation. McNamara's flexible response proposal became the lightning rod for German frustration, complicating America's efforts to peddle the concept to the Allies, and delaying formal NATO approval until 1967.

In the end, Europe and the Germans bowed to the inevitable and embraced flexible response. Developed by McNamara and his colleagues, the strategic concept was accepted as US policy by President Kennedy and endorsed

by his successor, Lyndon Johnson. In an Alliance of unequal partners with limited security options, these facts and the basic logic of the matter virtually guaranteed eventual adoption of flexible response as NATO doctrine.

Franz Joseph Strauss's eclipse after the *Spiegel* affair¹⁶ and the fading Adenauer's 1963 replacement as Chancellor by Ludwig Erhard—who was determined to reaffirm the American connection and reestablish the coincidence of German and American security interests¹⁷—helped Germany accept the new doctrine. Erhard's task was eased by a growing and widespread perception that the Soviet threat to Western Europe had lessened after erection of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

With NATO nuclear consultation resolved by establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group, continued US troop deployment assured by various German financial offsets, and Germany's foreign ministers beginning to look eastward for political-economic openings, Germany joined the other Allies in endorsing flexible response as NATO doctrine in December 1967.

Germany and NATO Strategy Over the years, flexible response has proved a broad, elastic military doctrine for the Atlantic Alliance. Although its critics are legion and proposals for new strategic concepts appear regularly, flexible response has weathered well, remaining the basis of NATO's deterrent and defense planning after nearly two decades. It combines the virtues of realism, vitality, intellectual credibility, and incalculability. The West German government has been comfortable with the concept, which can be explained easily to its citizens, as in the following excerpts from the *White Paper* issued in 1979 by the Federal Republic's Minister of Defense:



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The Berlin Wall illuminated in 1962 by lights from Templehof Air Base.

Flexible Response aims at avoiding war through deterrence. Deterrence will be credible if the allied nations are able and resolved to stand together ... and if this ability and resolve ... is manifest to an attacker. The risk inherent in his attack must be incalculable to any aggressor, [whose] possible successes must be grossly disproportionate to his casualties and losses.

Strategic nuclear forces, theatre nuclear forces, and conventional forces are a triad ... each individual component ... credible by itself and ... interlinked for escalation. ... [An] aggressor must not be able to predict when and by what means NATO will respond to the attack: this makes the risk to the aggressor incalculable.

The North Atlantic Alliance cannot do without nuclear weapons. If the Alliance had ... [only] conventional forces,

an aggressor would be able to calculate and limit his risk. NATO holds nuclear weapons . . . but because it is determined to prevent any war whatsoever.¹⁸

German defense planning under flexible response has benefited from both its solid intellectual grounding and its vitality. By stressing deterrence first and foremost, the strategy meets Bonn's concern that any war—conventional or nuclear—would mean disaster for the Federal Republic. The endorsement of forward defense, in case deterrence should fail, is a major political concession to the Federal Republic: Opting for a more fluid defense in depth, as advocated by many traditional military strategists, would concede the loss of large amounts of German territory in the early days after a Soviet attack across the inner-German border. The means, conventional or nuclear, NATO would employ to meet various levels of aggression have been kept deliberately vague so that a potential aggressor cannot calculate with any assurance the risk he faces.

The importance Bonn accords to incalculability as a deterrent was shown clearly in 1983, when West Germany's major political parties closed ranks to oppose a major "no first use" initiative on nuclear weapons proposed in *Foreign Affairs* by four distinguished Americans¹⁹ and echoed by such organizations as the Union of Concerned Scientists. The proposal gained prompt support from a distinguished group of western statesmen and military thinkers, Germany's new antinuclear party—the Greens—and spokesmen from the West German political left.

Although attractive from an antinuclear standpoint, the proposition's effect would have been to increase military calculability and to undermine NATO's deterrent posture. This reasoning, central to strategic thinking in the governing coalition and in SPD security circles, triggered a tightly argued German response in the succeeding issue of

Foreign Affairs to the McNamara-Bundy-Kennan-Smith proposal.²⁰

"Deter, not Defend" Moreover, the argument of the American "Gang of Four," that increased NATO conventional forces would give the Allies a more viable defense capability than that provided by NATO's nuclear armaments, fell on deaf ears in Bonn—where the desire to deter, not defend, continues to reign supreme. Cost considerations aside, for conventional deterrence would be much more expensive than that now provided by NATO's nuclear arsenal, West German politicians and military officials are reluctant to contemplate programs that increase the likelihood of conventional war in Europe, even programs that would mean that NATO could resist aggression without recourse to nuclear weapons.

Flexible response has given NATO a malleable doctrine that has accommodated differing national perceptions of the threat, the uneven political thaw of detente, and varying national reactions within the Alliance to such events as the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia, its activities in Poland and its invasion of Afghanistan.

The doctrine's flexibility has helped defuse potential allied discord over appropriate political and military responses to these developments, as well as to Soviet adventurism in other geographic areas the United States considers important to the West. Since 1967 the Federal Republic's military planners have taken the long view in developing a well-trained and well-equipped *Bundeswehr* that meets Germany's responsibilities to common defense, and on which NATO can base an effective forward defense.

Most important to Bonn, however, is what flexible response says about the Federal Republic's relations with

Washington. For Germany, NATO strategy is meaningful only insofar as sizable US forces remain stationed in Europe. Their presence gives substance to the allied capability for containing low-level aggression, and to the confidence that a "seamless web" of deterrence connects forces deployed along NATO's borders to well-trained reinforcements, to NATO's theater nuclear arsenal, and to the central nuclear systems of the United States.

Flexible response, which combines incalculability with extended deterrence at affordable cost, effectively answers all of Germany's basic security needs.

Evolution of NATO

THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE soon will mark four decades of successful collective security. And, the Federal Republic of Germany recently celebrated 30 years of NATO membership.

Both events testify to the achievements of the Western Alliance and to Bonn's smooth political and military integration into the North Atlantic club of democratic nations.

Peace has reigned in Europe since NATO's formation. Under the protection of its security umbrella, member states have achieved unparalleled levels of individual and collective prosperity. The average European in 1987 has little fear of imminent attack by the Soviet Union or its allies, and feels secure to focus on economic, social, and more narrowly personal matters.

The Atlantic Alliance unquestionably is one of the signal western accomplishments and continuing successes of the post-1945 period.

NATO in Transition

Notwithstanding NATO's successes, however, critics abound. Many are supportive but seek to warn the Alliance of what they perceive as threats to its continued

viability. Scarcely a month passes without a book, article, or speech proclaiming a new or imminent "crisis" in NATO, and proposing ways to surmount it. Such alarms usually are well intended. And sometimes, most notably in the 1967 Harmel Report (see appendix C), which examined future tasks of NATO at a key juncture in the life of the Alliance, these alarms prompt important changes in the institution, such as its methods of operation, or relationships among member countries.

Occasionally, however, these warnings have been self-serving, designed to support specific national objectives which are not always shared or given equal priority by all member nations. Meeting problems created by external changes and national initiatives has posed a series of challenges for the Allies, as NATO has evolved to accommodate new developments within the East-West arena.

Because the West German government has tied its national security so firmly to the North Atlantic Alliance and, more specifically, to the United States, the German Federal Republic (FRG) has been unusually sensitive to the health of NATO and skeptical about any major changes proposed to an institution that continues to serve Germany well.

At the same time, Bonn's addiction to its American security blanket often places the FRG in an awkward position, when initiatives are proposed by the United States. In virtually all instances when the United States has pressed on its Allies controversial proposals or programs, such as the multilateral force (MLF), the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW) (or "neutron bomb") and Pershing II and cruise missiles, the Federal Republic ultimately has given its support, regardless of the high domestic political cost involved. Even when the United States suddenly reversed direction and cancelled the MLF and ERW, US-West German relations soured only

temporarily. Neither West Germany's basic support of NATO nor its reliance on the Alliance's mutual security guarantee appeared diminished in the least.

German Security Needs Throughout three decades of membership in NATO, Bonn has sought a major role in formulating a sound deterrence/defense policy for the Alliance. The Federal Republic has given budgetary priority to its *Bundeswehr*, taking pains to assure that its military contribution to NATO is superior in all respects. It has led efforts to enhance Europe's role in the Alliance and to promote closer collaboration on design and production of military equipment. The German government also has tried to mediate between the United States and other Allies on such issues as the relevance of the Soviet threat to western interests outside NATO's geographic area, which Washington believes should be recognized as an important Alliance concern.

Bonn's efforts to make the Alliance function better sometimes have aroused controversy at home and frictions with one or more of its Alliance partners. German relations with the United States have become noticeably cool at times, notably when the Federal Republic's leaders have considered Washington's defense views disorganized and muddled, or because of American pique over Bonn's unwillingness to make economic sacrifices to deny the Soviet Union a large-diameter gas pipe.

Nevertheless, the German government has been careful not to permit its relationship with the United States to suffer irreparable harm.

No Guarantees Throughout 30 years of association with NATO, Bonn's positions have reflected a conviction



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US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (center), accompanied by Ambassador-at-Large Phillip K. Jessup (left) and John J. McCloy, US High Commissioner for Germany (second from right), calls on Theodor Heuss, President of the Federal Republic of Germany (second from left), between meetings of the Big Three Foreign Ministers during the signing of the Contractual Agreement in May 1952. With them at the right is West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.

that success of the Alliance is vital for German security in a divided Europe. Without NATO, Germany would have no guarantee of keeping American troops in Europe or preserving the American nuclear guarantee. Unquestionably, the Federal Republic is the leading European contributor to NATO. Germany also relies totally on the Alliance and the United States for its national security. Because of Bonn's consistent determination to make NATO work effectively, its reactions to current Alliance problems, as well as to the directions in which the organization has evolved over the past decades, are instructive.

Diverging Views and Stress within the Alliance

NATO was established in a period of high military threat and limited European capabilities, a situation which had changed dramatically by the early 1960s, however. The economic health, political outlook, and attitudes of many member nations had altered markedly from outlooks and attitudes of 1949-55, causing transformed perceptions in national capitals and at NATO Headquarters.

Outside, the world also was changing, as were security needs and opportunities of NATO countries, collectively and individually.

Throughout its life, NATO has faced internal and external challenges, constantly adapting its policies and programs to meet these challenges. Although the Alliance's continued vitality testifies to the success of these adaptations, political and military costs have been considerable. And the Germans have paid their full share of both.

Evolution of the Threat Initially, the principal threat to NATO came from the large, well-armed conventional forces of the Soviet Union. Unable or unwilling to match this force directly, the Western Allies sought to deter attack by threatening massive retaliation with US nuclear arms. In ensuing years, NATO doctrine evolved gradually, from undifferentiated massive retaliation through the possible use of theater nuclear weapons to flexible response, with its implicit corollary of no early first use of nuclear weapons.

These changes reflected the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, which placed the United States increasingly at risk, nourishing doubt that US central nuclear systems automatically would be brought into play in the case of low-level Soviet aggression in Europe. Concurrently, allied political leaders and military strategists have devoted much of their energies to elaborating and adjusting NATO nuclear doctrine and strategy, to assure full coupling of allied deterrent and defense forces throughout the security spectrum.

As Soviet nuclear capabilities have changed, so has the military threat to NATO. Allied perceptions of that threat vary from country to country, however, reflecting different readings of political, economic, and military developments east and west of the inner-German border. In late 1950, after the Korean attack shocked Western Europe into recognizing its vulnerability to attack by the Soviet Union and its East European dependencies, NATO nations agreed that they faced real danger of attack by a superior conventional force deployed on their borders. As a result, the Allies accepted highly ambitious national force goals and agreed that West Germany must rearm if Western Europe were to have any chance of mounting a viable conventional defense.

When no Soviet attack occurred, NATO's sense of urgency slackened. Lisbon force goals, set in 1952 when allied concern was at its height, were scrapped as unrealistically ambitious. National force build-ups slowed. Concurrently, the initial *Bundeswehr* plan, crafted to plug the NATO force gap, and viewed by Adenauer and his security advisers as the price of German membership in NATO, was pared back in favor of Germany's economic development program. Helmut Schmidt—West German Chancellor for the period 1974-82, and Defense Minister in the Cabinet of Chancellor Willy Brandt—recalls that,

by 1954, no one in Europe "believed that serious efforts were necessary to raise more diversions."¹

Western reactions to the 1956 Soviet intervention in Hungary and the Berlin Crisis of 1961-62 implicitly approved the status quo in Central Europe. Further, the ferment in Moscow's satellites brought into question the military dependability of the Soviet Union's East European Allies. Thus, many governments in Western Europe gradually came to consider themselves less and less threatened militarily by the Warsaw Pact nations.

NATO military authorities and many US officials often have held different views.

As professional military men, NATO's military commanders have been taught the prudent dictum that capabilities, not intentions, must be weighed in assessing threats. Consequently, NATO military advice consistently rests on a maximalist view of the Soviet threat, and regularly calls for increases in NATO forces and military capabilities to counter the Soviet threat. Officials of successive US administrations have echoed the NATO Military Committee's call for quantitative and qualitative increases in NATO country forces, pressing hard under a number of initiatives and programs, including *AD-70*, the Long-Term Defense Program, and the Conventional Defense Improvements Initiative, to strengthen NATO's forces.

Generally, the result has been predictable. Most European Allies have long-term defense plans designed to deter aggression, defend against limited attack, and counter political-military pressures from the East. Unconvinced of the immediacy of any military threat, the European Allies have been loath to upset carefully formulated national plans to accommodate concerns of NATO military staffers or whims of every newly elected US administration. Similarly, governments have been reluctant to divert scarce national funds from other sectors of the economy to undertake unplanned defense projects.

As a result, the European Allies generally limit their responses to such initiatives as undertaking low-cost or no-cost measures, reordering or accelerating already-planned national projects, or studying the problem.

This recurring outcome causes no surprise to NATO professionals. But it is a source of continual frustration to officials in Washington, who seek to "fix" NATO problems or strengthen the Alliance. Lukewarm reaction of some Allies to such initiatives periodically causes stresses within NATO Headquarters and between the United States and its major security partners. Unless Europe's perception of the threat changes, however, this situation is likely to endure.

Germany's attitudes are similar to those of other European states. Although the majority of Germans support NATO membership, and most want US troops to remain in the Federal Republic, a few Germans feel threatened by Soviet actions. A November 1986 poll, for example, conducted by the German opinion organization EMNID, found 60 percent of the German public unworried about the Warsaw Pact threat. Domestic economic and social issues rank well above security for the average German, who considers money allocated to national defense—only 3.3 percent of GNP in 1984, compared with 6.5 percent for the United States and 5.3 percent for the United Kingdom—"about right."

Despite the general satisfaction of the German government and citizenry with things as they stand, however, Bonn remains apprehensive that outright rejection of US initiatives in NATO could cause the United States to loosen its ties with the Western Europeans or trigger a US troop withdrawal.

Accordingly, if their government is convinced that the United States really cares, the Germans can be expected to be generally receptive to US proposals. Again and again, Bonn has questioned, studied, and equivocated but, in the end, supported US initiatives.²

Detente and Ostpolitik Adaptation to change has been one of NATO's great strengths. The preparation and adoption of the Harmel Report (see appendix C), an extremely important step in NATO's development, demonstrates this ability to adapt to changes.

In 1964, Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel expressed his conviction that the situation facing NATO had changed radically and that the Alliance was in danger of losing its vitality and relevance to member states. He urged that NATO reevaluate its objectives. Accordingly, NATO Ministers accepted Harmel's assessment and commissioned a study group to look into the matter.

The Harmel Report, entitled *Future Tasks of the Alliance*, was the product of this investigation. In this seminal document, approved and published by the North Atlantic Council in December 1967, the Ministers—

- Acknowledged the change in the international situation.
- Recognized the need to search for more stable conditions in the interests and promotion of European detente (relaxation of tensions between nations).
- And resolved to take realistic measures to improve East-West relations.

They endorsed arms control through balanced force reductions and sanctioned development and expansion of contacts between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Ministers also stressed the need to solve the German problem by removing "unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe."³

With publication of the Harmel Report, "Detente" and "Disarmament" joined "Deterrence" and "Defense" as key terms in the NATO lexicon.

German officials already had begun to test East European waters that the Harmel Report declared open to navigation. Gerhard Schroeder, Foreign Minister in

Adenauer's last Cabinet, and in the Erhard administration that followed, began a "policy of movement," designed to bridge differences with the East and to increase trade with Soviet satellites.

The Bonn government also hoped to loosen East European ties with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and, if possible, isolate the East German regime. Willy Brandt, Schroeder's successor, broadened and extended the approach but was stymied by the Soviet Union's decisive 1968 military intervention in Czechoslovakia, which showed that the USSR was determined to block any attempt to alter the status quo in Eastern Europe, and by East Germany's emergence after construction of the Berlin Wall as a viable state highly important to the Eastern Bloc.

As Chancellor, Willy Brandt redoubled his efforts toward the East. He moved boldly to deal with the Soviet Union and the GDR in ways designed to permit East-West detente and deal with key aspects of the German problem, including the status of Berlin and the eastern borders, without foreclosing the possibility of reshaping the relationship between the two German states. By the end of Brandt's tenure as Chancellor in 1974, the Federal Republic had signed basic treaties with the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, helped facilitate a new Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, and concluded an Intra-German Basic Treaty with the East Germans.

By terms of these arrangements, Bonn recognized the Oder-Niesse line as Germany's eastern border and codified the status quo in Central Europe. The Federal Republic also regularized its relations with the GDR at a level below full recognition under international law. Further, it secured rights in a West Berlin that the Soviet Union acknowledged was separate from the GDR.

European settlements of 1970-73 established the foundation of detente. These settlements also proved



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US President Richard M. Nixon met with representatives of NATO, including West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (left), at the State Department in Washington on 11 April 1969. With them here, from left, are Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Secretary of State William Rogers, and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger.

central to the success of the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik*. Indeed, some analysts argue that detente in Europe was possible only after the two German states recognized the formal division of Germany, and the United States and the Soviet Union acquiesced in the arrangement.⁴

Thereafter, barriers to East-West intercourse were dramatically lowered. The Federal Republic and other Western European states moved promptly to increase trade with Eastern Europe. Moscow pressed for a European Security Conference that it hoped would legitimize its post-World War II boundaries, diminish American influence in Europe, and allow the Soviets to address pressing domestic issues. On the other hand, the United States had a somewhat different agenda. Washington

welcomed the opportunities that detente offered, but tried to link western cooperation with success in strategic arms control negotiations, progress on NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional force reduction discussions, and improved Soviet behavior in the Third World.

By 1980, all parties in the East and West had realized at least a part of their goals under detente and most had a stake in its continuation. Changes in leadership in Bonn, from Brandt to his more conservative SPD colleague, Helmut Schmidt, and, subsequently, from Schmidt to the Christian Democrat Helmut Kohl, brought a shift in emphasis from East-West to West-West relations, and an increasing focus on domestic policy. Nonetheless, all German governments since 1967 have endorsed both detente and the improved East-West ties it has engendered. Kohl's Christian Democrats have left little doubt that they, too, consider the "new order" favorable to the Federal Republic's interests.

Even Franz Joseph Strauss, at once the most respected and most feared politician of the German right, confounded many observers in 1984 by acting as go-between in a billion *Deutsche Mark* loan the Federal Republic made to the East German government.

Enthusiasm for detente has cooled within NATO capitals since the heady 1970s, but the cooling process has been uneven. Unfortunately for German-American relations, disillusionment with detente has been much deeper in Washington than in Bonn. Certainly, both governments were alerted by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and by Moscow's role in damping down the Polish crisis, but the import accorded these matters differed sharply. Bonn viewed both developments with concern, but considered neither a threat to basic allied security interests. Therefore, the West German government was reluctant either to undertake compensatory military measures the United States urged in NATO councils, or

to upset its commercial relations with Eastern Europe by forbidding export to the Soviet Union of large-diameter gas pipe. As the United States had lost some of its enthusiasm for arms control, and hoped to exploit detente to restrict Soviet adventurism in the Third World, Washington considered the East-West balance sheet increasingly unfavorable. It sought to reduce the commercial and psychological benefits the Soviets and their allies enjoyed under detente.

This difference in views between Bonn and Washington has conditioned reactions in both capitals to a host of East-West issues, and serves to heighten tensions between the two principal Western Allies when NATO political or military actions are proposed to counter ambiguous Soviet activities. Such differences are likely to remain a source of friction as long as Bonn regards detente and its results as generally beneficial, while Washington considers it a failed policy.

The facets, although interesting, are viewed from such differing perspectives that remembering that one is viewing the same stone sometimes is difficult.

Broadening the North Atlantic Treaty Area As previously explained, NATO's founding fathers drew the North Atlantic Treaty's geographic limits with extreme care. According to the Treaty, the Alliance covered attacks on the territory of the signatories

in Europe or North America ... on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.⁵

Allied leaders were careful to exclude from NATO's jurisdiction all non-European colonial possessions of

member nations (except Algeria, which in 1949 was considered part of metropolitan France). This exclusion relieved the Allies of dealing with a number of potentially divisive matters, including colonial policies of member nations or measures taken by allied governments to maintain control of their overseas empires. NATO, therefore, took no institutional position on French or American activities in Indochina and Vietnam, although Alliance authorities noted and regretted the reduction of forces, military equipment, and supplies from Europe for such purposes.

The inelasticity of the NATO Treaty area also masked policy differences between the United States and its Allies toward the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Recently, however, the narrow definition of the Treaty area and its immutability have been seen as a disadvantage by US policy makers. Convinced that Alliance security is inextricably linked to developments outside the narrowly defined NATO Treaty area, many US Government officials and congressional leaders have been seeking ways to hurdle the historic barrier. Focusing on Middle East oil, on which the European Allies are far more dependent than the United States, Washington has urged its Allies to recognize the "out-of-area" threat to common interests and join the United States in taking steps to protect western interests outside the NATO area.

Spokesmen have described various types of support that might be given, including contributions to the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) the United States has been organizing, logistic and transit assistance to the RDF should Washington decide to deploy it, or assumption of US defense tasks in NATO Europe that RDF deployment might leave uncovered.

Not surprisingly, allied reactions have been cautious and unenthusiastic. US plans to form an RDF always

have been controversial in Alliance circles, if only because US military resources are finite and any RDF deployment would adversely affect America's ability to reinforce Europe in a crisis or in wartime. Further, many Europeans—including the West Germans, who believe their diplomatic and commercial ties with certain Middle Eastern or South Asian countries could help contain or resolve a crisis in the area—would be uncomfortable were they forced to choose sides in a situation not of their making and, possibly, deleterious to what European governments consider to be important national interests.

The result of these considerations has been a series of acrimonious discussions and unhappy policy compromises that have failed to satisfy any of the disputants. Communiqués issued after recent NATO ministerial meetings invariably contain references to "out-of-area" matters. The wording always is the product of lengthy and highly charged drafting sessions which reflect time-consuming discussions at highest levels.

In the end, however, most statements are vague and ambiguous, indicating agreement, for example, to "take account of" developments outside the NATO area, or to consult bilaterally with other Allies, when appropriate. The unsatisfactory nature of such exercises reflects the difficulty involved in trying to push NATO nations beyond limits all have found useful in the past, as well as the unlikelihood that consensus can be achieved in non-crisis situations on matters that involve deeply felt political, economic, religious, or ethnic considerations.

Weapons Issues

NATO member nations spent more than \$320 million for defense in 1984, more than a third of it on military weaponry. All members, except Iceland, which has no

armed forces, face periodic decisions on types and numbers of weapons with which to equip their forces. All have modernized their equipment periodically, often after heated discussions on what will be procured and who will produce it. This complicated process often is controversial, for major weapons issues in NATO tend to arise outside the normal process and usually reflect political or doctrinal questions, not simply questions of military modernization. Such matters are debated hotly and at length, both nationally and within the Alliance. Their resolution often places major strains on the Alliance itself and on bilateral relationships, particularly between Bonn and Washington.

The four major weapons debates in NATO listed below have generated unusual acrimony.

- The 1961-65 consideration of the Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal.
- Discussion of the "neutron bomb" or Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW).
- Modernization of the Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces (LRINF) missile.
- Consideration of the Conventional Defense Improvement Initiative (CDI).

Because all four debates involved either NATO's nuclear forces or highly advanced technology, one can predict that future considerations of similar types of weapons, as well as their control, linkage, or warfighting capabilities, are likely to arouse passions and controversy throughout the Alliance.

Multilateral Force The US Multilateral Force (MLF) proposal, which came on the heels of the 1962 Nassau Agreement and died an unlamented death after its reluctant endorsement by the Erhard government, has been discussed earlier in chapter 3. Developed by the United

States to forestall West Germany's alleged desire to become a nuclear power, and to help prevent nuclear proliferation in Europe,⁶ the concept of a multinationally manned, jointly controlled nuclear missile force made little military and less political sense.

But those who pressed for, and eventually obtained, Bonn's approval of the concept were concerned principally with the Federal Republic's place in the Alliance. Through MLF, they hoped to reassure Bonn that despite actions being taken by London and Paris, the Germans had an active and influential role to play in NATO.⁷

By 1965, MLF was both a military and political fiasco. Although the Germans reluctantly accepted the US offer, the concept had been found wanting by NATO authorities, the other Allies, and Members of the US Congress, who hastened to distance themselves from it. Moreover, Erhard's agreement to the American-sponsored program had undermined de Gaulle's plans for a French-dominated European defense system, souring French-German relations for nearly a decade. Additionally, the MLF galvanized Soviet resistance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) being discussed in Geneva, and threatened to become a major liability to US security policy.

After assessing the situation and concluding that MLF was a lost cause, Lyndon Johnson ended the agony by abruptly scrapping the MLF in 1965, a move that embarrassed the German government but saved NATO further controversy and paved the way for completing the NPT. Washington ultimately salved Bonn's wounds by establishing the NATO Nuclear Planning Group and giving the Germans assurances that the NPT would not rule out formation of a European Nuclear Force in any politically united Europe of the future.

Nevertheless, many Germans emerged from the MLF exercise feeling badly used, victims of Great Power dealing over the heads of an erstwhile ally.



National Archives

US Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, enroute to West Berlin three days after the Berlin Wall was built, speaks at the Bonn Airport in August 1961. West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer stands behind Johnson. The Vice President assured the Germans of US determination to fulfill obligations.

Enhanced Radiation Warheads The Enhanced Radiation Warhead (ERW) or "neutron bomb" controversy left an equally bad taste in German mouths. Here, however, the complaint was not of duplicity, but of American incompetence and mismanagement. Jimmy Carter's 1976 election as US President deeply concerned many Europeans. Although Harold Brown, Carter's Defense Secretary, was respected in European defense circles, many Carter advisers, as well as the President himself, had limited expertise or experience in international security matters. Moreover, the American President's training as an engineer gave him a predilection for "tinkering" that

unsettled NATO bureaucrats and officials, who viewed doctrinal imprecision and policy ambiguity as keys to allied consensus.

Apprehension within NATO over the White House's new occupant, and attitudes of a number of national security advisers surrounding him, soon acquired substance. The American press reported early in 1977 that Carter strategists were suggesting, in *Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM)-10*, that NATO's forward defense concept be scrapped in favor of a militarily preferable defense in depth. *PRM-10* also reportedly proposed that the timing of possible tactical nuclear responses in Europe be reconsidered, calling into question the validity of NATO's strategic doctrine. Then, on the heels of the *PRM-10* controversy, the Carter administration announced plans to produce and deploy an Enhanced Radiation Warhead or "neutron bomb."

The ERW concept was straightforward and logical. NATO's deterrent strategy was dependent in part on some 7,000 battlefield nuclear weapons stored in Europe for possible use against unchecked Soviet aggression. Many of these weapons were old; most were "dirty," in that their use probably would have caused major collateral damage to civil infrastructure and nonmilitary personnel. The ERW would be a relatively "clean" weapon that would upgrade deterrent and defense capabilities of NATO's theater forces.

Logical as the neutron bomb appeared to many Americans, it created consternation among the Allies. Many Europeans feared that introduction of a "clean" nuclear device would lower the threshold of nuclear conflict by giving NATO commanders a weapon they might be more willing to use on the European conventional battlefield. American production and deployment of neutron weapons also had a special poignance for the Federal Republic, as German territory and German people would be the likely targets were neutron bombs to be used.

Most governmental concerns usually can be dealt with rationally, and the United States quickly set to work to allay allied reservations. Public emotion, however, presented wholly different problems. With the neutron bomb debate, many European "men in the street" gained their first real awareness of types and numbers of battlefield nuclear weapons present in Europe and of specific dangers these weapons posed to the populations they were supposed to defend. Public opinion in Germany and other European NATO countries quickly was whipped to fever pitch by peace groups and leftist propagandists. Demonstrators railed against this "capitalist weapon" designed to kill people but leave houses and factories unharmed.

Chancellor Schmidt faced a difficult predicament. Although he favored modernization and rationalization of American nuclear weapons in Europe, he was under great pressure from without and within not to accept the new American weapons. Finally, however, the Chancellor courageously bucked public opinion and agreed to the introduction of neutron warheads into the Federal Republic. Having taken the domestic heat for this difficult decision, Schmidt promptly was abandoned by Carter and left to twist in the wind. The American President, who had vacillated privately throughout debates in the Congress and within the Alliance, suffered a "crisis of conscience" and decided not to proceed with deployment of the ERW. No convincing rationale was presented for Washington's sudden reversal of course.

The incident left a number of Allies, particularly the Germans, disillusioned and troubled by what they perceived as indecision and moral ambivalence on the part of their principal ally.

Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Missile Modernization

The 1979 dual-track decision to modernize

NATO's Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Missile Forces (LRINF) differs in some respects from MLF, ERW, and the Conventional Defense Initiative (CDI). Unlike the others, LRINF modernization, the product of a European initiative, was supported and adopted unanimously by the Allies in 1979, and now is being implemented by all five European stationing countries (Britain, Italy, the FRG, Belgium, and the Netherlands).

Moreover, the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) programs are as political as military in nature. Nevertheless, LRINF modernization remains controversial. With US-Soviet discussions of intermediate-range nuclear weapons once again underway in Geneva, and full deployment not expected to be completed before the end of 1988, LRINF issues may continue to generate frictions in NATO.

Although he recently has tried to deny paternity, Helmut Schmidt generally is considered the father of LRINF. As West German Chancellor, he took the occasion of a 1977 address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London to draw attention to implications of SALT II for Europe. He stressed the growing imbalance in Euro-strategic missiles, which he believed threatened to weaken the "seamless web" of deterrence on which NATO's flexible response doctrine rests.

Whether Schmidt's concerns were directed only at the Soviet Union's new SS-20 System, a mobile 5,000-kilometer- (3,100-mile) range missile with vastly improved accuracy, or also included shorter-range weapons, is not clear. In any case, NATO selected Pershing II and GLCM to answer the SS-20 threat and spent 1979-83 pursuing both arms control and development or deployment of the two missile systems. When by 1983 no agreement with the Soviets proved possible, deployment began in Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Belgium and the Netherlands

subsequently agreed to station GLCMs; by 1986, basing activities had begun in all five countries.

The Federal Republic is the only NATO Ally that is stationing both the Pershing II and the GLCM, to modernize NATO's LRINF and give NATO advanced nuclear delivery systems in Europe that can hold Soviet territory at risk. The logic of the stationing plan is clear: The Federal Republic's geographic proximity to the USSR was attractive to NATO military planners, who wanted to deploy the slow-flying GLCM reasonably far forward. German political leaders also were keen to station GLCMs in Germany because this weapon would link the Federal Republic directly into the Euro-strategic equation.

Modernizing US Pershing missiles in Germany made even more sense: The 20-year-old Pershing I system's technology no longer was current, and missiles and launchers were becoming difficult and costly to maintain. Deployment in Germany of both the highly visible, highly accurate Pershing II and the long-range, terrain-hugging GLCM satisfied political needs in Bonn and other European NATO capitals, and military requirements of NATO military planners as well.

Irrefutable as the deployment decision's logic may have been, implementation was by no means certain. In 1981-83, demonstrators took to German streets in the greatest numbers since the 1930s. The German peace movement found in LRINF modernization an issue of great appeal, and a number of groups quickly enrolled in the opposition. The youth wing of the SPD, student groups, and the Evangelical (Protestant) Church contributed considerable support and articulate leadership to the Peace Movement. The Greens—a loose grouping of environmentalists, antiestablishment youth, and opponents of a wide variety of military programs—united in opposition to the Pershing missile program, and rode the issue to electoral success nationally in March 1983.

The Soviet Union did its best to deepen and exploit the NATO missile modernization crisis. Local communist groups certainly were involved in such events as the Krefeld Appeal,⁸ and many rightists claimed that the Soviet hand was apparent in the nuclear disarmament movement and anti-deployment demonstrations in the Federal Republic. Today, most analysts discount the Soviet role in creating or directing the German antimissile movement. Moscow doubtless tried to influence the movement and certainly provided some financial support to facilitate demonstrations, but its total contribution appears to have been relatively minor.⁹

Most of the Soviet Union's efforts to block Pershing II deployment in West Germany involved information campaigns aimed at specific groups, devised to exploit fears or concerns peculiar to the German people. As an example, in its appeals to SPD and church leaders, Moscow stressed the danger that Germany could become a nuclear battleground, that eventual reunification would be precluded, or that arms control possibilities would be sacrificed unnecessarily. After US and NATO officials began to characterize implementation of the dual-track decision as a litmus test for loyalty to the Alliance, Moscow redoubled its efforts to obtain at least a postponement of deployments until the arms control talks in Geneva could be given a fair chance.

Tempting though these arguments may have been to a Germany passionately opposed to nuclear war, all participants, East and West, clearly recognized that any postponement would drive a wedge between the Federal Republic and its Allies and could threaten NATO itself. As Moscow strove to alienate Germany from its NATO partners, the Allies resisted doggedly, determined to maintain a common front. Fortunately for the Western Alliance, German politics assisted.

By 1982, the German economy had followed the economies of the United States and most of the Allies

into recession. The Schmidt government, which in 1979 had endorsed NATO's two-track missile decision (as much out of hope that negotiations would succeed as conviction that deployment should proceed), was exhausted from 11 years in power, and increasingly estranged from its more conservative Free Democrat (FDP) coalition partner. The SPD left was in open rebellion over the prospect of Pershing II stationing in Germany, and the Greens threatened to make deep inroads into the socialist electorate. Further, long coalition association with the SPD's policies had eroded public support for the FDP, which was in danger of slipping below the 5 percent that determines eligibility for *Bundestag* representation.

Rudderless and spent, the Schmidt government collapsed in September 1982, when the FDP shifted its support to the right, bringing to power a Christian Democrat-Free Democrat coalition, just as the German missile debate built toward its climax. A national election in March 1983 ratified this new arrangement, confirming the soundness of the FDP's political judgment, eclipsing the SPD right wing, and bringing the Greens into the *Bundestag*.

From the beginning, the Kohl government appeared to understand the gravity of the missile deployment decision it faced. If any ambiguity existed, the barrage of advice and warnings that poured into Bonn during 1983 from Germany's major Allies certainly removed it. Even France's Socialist President, Francois Mitterand, lectured his German compatriots on the importance of fulfilling the NATO pledge. Despite left-wing charges that Pershing II was a dangerous first-strike weapon, designed to decapitate the Soviet leadership, and Moscow's threats that a missile go-ahead would spell the doom of the Geneva talks and thus be a clear setback in Soviet-German relations, the German government held firm.

Much as the government reportedly would have welcomed a US-Soviet deal that would have made Pershing deployment unnecessary, the German Chancellor and his security advisers never wavered in their determination to move ahead on Pershing II stationing, once prospects for an eleventh hour agreement disappeared. Kohl's response to the wave of demonstrations that preceded the November 1983 LRINF stationing vote was firm and unyielding.

The missile debate in the *Bundestag* was dramatic, but the vote never was in doubt. As INF deployment was anathema to the Greens, their emotional denunciation of the proposal and negative vote came as no surprise. Helmut Schmidt urged his SPD colleagues not to repudiate the dual-track decision, but the SPD followed its chairman, Willy Brandt, in voting against deployment. Nevertheless, the CDU-CSU-FDP coalition had the necessary votes and maintained tight discipline. Unintimidated by crowds of demonstrators that turned the *Bundestag* into an island in a milling sea of protest, government parties voted on 22 November 1983 with near unanimity for deployment.

Successful resolution of the Pershing II deployment question in Germany had major significance for several participants. NATO, which had made the matter an issue of allied confidence, was saved a major crisis. The Soviet Union, which played its hand strongly in an effort to block deployment and weaken NATO, suffered a major foreign policy defeat. The SPD was in disarray, with the Greens poised to pick up the pieces. Moreover, Germany's center right government emerged essentially unscathed from a situation that could have torn the fabric of the coalition irreparably.

As America began to airlift Pershing II missiles and warheads to the Federal Republic, Washington had cause to take real satisfaction in the outcome of the crisis and in

the fortitude shown by the German government when the issue was "on the line."

Since December 1983, the German security situation has been anticlimactic. LRINF deployment has proceeded virtually without incident. A serious missile fire in January 1985 raised major questions about the safety of the Pershing II System. But actions taken subsequently to ground the missile sections, thereby precluding the build-up of static electric charges that caused the 1985 fire, seem to have allayed German fears. Even at the height of public concern over the system's vulnerability to accident or sabotage, few calls were heard for reconsidering the deployment decision. With INF negotiations again resumed in Geneva, most West Germans seem to have accepted the message of a pro-deployment slogan, "Better a Pershing in the garden than an SS-20 on the roof!" Most important, the Euro-strategic missile imbalance that Helmut Schmidt identified in 1977 is being addressed.

In one way or another, full deployment of 572 Pershing IIs and GLCMs, or a lower-level balance that may be agreed to in the Geneva talks, the Soviet "break out" in LRINF is being neutralized and the credibility of the deterrent enhanced.

New Technologies and the CDI In recent years, the United States has used a new argument to persuade NATO nations to enhance their conventional military capabilities. This approach takes into account high political and financial costs involved in increasing the size of NATO's forces, as well as demographic pressures on present force structures, and calls for exploitation of new technology to increase conventional capabilities of forces already in being.

NATO always has enjoyed a degree of technical superiority over the Warsaw Pact. Washington wants to press this advantage in key areas that it believes would substantially increase allied warfighting capabilities.

The German government is not unsympathetic to the CDI. The *Bundeswehr* faces major manpower problems that could compel it to reduce force levels sharply in the 1990s. The German demographic profile, warped by the Second World War and constricted by recent tendencies of couples to marry later and have fewer children, will show only 140,000 men of draft age available annually by 1994, whereas 250,000 are required to keep *Bundeswehr* strength at 495,000.¹⁰

Although the government is taking a number of measures to decrease reliance on draftees, new weapon concepts that could help the *Bundeswehr* perform its functions with fewer personnel certainly would be attractive.

A number of objections to the new technologies initiative have been raised, however, clouding prospects for German participation and increasing chances that the program could increase friction with Washington. The principal concern is financial, for new technology is extremely expensive. Whether NATO is considering "emerged technology"—technical advances already in hand and, therefore, priced—or "emerging technology," which still requires substantial research and development, the German government fears that costs, particularly at the "emerging" end of the spectrum, would far outstrip what it is willing to spend for defense.

Indeed, cost increases for weapons scheduled to be acquired under the 1985 12-year plan have left the Defense Ministry some DM 25-30 billion short in the procurement field alone. Were the new, technically advanced weapons envisioned in the CDI likely to give the *Bundeswehr* added capability without significance cost



National Archives

Officers of NATO Ace Mobile Force take part in a NATO exercise in 1969. This "Fire Brigade" force is made up of forces from Canada, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

increases, Bonn would have greater interest. Unfortunately, the German Defense Ministry anticipates that such weapons will be very, very expensive—a luxury it simply cannot afford.

Even if the price were "right," Bonn still would likely view high-technology "smart" weapons warily. Many potential system capabilities that attract US and NATO military strategists, that would give allied commanders ways to conduct offensive counter air operations and interdiction deep within Eastern Europe, trigger emotional reactions in the Federal Republic. Present German defense policy acknowledges the need to hold at risk the territory and military bases of an aggressor, and cites the potential value of new, long-range

conventional weapons to operate against an aggressor's air and follow-on ground forces before they can join the battle.¹¹ But parliamentary critics have charged repeatedly that arming the *Bundeswehr* with deep-strike weapons would mean abandonment of West Germany's defensive posture and, correspondingly, the beginning of a return to the aggressive militarism of the past.

This extreme sensitivity to any indication that Germany or NATO might be seeking to develop more aggressive policies or offensive capabilities helps explain the strident German criticism that followed the 1986 publication of the US Army's revised *Field Manual 100-5*, which set forth basic doctrine for the general conduct of US Army operations worldwide. Similar criticism arose during discussion of the highly controversial AirLand Battle 2000 concept.

This sensitivity also explains the 1984 remark of a high German Defense Ministry official after conclusion of a DM 5,000 million *Patriot-Roland* Air Defense arrangement with the United States. The new cooperative venture, he said, really would confound the Greens and Social Democrats in the *Bundestag*, for they would find little to criticize in Germany's replacement of nuclear-armed *Nike* missiles with conventional *Patriot* and *Roland* Air Defense Systems that have no offensive capability whatsoever.

Strategic Defense Initiative

In March 1983, news wire services in Europe carried a report that the President of the United States had outlined his vision of a world free from nuclear weapons, and called for a program designed to develop a strategic defense system for the United States that would render offensive nuclear forces useless. President Reagan

proposed a massive strategic defense research program and, assuming the research proved successful, construction of a strategic defense network by the year 2000.

The report hit Europe like a bombshell.

None of the Allies had been consulted or informed. No one knew exactly what the President had in mind, nor was able to prepare for the flood of questions that inevitably followed. Not surprisingly, therefore, European leaders reacted coolly to a proposal that many feared could undermine US-Soviet strategic agreements and call into question key elements of NATO security arrangements. As aides elaborated the proposal, and after the President offered to share the system with the Soviet Union, European concern mounted.

This improbable offer had such grave implications for America's Allies that many European observers were convinced that the proposed strategic defense concept either was a public relations ploy or had not adequately been thought through.

In fact, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—popularly dubbed "Star Wars"—represented decisions by the Reagan administration to combine a number of research programs on antimissile defense already underway, to focus existing programs—together with new programs that were to be initiated—on achieving an effective antiballistic missile (ABM) defense, and to seek a massive, multiyear increase in funding for SDI programs. Initial reports spoke of a five-year, \$28 billion research program, at the conclusion of which construction of an effective ABM defense system presumably would commence.

Germany's measured reaction to SDI was, in retrospect, predictable. After initial expressions of skepticism and of concern over implications of SDI for European security, the West German government began to express guarded support for an American research program. Chancellor Kohl's favorable remarks on SDI at the

Wehrkunde Conference early in 1985 were the first from a major European leader. On 18 April 1985, the German government issued a statement endorsing SDI research as "justified, politically necessary, and ... in the interest of the security of the West."¹²

The 1985 *White Paper on Defense* was recast to include a detailed explanation and justification of SDI research as a war prevention measure, consistent with NATO's strategy of flexible response.¹³

The *White Paper* stressed the initial limitation of SDI to research. The government noted that, as such, SDI complies with the ABM Treaty, and pledged regularly to assess SDI's implications for German security, as well as the requirement that European and American security remain coupled. The *White Paper* stated that NATO's flexible response doctrine would be retained without revision, unless a "more promising alternative for war prevention has been found."¹⁴

Privately, German officials and defense thinkers are more troubled. Most accept intellectually the validity of SDI research, although many express skepticism that an adequate ABM shield could be constructed at an acceptable cost, or that deployment of such a system would enhance Western security and not endanger allied cohesion.

Further, concern also exists that, unlike the precise stand taken in Bonn, no sharp distinction is being drawn in the United States between SDI research and SDI system construction. Many fear that the US Congress and the American people are being sold SDI on the basis of the President's vision. This vision is one of a deployed missile defense system, not a research program that will be evaluated carefully for feasibility and cost prior to a decision to move forward. Bonn fears that the voices of those Americans who decry throwing good money after

bad may be drowned out by the multitude clamoring for better protection against the nuclear forces of the "Evil Empire."

During 1985 and 1986, several groups of German government officials and businessmen visited the United States to investigate possible German industrial participation in SDI research and component production for systems that may be developed. German industry understandably is eager to gain technological expertise from taking part in SDI, and its capabilities in certain important areas like particle beam research give German companies useful leverage. Nevertheless, recent efforts by the US Government to tighten controls on technology transfer, and the possibility that non-US firms could be denied results of classified SDI research, have cast doubt on the extent to which German industry could profit from SDI contracts.

The Strategic Defense Initiative also gives the German government practical concerns.

SDI research is proving extremely expensive. System construction, even if it focuses on ballistic missiles and excludes the air-breathing threat from manned bombers, air-launched missiles, and sea-launched cruise missiles, undoubtedly would be much more costly. Where would these additional funds be found? They probably would come, in large part, from existing American defense programs—with dire implications for the European Allies, who would be asked either to assume tasks in Europe and South Asia now being performed by American forces, or tolerate reduction in NATO's deterrent and defense forces in Europe that such a shift in US financial priorities doubtless would trigger.

The piper will have to be paid, one way or another. Many officials in Bonn fear the check will be written in *Deutsche Marks*.

Sharing the Burden of NATO Defense

NATO burdensharing, a perennial Alliance problem that surfaces at virtually every time of stress, stubbornly resists solution. Indeed, a survey of occasions on which the burdensharing issue has arisen, and of remedies proposed, suggests strongly that cries for more equitable burdensharing relate more to general strains in the Atlantic relationship than to verifiable inequalities in national contributions to the Alliance.¹⁵

One way or another, however, burdensharing has been a particularly live issue in recent years, with the United States usually the claimant and the Germans often being looked to as the most likely donor. Assessment of national contributions to NATO always has been difficult. Aside from the nebulous concept of national security, full agreement never has existed within NATO about exactly what the Alliance provides member states, what policies and capabilities are needed to achieve security, or how the burden—financial, political, social, or military—should be divided.

Member states differ widely in size, national wealth, military capability, political outlook, and world view. As a result, measures of national contribution to the Alliance often are poor indicators of whether a particular country is carrying its proper share of the burden, or whether its efforts are proportionate to benefits received from NATO membership.¹⁶

Some observers are critical of the whole concept of burdensharing. "To pose the issue," NATO bureaucrat Simon Lunn writes,

implies an approach to Alliance membership which is antithetical to the spirit of the Alliance as a voluntary

grouping of sovereign nations. Although it was recognized from the beginning that there should be an equitable distribution of defense tasks, it was also acknowledged that a 'final decision as to what constitutes an equitable distribution formula can never be derived from the mechanical use of statistical formulae.' Thus, attempts to produce comparisons of defense effort are at best limited in application, and at worst divisive in consequence.¹⁷

Still, burdensharing rarely is far below the surface of allied discussions. More equitable apportionment of the NATO burden frequently is held aloft as the goal of those who seek to shift responsibilities within the Alliance, justify reductions in national force commitments, or promote new NATO military programs. In recent years, the US Congress has seized the issue to dramatize what it contends is a disproportionate US contribution to NATO and has threatened reductions in US troop deployments in Europe, unless the Allies bear a larger part of the common burden.

These congressional sentiments are concretely expressed in the Levin Amendment, first attached to the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1981, and renewed annually since that time. Under this rubric, the Secretary of Defense has been directed to submit a comprehensive report each year on contributions of NATO nations and Japan to the common defense, and to describe activities by the administration to promote more equitable allied burdensharing.

These reports compare national contributions to western defense, using a number of measures (for example, percentage of GNP devoted to defense, men under arms, force levels, and ability to pay). They also make judgments on the relative equity of burdens carried by the United States and its Allies, based on quantitative

contributions and non-quantifiable factors, such as host-nation support and political burdens of conscription and LRINF stationing.

In recent years, the Department of Defense (DOD) has concluded that NATO Allies and Japan were carrying "at least their fair share" (1981) and "roughly their fair share" (1982-86).¹⁸

DOD burdensharing reports underscore the near impossibility of assigning relevant indicators for national contributions or of determining fair shares for individual member countries. The conclusions of these DOD reports consistently reflect such uncertainties, noting as well that increased national efforts do not necessarily mean enhanced NATO defense capabilities. Defense expenditures for colonial wars, to buttress defenses against fellow NATO members, or to give large pay raises to career soldiers, for example, may reflect positively in a nation's total outlays for defense. But they add little if any additional capability to NATO's forces.

The fixation of many Members of the US Congress on the equity of NATO burdensharing reflects a widespread belief within the US electorate that the United States carries more than its fair share of allied defense costs—that Europe, in other words, is getting a free ride at Uncle Sam's expense. Many Americans wonder why 350,000 US military personnel are still stationed in Europe 40 years after the end of the Second World War. They also ask why the United States should tolerate huge defense-driven budget deficits to man and equip these European-based forces, when many Allies spend only half as much of their national incomes for military purposes, despite having larger per capita GNPs?

NATO supporters in Washington argue repeatedly that such statistics tell only part of the story.

American commitments around the globe limit the validity of defense expenditure comparisons with most

other NATO members, whose focus and responsibilities are much more limited. Further, a significant portion of US defense spending is devoted to nuclear weapons, an area over which the United States chooses to keep total control. In addition, some burdens—conscription, missile stationing, foregone revenues, and host-nation support—are hard to quantify, but add significantly to the contributions of several Allies.

Such arguments have had some effect. But they offer limited appeal to critics who see in burdensharing a useful stick with which to beat the Allies and an appealing issue to use with voters who wonder why NATO Europe, with a population and economy roughly America's equal, spent only half as much for defense in 1983 as the United States.¹⁹

Moves to Political Stage Burdensharing always has been an issue in NATO. But only since the late 1970s has it moved from the arcane world of the specialists to the political stage. In NATO's early years, the United States possessed a preponderance of western military power and wealth. At a time when Washington sought to arm an impoverished Europe quickly to meet the threat of Soviet aggression, a healthy and prosperous United States naturally felt that it could shoulder a disproportionately large share of the equipment, training, and infrastructure needed to strengthen western defense.

As NATO Europe recovered economically, the Allies began to defray an increasing share of Alliance costs. Defense expenditures by the European Allies increased by more than 2 percent annually, after inflation, during 1970-78, while US defense spending decreased by 2.1 percent in real terms annually during the same period.²⁰

By 1978, America's European Allies were providing some 45 percent of total NATO defense spending, which

many observers considered quite reasonable, in view of US spending for nuclear programs, commitments in the Middle East and Asia, and other aspects of global power projection.

Similarly, the US share of the NATO infrastructure program, the Alliance's largest commonly funded undertaking, declined from 43 percent in 1950 to only 28 percent in 1986 (24 percent for air defense projects, to which France contributes). This division reflects Europe's better ability to pay and major allied efforts to upgrade communication networks, as well as port and aerial facilities for receiving supplies and reinforcements in times of crisis or war. Despite this program's increased relative cost to the Allies, its importance for NATO deterrence and defense is reflected in the growth of annual programs, from about 110 million Infrastructure Accounting Units (IAUs) in 1975 to more than 440 million IAUs in 1985.²¹

Notwithstanding these trends, the burdensharing debate remained active and, by the late 1970s, assumed a more political character. While increasing numbers of congressional members were finding burdensharing a useful issue, the Carter administration employed it to secure firmer European support for programs it was promoting to rejuvenate the Alliance. In May 1977, President Carter proposed to allied leaders at the Washington summit meeting that the Alliance formulate a Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP) to meet challenges of the 1980s, particularly challenges posed by rapid advances in Warsaw Pact military capabilities. The LTDP was an effort to get NATO and country officials to move outside normal planning processes and beyond those programs already in national plans to undertake measures that would result in actual increases in allied force capabilities.

To finance the LTDP, the United States proposed that all member countries increase their defense spending by 3 percent annually in real terms for the succeeding

five years. Goals of this sort are not unusual for the Alliance, which in earlier years had agreed to resource guidelines calling for "a moderate overall increase in defense expenditures"²² or "real annual increases in defense spending by all Allies."²³

While the 3 percent goal was couched in typical NATO ambiguity (countries would "aim at," for example, an increase in the "region of 3 percent"²⁴), US officials and the US Congress chose to ignore qualifiers and equate performance in meeting the 3 percent goal as a test of faith in the Alliance. With Carter's revitalized defense programs and the Reagan build-up clearly producing steady US defense spending increases at or above 3 percent, the use of this yardstick by the United States became nearly absolute.

As the Carter years unfolded, it became clear that both the LTDP and the 3 percent real increase were designed primarily to get the Allies to do more and to pull more of their weight in the Alliance. Burdensharing rationale, while not necessarily implicit in the LTDP, was cited by US spokespersons in NATO councils with increasing frequency. Robert Komer, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and NATO Adviser in the Carter Pentagon, described the LTDP as one of his "ingenious schemes for getting our Allies to contribute more." Noting that US defense programs already contained most of the measures required of the United States under the LTDP, Komer acknowledged that the only countries really required to do more under the program were America's European Allies.²⁵

After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US attitude toward burdensharing became even more complex. Washington wanted solid NATO support for actions planned in response to what the American Government considered naked Soviet aggression that challenged strategic western interests in Southwest Asia.

In NATO debates that followed the Afghan invasion, the United States clarified its new attitude toward burdensharing. Quite apart from the traditional measure of resources and forces, Washington wanted political support for those activities it considered to be in the common interest. For example, if Europe were more dependent on Persian Gulf oil than the United States, shouldn't the Europeans share in safeguarding the flow of that oil?

Additionally, some division of labor was necessary for out-of-area matters of common concern. Allies like France and Britain, who had forces to contribute, could stand ready to assist the United States and the RDF it was developing to meet possible South Asia contingencies. Other Allies should be prepared to assume additional responsibilities in Europe, if US forces earmarked for European defense had to be deployed elsewhere.

European governments were by no means as concerned as Washington over the South Asian situation. Further, many European leaders suspected that the firmness of the Carter administration's reaction reflected election-year politics, as much as any change in the security situation. Nevertheless, agreement eventually was reached to provide the political and military support for which the United States asked. A number of planned LTDP measures were to be completed on an accelerated schedule, although national funding limitations generally dictated rearrangement of priorities within existing country plans, rather than commitment of new financial resources for defense.

Additionally, some allied countries provided logistic support and transit privileges to facilitate activities in Southwest Asia, while others agreed to do more in Western Europe should potential US reinforcements be engaged elsewhere. Throughout the continuing Afghan exercise, as with measures for Poland that soon followed, the political dimension of burdensharing clearly had grown enormously.


They likely would be a major factor in future allied debates over similar programs and actions.

Shearing the German Lamb If the Allies often disagree with the US Congress and Washington officials about the fairness of NATO burdensharing, they are virtually unanimous in prescribing a cure. "The Germans," they say, "should do more!"²⁶

This attitude rankles in Bonn, where most officials believe that Germany already carries at least its fair share of the NATO burden and that efforts to squeeze more from the Federal Republic are unjustified and unfair. To be sure, West Germany has prospered enormously since the bleak postwar years, and its economy is in relatively good shape. Not everything is rosy, however, and many Germans fear that the fabric of German democracy is still too thin to withstand economic or social pressures that could be generated by excessive arms spending or military activity by the Federal Republic.

The German government is convinced that its NATO dues are paid in full by the major force contributions it makes to the Alliance. Germany is the only ally to assign all its combat units, except most of the Territorial (reserve) Army, to NATO in peacetime. The 12-division German army provides half the NATO land forces and the *Luftwaffe* half of all allied combat aircraft in Central Europe. These units are maintained at high manpower levels and meet NATO's highest operational requirements. Germany's active armed forces total 495,000 men and can be increased to 1.27 million within 72 hours by mobilizing trained reserves. (See figure 3 on page 143 for a depiction of the German share of NATO forces in Central Europe and in Northern Flank maritime areas.)

Moreover, in case of crisis or war the Federal Republic has agreed to make available some 93,000 reserve



Central Europe and the Northern flank include Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the North and Baltic Seas

Figure 3. German share of NATO forces in Central Europe and Northern Flank maritime areas

(Source: White Paper, 1985, Bonn: The Federal Ministry of Defence)

personnel for logistic support of US reinforcement units that would deploy rapidly to Europe from the United States. German defense expenditures for 1986 are expected to exceed DM 62,000 million, a marked increase from the DM 22,600 million allocated to defense in 1970. Per capita defense spending has risen from DM 370 million to DM 1,040 million during the same period. If Bonn's security-related expenditures for Berlin were included in these totals, defense spending would be about 25 percent higher, making Germany the largest contributor to NATO after the United States.²⁷

Additionally, the Federal Republic bears a number of unquantifiable NATO defense burdens. Conscription carries with it certain political costs not paid by other Allies—mainly Britain, Canada, and the United States—who depend on volunteer forces. Opportunity costs also are involved, and real costs for conscript armies generally are understated. If personnel costs for the *Bundeswehr* were computed at US pay rates, German defense expenditures would rise by about 20 percent.



US Navy photo

German soldiers explain their use of motorcycles to US Marines during Phase II of the NATO Exercise *Bonded Item*.

Military Use Over Rent Germany makes other contributions to NATO that are not shared by many of the Allies. Nearly 400,000 allied troops and 325,000 military dependents are stationed in the Federal Republic. The largest contingent—450,000—is American. But servicemembers from Britain, France, Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands place extra burdens on German civil infrastructure, the Federal exchequer, and Germany's citizens. To support these allied forces, the Federal Republic makes available property worth an estimated DM 40,000 million, thereby forgoing annual rents of some DM 2,000 million. More than a million acres (404,694 hectares) of land are set aside for military installations, a major sacrifice for a nation that packs more than 60 million citizens into territory the size of the American State of Oregon.

Military maneuvers also pose a significant burden for the Germans. Some 5,000 exercises lasting three to four days and involving up to 2,000 men are held on German territory each year. In addition, 80 maneuvers of longer duration, each involving more than 2,000 personnel, also take place in the FRG annually. The German government pays 25 percent of allied costs for the property damage that often results.²⁸

Low-level air maneuvers cause congestion and environmental problems for the Federal Republic, whose airspace is the most crowded in Europe.

Two major political considerations go unmentioned in official German publications, but they must be considered in any calculus of burdensharing.

- One is the siting of Pershing and cruise missiles in the Federal Republic, implementing the 1979 NATO dual-track decision on LRINF.

- The other is the Federal Republic's geographical position in Central Europe.

Were war to break out in Europe, Germany would provide the most likely battlefield. For most Germans, the possibility that either conventional or nuclear war could be fought on their territory is an abiding concern.

The portrait of Germany as a solid contributor to NATO is persuasive, full of sound quantitative data and many excellent examples of nonquantifiable burdens the Federal Republic bears. But will Bonn's recitation of major contributions the Federal Republic makes to NATO keep the Allies from shearing the German sheep too close to the flesh? Barring recurrence of economic miracles in the Ruhr or the Saar, a good case can be made that NATO should look elsewhere for a banker to underwrite new burdensharing schemes.

But evolution of the issue still leaves Germany at risk. Although quantitative contributions remain important, a narrow focus on such matters really misses the

point. NATO discussions are shifting increasingly from financial to political burdensharing. And the United States can be expected to look more and more to the Federal Republic as a political makeweight in Europe, to secure allied support for US initiatives.

In view of the sensitivity of Germany's relations with its fellow Europeans and the frequent disagreements between Washington and Bonn about the most effective ways to approach Alliance problems, the burdensharing process promises to be difficult.

As the burdens to be shared in NATO become more and more political, however, the problem scarcely can be avoided.

German Security in NATO—Domestic Considerations

COORDINATION OF SECURITY POLICIES among a group of nations of such geographic, economic, and demographic diversity as the North Atlantic Allies can be both complicated and frustrating. Over the years, differences of opinion have occurred regularly within this family of nations, aptly described as highly resistant to "hegemony either from within or without."¹

Most of these differences have been resolved relatively easily with the logic and compromise that have served NATO well throughout its four decades. Sometimes, however, one Ally or another has proved particularly difficult, by espousing positions that often appear illogical to its partners or reflecting local factors that may not exist beyond its borders, or are less compelling elsewhere.

This phenomenon is particularly noticeable for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), where a number of domestic considerations place unusual burdens on security policymaking.

General Political Factors

Since the German Socialists adopted their Bad Godesberg Program* in 1959, all major parties in the Federal Republic have supported membership in the North Atlantic Alliance as the foundation for West German security. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) has rarely agreed fully with all aspects of NATO strategy or military doctrine, however, and large numbers of party members and some *Bundestag* representatives are opposed to NATO nuclear policy in general, as well as to any use of battlefield atomic weapons on German soil.

SPD theoreticians, like Egon Bahr and Horst Ehmke, have suggested or supported a number of ways to reduce the role of nuclear arms in NATO deterrent and defense strategy—including “no first use” pledges and a nuclear-free zone in central Europe—but appear unwilling to recognize the need to couple actions of this sort with compensatory moves such as conventional force improvements.²

Appealing as such proposals are to some elements within the SPD, they never have been adopted by the party, which is understandably reluctant to face the electorate vulnerable to the charge that it is “playing games” with German security. German society remains

*The Social Democrats' Bad Godesberg Program, or Manifesto, adopted in November 1959, acquiesced in Germany's security relationship with the North Atlantic Allies, practically abandoned socialism as a goal, and advocated an economic policy of “as much freedom as possible, as much planning as necessary.” It was the first such open statement of the party's beliefs since those agreed on in Heidelberg in 1925. The community of Bad Godesberg was incorporated into Bonn in 1969; it is the site of numerous foreign embassies and government agencies, and residences of diplomats and government officials.



National Archives

The US Embassy in Bad Godesberg in 1960. Chancellor Adenauer supported the Western Alliance under US leadership, and many meetings were held here for discussions on forming the Western European Union. The US Embassy also was a focal point for the visit of President Kennedy to West Germany and West Berlin in 1963.

fundamentally conservative, with a large and persistent majority of voters firmly wed conceptually to security through the Western Alliance.

Nevertheless, some opposition to NATO is emerging. Oskar Lafontaine—a young, politically attractive SPD *Bundestag* member who became Minister-President of the Saarland in 1985—is highly critical of NATO, and openly advocates distancing Germany from the Alliance. While the views of Lafontaine and his supporters are not yet fully in the SPD mainstream, Social Democratic reverses in the January 1987 Federal election could presage an SPD move toward the left.

Of more immediate political concern is the emergence of the Greens, a new national front whose

militantly anti-defense, anti-NATO stance has disrupted *Bundestag* debates and politicized a number of issues not formerly in contention. A product of antiestablishment disillusion and increased concern with environmental matters, the Greens became a local political force in the late 1970s. They vaulted onto the national stage during the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) deployment debate, winning 5.6 percent of the party vote and 27 *Bundestag* seats in the 1983 Federal election.

Once seated, the Greens' representatives used parliamentary procedures to pose hundreds of major and minor questions on defense matters, overtaxing normal channels of departmental response to the *Bundestag*, and saturating question periods with allegations and criticisms. Gerd Bastian, a former *Bundeswehr* general officer, gave the party a defense "expert" in the *Bundestag* who could speak knowledgeably on security issues, enhancing the quality, if not always the credibility, of the Greens' anti-defense diatribes.

The Greens' effectiveness in assaulting the defense establishment and German security programs was reduced by Bastian's departure from the *Bundestag* after the Greens' decision to change their delegation in 1985, halfway through the 1983-87 parliamentary session. Nevertheless, the inability of West Germany's traditional parties to fire the popular imagination, together with popular disillusion over the involvement of major figures across the political spectrum in a variety of improprieties, have increased the appeal of the Greens well beyond their natural constituency of youth, environmentalists, and the disenchanted.

Although observers differ in their assessments of how many supporters the Greens eventually may gain and of their lasting power, most agree that the party, which has focused more on opposing policies and activities of the traditional blocs than on advocating

positive programs, is likely to remain a factor in German politics for some time to come.

The party's surge in popular support after the April 1986 nuclear accident at Chernobyl,* a major factor in its success in winning increased voter support (9.5 percent and 43 *Bundestag* seats) in the 1987 Federal elections, underscores both the degree to which the public identifies opposition to nuclear power with the Greens and the depth of national concern over nuclear matters. Stationing of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) may have become nonissues for many observers by early 1986. But the political fallout from Chernobyl and the continued concern over nuclear power could serve to push missile stationing or other nuclear weapons issues back onto center stage in the future.

Nationally, the Social Democrats appear most vulnerable to the Greens' challenge. Party Chairman Willy Brandt, who recognizes the threat the Greens represent to the SPD's left wing, has tried to move the party leftward in an attempt both to check erosion from the socialist ranks and to lure members who may have become disillusioned with the Greens' *Bundestag* performance. Nevertheless, Brandt's simultaneous scramble back toward the center on defense matters—a sine qua non for

*A serious accident at a nuclear-power plant at Chernobyl, near Kiev in the Soviet Ukraine, that probably began on 26 April 1986, spewed clouds of radiation that eventually spread over other nations in Europe. The mishap, initially veiled in secrecy by Moscow, caused widespread fear and conjecture throughout Western Europe. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, West Germany's environmentalist Green Party, during its annual conference in Hanover on 19 May 1986, called for the immediate closing of all nuclear plants in the Federal Republic. The Greens also threatened to withdraw from their ruling coalition with the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the *Länd* (State) of Hesse, unless the government there initiated concrete steps to close nuclear facilities in that State.

any party that hopes to win national electoral success in the Federal Republic—has limited the SPD's immediate appeal to many Greens' supporters.

What seems clear, however, is that further growth of the Greens' bloc in the *Bundestag* at the expense of West Germany's traditional parties, especially the SPD or the Free Democrats, would vastly complicate German security policymaking, particularly the hard defense spending and personnel decisions that will be required for the *Bundeswehr* during the 1990s.

General Military Considerations

In contrast to the uncertain German political climate, the military situation of the Federal Republic is clear, although no less troubled. Basic problems—including manpower, money, and military strategy—haunt German military planners and seem certain to affect Germany's relationships with NATO Allies in future years.

Manpower Constraints The *Bundeswehr* provides by far the largest national contribution to allied forces in NATO's vital central region. Its 12 heavy army divisions, the foundation on which any allied conventional ground defense would be based, are the major fighting component of the 495,000-man *Bundeswehr*. Since NATO's early years, a half-million-man German force has been a "given" for NATO military planners. In the 1980s, that assumption is increasingly in question, because the German manpower situation has been changing rapidly and soon will become critical. The *Bundeswehr* has three major personnel components—regulars, long-term volunteers, and conscripts. In 1984 these groups accounted for 14, 42, and 44 percent, respectively, of Germany's active duty

forces.³ (See figure 4 on page 154 for a breakdown of the authorized strength of the armed forces of the Federal Republic.)

These percentages differed little from percentages registered annually over the previous 20 years, although the number of long-term volunteers (*Zeitsoldaten*) rose slightly (2-4 percent) over the period, in comparison with conscripts.⁴

More than 220,000 draftees were serving in the *Bundeswehr* in 1984, and the conscript pool remained large enough to produce a like number of draftees in 1985 and 1986. By 1994, this situation will change radically. Using the same availability criteria as applied in 1984 (exemption of conscientious objectors, the physically unfit, married men, and non-German residents), only 140,000 conscripts will be available annually for the *Bundeswehr*, the police, and the Federal Border Guard. This figure compares with more than 280,000 in 1984.

Unless offsetting measures are taken, the size of Germany's armed forces will shrink dramatically.

This problem should come as no surprise to *Bundeswehr* planners, but this fact doesn't make its solution any easier. Future manpower availability problems were first highlighted in the *White Paper 1979* and have been studied exhaustively since then. In a 1982 report, the Special Commission for Long-Term Planning for the *Bundeswehr* warned that unless remedial actions were taken, the strength of Germany's armed forces would decrease to 290,000 by 1995.⁵

The cause of this problem was simple but unalterable: West Germany's demographic profile had changed radically in the postwar years, reflecting the facts that more and more Germans are staying single, marrying later, and having fewer children. The German population is not only aging but, since 1974, has declined by nearly




Figure 4. Authorized strength of the armed forces

(According to the 1984 Manpower Structure Model,
less reserve duty trainees.)

(Source: White Paper 1985, Bonn: The Federal Ministry of Defence)

500,000.⁶ (See figure 5 on page 155 for a chart showing the age structure of the resident population of the Federal Republic, as of 31 December 1981.)

To remedy this situation, the Commission recommended that a number of compensatory measures be considered, such as the following: Tightening criteria for draft exemption; increasing the number of regulars and short-service volunteers; replacing active duty servicemen with reserve trainees; replacing men with machines; shifting nonmilitary tasks to industrial or commercial contractors; civilianizing a number of military functions; allowing increased numbers of women to volunteer for noncombat military duty; and extending the term of conscript service.




Figure 5. Age structure of resident population

(Source: *Facts about Germany*, Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Lexikon-Institut, 1983)

The Commission also recommended that steps be taken to make military service more attractive to German youth.

The Kohl government and its Defense Minister, Manfred Woerner, have taken steps to implement the parts of the Long-Term Planning Commission's recommendations that can be effected administratively. A number of positions in the armed forces have been civilianized and the draft exemption process has been

tightened. New incentives have been offered to enhance the appeal of the *Bundeswehr* to short- and long-term volunteers, and the number of volunteers has increased significantly.

Even more important, the government obtained *Bundestag* approval in 1985 to increase the conscript term from 15 to 18 months in 1989. When implemented, this extension could be highly unpopular. But early passage of enabling legislation should remove some of the political cost that later consideration might have entailed.

Notwithstanding the steps underway to relieve the expected manpower crunch, many questions still remain. Critics contend that even with the three-month draft term extension and other measures being taken, a 495,000-man *Bundeswehr* cannot be maintained through the 1980s. Even now, they charge, the Defense Ministry is "doing it with mirrors," counting 10,000 to 20,000 reserves on active-duty-for-training in the personnel totals being reported to the Allies. This situation, they say, can only get worse if the *Bundeswehr* is forced to compete with reviving German industry for longer-term volunteers.

Responsible members of the Defense Ministry staff acknowledge privately the likely validity of such criticisms. They are expecting the government to maintain its present course until personnel problems become unmanageable and then, perhaps, to increase the *Bundeswehr's* female support component to release more men for assignment to combat units.

Compounding the situation, increasing costs of military manpower represent a growing concern throughout Germany's defense establishment and the security community. Defense spending in the Federal Republic is not yet a zero-sum game, but the general paucity of Federal financial resources sharply limits fund availability for defense purposes. Improving financial incentives for volunteers, and increasing the proportion of volunteers to

draftees, inevitably will mean a rise in personnel costs for the armed forces. If defense expenditures are not increased substantially above the levels now planned, the effect will be to reduce funds available for procurement, maintenance, and training.

Maintaining the *Bundeswehr's* present size without increasing overall outlays for defense could reduce its combat capabilities drastically over time.

One other aspect of the manpower situation also is troubling. Buried in Defense Ministry statistics on conscript availability and service in the *Bundeswehr* are large numbers of conscientious objectors—nearly 67,000 in 1985.⁷

In recent years, 10 to 15 percent of men eligible for conscription have opted for "alternative" service. This group always has been disproportionately weighted with *Abiturenten*—gymnasium graduates from which most of Germany's leaders traditionally have been drawn. Add the thousands of German youth who spend their draft-age years (German males are liable to conscription until age 28) studying or working in West Berlin, not legally part of the Federal Republic, and one encounters a potential political-psychological problem.

Although efforts have been made recently to tighten requirements for claiming objector status,⁸ options for "alternate" service and youth flight to Berlin deprive the *Bundeswehr* "academy of democracy and patriotism" of an opportunity to reach many members of these important and often disaffected groups.

Military Strategy Beneath the sheltering umbrella of NATO strategy and doctrine, a running argument can be heard over how the German armed forces should be configured, deployed, manned, and equipped to meet peculiar German security needs most effectively. Often,

such exchanges are triggered by opposition parties disputing governmental program proposals or strategies they are designed to support. Occasionally, they involve differences of opinion within parties or coalitions.

While the various proposals rarely pose a direct challenge to agreed-upon NATO doctrine, the persistence of some ideas suggests a continuum of German dissatisfaction with certain NATO policies, roles assigned to German armed forces, and the *Bundeswehr's* activities in discharging its responsibilities to the Alliance.

Unquestionably, the principal security concern of many Germans is their dependence on nuclear deterrence. Few Germans would choose to tie their security to weapons of such catastrophic danger, and many are uncomfortable that large numbers of nuclear weapons are stored in the Federal Republic. Virtually all Germans would support large-scale reductions in nuclear arms or their complete abolition, as long as such actions were coupled with adjustments in conventional force levels that would serve to deter non-nuclear war.

But here lies the rub: Critics propose no persuasive alternatives to the West's venerable Flexible Response Strategy that promise effective, affordable deterrence. Thus, grudging recognition generally exists in Germany that, like it or not, NATO and the Federal Republic will remain dependent on nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

The Threat: Few True Believers In the sub-strategic area, many Germans now question NATO's assessment that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact Allies pose a serious military threat to Western Europe. These same Germans wonder whether the Federal Republic could not prudently reduce or restructure its ground forces. Aggression by the Warsaw Pact—a dreaded

possibility in the late 1940s and the 1950s—seems less and less likely. Why, many ask, should Germany expend its financial and manpower resources on a half-million-man *Bundeswehr*, when fewer soldiers might do the job just as well?

The Greens reject any contention that the Soviets threaten Western Europe militarily or politically. They advocate what might be termed "social defense"—disbanding most of Germany's ground forces and depending on citizen-soldiers to defend their homes "Minuteman-style," with small arms and antitank rockets. Should the country be overrun, the Greens say they would fall back on passive resistance or partisan activity to reverse the military outcome.

SPD theoreticians also reject NATO's claim that the Warsaw Pact threat is strong and growing, and must be matched by allied countermeasures. Christian Krause, a retired *Bundeswehr* general officer, and spokesman for a 1982 Social Democratic Study Group, contends that

neither [Warsaw Pact] military aggression nor the exertion of pressure on NATO is likely. . . . There is no discernible need to offset the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact with nuclear weapons nor to undertake a drastic build-up in NATO's conventional arms.⁹

SPD defense "experts" and spokesmen have called for reductions in German armed forces and achievement of a better NATO-Pact conventional balance through arms control. Andreas von Buelow, Parliamentary State Secretary for Defense in the Schmidt government, published two "personal" reassessments of the military threat to NATO in 1985. He stated his belief that Germany could reduce the size of the *Bundeswehr* to 280,000 men without affecting German security. Although von Buelow's views have not been endorsed fully by the SPD, he was selected in 1986 to chair a group charged with drafting the

defense policy plank for the party's 1987 national election campaign. Von Buelow's previous posting in the Defense Ministry gives his views on security matters a patina of authority not enjoyed by the Greens.

In fact, few German officials past or present appear to view the military threat in the stark terms used by NATO's military authorities. Virtually all Germans draw a clear distinction between the Warsaw Pact's military capabilities and what they see as a very low possibility of a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe. While most German leaders acknowledge the need for military planners to consider "worst cases," governments have not been persuaded of the need to adopt national military measures on the basis of NATO's assessment of Soviet capabilities.

The Federal Republic of Germany increased its military spending regularly throughout the 1970s. But it has not undertaken extraordinary measures to achieve the 3 percent target for real annual growth in defense expenditures agreed by Ministers in 1978 and repeatedly validated since then.

Washington's expectation that Helmut Kohl's Center-Right Coalition would be more willing to increase defense spending than the Center-Left government it replaced has been dashed. Kohl and Defense Minister Woerner took office determined to support as strong a defense program as circumstances would permit, but both bowed to political and economic realities when they found themselves compelled to deal with the same set of problems that faced their SPD predecessors. Although defense has been allocated an increased share of the 1983-86 Federal budgets, and given immunity from certain across-the-board spending cuts, defense spending has done little more than keep pace with inflation under the Kohl chancellorship.¹⁰

If, as appears probable, most Germans, including those in government, continue to view Soviet actions as

less threatening than they sometimes appear to NATO military authorities or policymakers in Washington, Alliance initiatives involving significant financial or political costs are likely to elicit little more than lip service from the Federal Republic. Unless, of course, the initiatives are coupled with a threat that German inaction could lead the United States to take its forces home.

Political-Economic Factors

Having placed all its security eggs in the NATO basket, the Federal Republic has been unusually sensitive to any indication that the Alliance may be in trouble. The FRG also is likely to be in the forefront of efforts designed to make NATO work better. Here, Bonn recently has shown particular interest in the two projects listed below.

- The establishment of a European grouping in NATO that could play a larger role in Alliance decisionmaking.
- Arms cooperation among the Allies.

European Pillar NATO always has been an Alliance of democratic partners, whose policies are decided by consensus, not by fiat. Nevertheless, the size, wealth, and power of the United States gives it considerable influence over its smaller partners, a situation not necessarily to the longer-term benefit of the West nor always appreciated by the other Allies. Many German statesmen believe that a remedy to the problem of inequality among the Allies could be found in establishing closer bonds among European members of NATO, in effect forming a "European Pillar" in NATO that would move the Alliance toward a more balanced US-European security condominium. This impulse, in many respects a remnant of

the European integration movement, under which the German Federal Republic gained its sovereignty, explains Bonn's role in establishing an Independent European Project Group outside NATO's military structure, with France as a member, and its support for a range of projects, programs, and initiatives that could strengthen the European Pillar.

Successive German governments have promoted European cooperation and consultation on Alliance issues, so that coordinated European views could be articulated with more clarity and weight in NATO councils than has been the case in the past. While pursuing this line, Bonn has been careful not to promote a European grouping opposed to US leadership but, rather, one that can speak authoritatively for the European Allies and place them in a better position to discharge fully their responsibilities to the Alliance.

To further this initiative, the Federal Republic has chosen, as a matter of policy, to join in a number of arms production ventures with its European partners, rather than buy military equipment from the United States. By doing so, Bonn hopes to stimulate Europe's arms industries and tie Europe's national economies more closely together.

Arms Cooperation and the Two-Way Street

Bonn's conscious tilt toward cooperative European arms projects, and its interest in pursuing joint weapons development projects with the European Allies, are aimed, at least in part, at promoting a stronger, better integrated NATO Europe. They also appear to reflect a continuing desire on the part of many German officials for closer Franco-German ties within a greater Europe—a situation containing numerous built-in contradictions, given France's continued absence from NATO's integrated military structure.

The German decision to build and buy "European" has not been easy, for projects like the *Tornado* multi-role combat aircraft, the European fighter for the 1990s, and the Franco-German advanced antitank helicopter have had high political and financial costs. Critics contend that better weaponry could be procured for the *Bundeswehr* at less cost and more quickly, were the Europeans to buy American equipment already in production. Although the German government acknowledges the apparent truth of this criticism in many cases, it justifies minor price premiums as subsidies to help European industry retain jobs and stay abreast of modern technological developments.

What is often left unspoken, however, is Germany's concern over the heavy and continuing imbalance in the US-European arms traffic and its determination to redress the situation. Economic and industrial planners in the Federal Republic know that Europe needs to increase the scale of local arms production and the technological know-how available in domestic industry, if the arms flow on NATO's "two-way street" is ever to have a significant East-West component. German officials believe a healthier, more competitive European arms industry also will benefit the United States, by strengthening Europe's economy and improving allied capabilities to assume a larger share of the common burden.

Bonn's concern over the light traffic on their side of the "two-way street" has been long in coming. Of necessity, the *Bundeswehr* began its life heavily stocked with arms of US origin. This situation was perpetuated under the "cooperative logistics" arrangements of the 1960s, in which the Federal Republic offset the balance of payments drain from US troop stationing in Germany by purchasing large amounts of military equipment from the United States. The Federal Republic has bought US military equipment costing more than \$10.5 billion during the past 25 years.¹¹

For some years, German industry has had little to sell the United States in the arms field. Although this situation has begun to change, major impediments still limit US arms purchases abroad. The few German weapons that have appeared to meet US needs, or that clearly have outperformed competing US systems, often have fallen afoul of the US military procurement bureaucracy, or have been blocked by congressional action, after lobbying by US defense contractors or protests that foreign purchases would cost America jobs.

In cases in which the United States finally chose a German weapon, results have fallen well below initial expectations.

The much-ballyhooed US selection of the French-German *Roland* Air Defense System disappointed badly, for example. After a major system redesign that sharply decreased *Roland's* European component and negated most aspects of weapon standardization, the project was severely pruned and finally killed during the annual US budget-cutting process. Similarly, the German 120-mm tank gun that won a NATO-wide competition for the main armament of the US M-1 Abrams tank in the 1970s was integrated into that system only in late 1985.¹²

Specific US legislative caveats, like the highly restrictive specialty-metal clause (which blocked imports of military equipment containing certain metals of non-US origin) enacted in the early 1980s, effectively have blocked American purchases of arms and military equipment produced outside the United States. The specialty-metals clause was repealed in 1983. But members of the Kohl government, particularly Manfred Woerner and his Defense Ministry colleagues, continued to give it pride of place in the litany of German political-military concerns recited regularly to visiting US congressional delegations.

Added to the inherent attractiveness of many US weapon systems, these impediments have served to

skew the transatlantic arms flow badly, in favor of the United States. Whether the military sales ratio is 8-to-1 or 12-to-1, as many Europeans claim, or only 3-to-1 or 4-to-1 as American officials argue, an imbalance clearly does exist. Europe is more than willing to pay a premium for developing quality home-produced arms, in an effort to redress this imbalance. The West Germans have played a leading role in this endeavor, which is likely to arouse negative reactions in many US circles, ranging from disappointment to cynicism and anger over what some will see as "anti-Americanism."

No doubt, Germany will continue to acquire some US military equipment, particularly in the fields of missileery and electronic warfare, where comparable or competitive European products do not exist. The Federal Republic also is looking for new approaches to weapons selection and procurement that promise better coordination and cooperation in the future. An excellent example is the innovative air defense arrangement negotiated by the Federal Defense Ministry and the US Department of Defense in 1983-84.

NATO's air defense concept involves low- and high-altitude surface-to-air missile belts running north and south through the eastern portions of NATO Europe, a limited-point defense capability at certain key installations, and a positively controlled fleet of air defense aircraft that would intercept and destroy attacking aircraft penetrating NATO's air defense missile belts. By 1980, the *Nike* high-altitude component of the NATO air defense system had become obsolete and urgently needed replacement. In addition to the system's age, *Nike's* phaseout had another major appeal for the Allies: The old high-level system was nuclear-armed, whereas all potential replacements were non-nuclear.

The logical replacement was the US-produced *Patriot* missile system, which the US Army—responsible for the

largest component of the high-level missile belt—already was purchasing. For Germany, however, the logic of standardizing on *Patriot* was blurred by a multi-billion *Deutsche Mark* price tag and little prospect of large-scale compensatory US arms purchases in Germany.

For nearly two years, US and German officials worked to solve this problem, which threatened to undermine the effectiveness of NATO air defenses in Central Europe. Finally, an imaginative deal was struck: The United States would help the Federal Republic acquire *Patriot* by providing the *Bundeswehr* with a number of *Patriot* fire units, in exchange for Germany's agreement to purchase a like number of *Patriots* and to man other US-owned *Patriot* units in Germany. The *Bundeswehr* also would buy a number of Franco-German *Roland* systems to defend airfields in the Federal Republic, on a number of which US aircraft are collocated.

The innovative character of the *Patriot-Roland* deal is a tribute to the imagination and tenacity of the Germans and Americans who negotiated it. At the same time, requirements and circumstances that produced the agreement may have been unique, making this sort of arrangement difficult to reproduce in the future.

Before turning to other topics, a few additional words about Franco-German arms cooperation appear appropriate. The Christian Democrat-led government of Helmut Kohl has made no secret that it wants to tighten its ties with Paris. Arms cooperation appears a particularly promising area. Defense Minister Woerner and his colleagues have been actively seeking defense projects on which the two nations can collaborate. Although Bonn failed to revive the stillborn joint tank project of the late 1970s, cooperative development of an antitank helicopter has proven more successful. Initially opposed by many in the *Luftwaffe* as "an Opel at a Mercedes price,"¹³ the helicopter has been approved conceptually by the German Cabinet.

Nevertheless, differing national military requirements have combined to raise the project's cost well above initial expectations. A French Defense Ministry official complained in April 1986 that because of such modifications, seven distinct versions of the French-German helicopter now are scheduled for production.¹⁴

Development of the helicopter has been approved by the German Cabinet, nevertheless, and now is moving ahead.

Efforts to mold French and German requirements in European consortium design and production of a European Fighter for the 1990s (EFA) have proved more difficult. France's selection of a combat aircraft always is made with one eye on the foreign military sales market and with a clear understanding of what *Dassault*—France's leading aircraft manufacturer—has on its design boards. In the EFA case, such considerations blocked agreement with other potential consortium members, and France chose in 1985 not to join Germany, Italy, Britain, and Spain in producing a common advanced fighter aircraft. While the consortium partners hope Paris eventually will reconsider and decide to cooperate in the EFA venture, the French need to produce a fighter they can sell abroad still appears the overriding consideration.

In a related development, the Federal Republic has joined France and 16 other European nations in undertaking broad research cooperation under the French-led *Eureka* project. Designed to direct European research into advanced defense technology, *Eureka* claims not to be a competitor of the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Spokesmen for the Kohl government say that Bonn sees no contradiction in supporting both undertakings. Critics, however, charge the Bonn government with intellectual equivocation, citing Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's warning that "we cannot risk losing our best brains [to] ... Americans going through Europe

with their checkbooks"¹⁵ as proof that many governments view *Eureka* as an alternative to and a defense against SDI.

To the extent that such contentions appear justified, German participation in this French-led effort, as well as in other Franco-German defense projects seen by Americans as counter to US strategic or commercial interests, is likely to displease policymakers in Washington and contribute to bilateral strains and strains within the Alliance.

Arms Standardization and NATO Defense Beyond the day-to-day considerations of national technology bases, industrial production, jobs, and the two-way street in arms sales lie major concerns over how good a defense force NATO countries buy for their money. Here, critics abound. How, they say, can the Allies outspend the Warsaw Pact year after year, yet be outproduced consistently in virtually all categories of weaponry? With US defense spending at an all-time high in 1984, and almost all the Allies meeting the 3 percent goal, this situation remained unchanged.

NATO clearly needs to take steps that will produce more "bang" not only for a buck, but for a *Deutsche Mark*, a pound, or a franc.

Analysts who considered this matter in the 1970s pointed to one obvious contributor to this unfortunate situation—the duplication of military equipment models in the weapons inventories of the NATO nations. Over the years, weapons diversity had reduced the scale of western arms endeavors, shortened production runs, and bred inefficiency. These problems stand in sharp contrast to Warsaw Pact practices, representing a major shift from NATO's early years, when most western armies were equipped with US weaponry under US grant aid and military sales programs.

American military supply programs were instrumental in getting the Allies back on their feet militarily in the perilous 1950s; they also served to promote a level of standardization in NATO armaments not approached since.

The North Atlantic Alliance's success in providing security for its members is manifest in western economic and political growth. Ironically, however, economic progress and national prosperity sometimes have encouraged military-industrial inefficiency, through a retreat from weapon standardization and interoperability. With NATO's industrial recovery came the revival of national capabilities to design and produce arms; by 1970, most of the Allies had chosen to produce their own military equipment, when such capacities existed.

In the early 1970s, a number of military writers, like Robert Komer and Thomas Callaghan, produced studies of NATO armaments that showed how serious the proliferation problem had become.¹⁶

Allied armies were equipped with four distinct types of main battle tanks, 14 different antitank missile systems, and a wide variety of wheeled and tracked vehicles, radios, small arms, and combat support systems that were highly inefficient to produce, operate, and maintain, and often could not operate together effectively. Although the NATO nations collectively outspent the potential enemy by a wide margin, uneconomic procurement and logistics practices in NATO produced fewer arms for the Allies at greater cost than in the authoritatively standardized Warsaw Pact.

Weapon standardization—or the somewhat less desirable but often more politically palatable interoperability—had a strong logical appeal to most of the NATO Allies. In 1974, the US Senate held hearings on the problem. After the hearings, Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) offered an amendment to Department of Defense (DOD) legislation for Fiscal Year (FY) 1975 that



Dilling Iron and Steel Works was the second largest such plant in the Saar in 1955. It was re-built as part of West Germany's revitalization through Marshall Plan and Schumann Plan programs.

directed the Secretary of Defense to consider all relevant equipment produced by allied nations as part of the US weapons selection process.¹⁷

Under this dictum and the Culver-Nunn Amendment of 1975¹⁸ that complements it, the DOD has been required to report to the Congress annually on its success in promoting rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) in the weapons inventories of the NATO Allies. NATO authorities applauded the Nunn initiatives and included RSI as one of the project areas under the Long-Term Defense Program adopted in 1978.

In practice, RSI has proven difficult to implement. Rationalization of procedures, techniques, and tactics has been relatively successful, and weapons have been

designed or modified to permit better interoperability. Important improvements have been gained in communications—where, previously, adjacent units sometimes lacked common frequencies on their radio transmitters and receivers—and in equipment cross-servicing and refueling. True standardization, however, has in most cases run afoul of the “not invented here” syndrome or lobbying by domestic arms producers.

Despite, or perhaps because of, the mixed success of RSI, a second round of analysis and proposals for “fixes” now is underway. David Abshire, until February 1987 US Ambassador to NATO, proposed a comprehensive program that would marshal support from legislatures, industry, and labor for an expanded Atlantic arms community, which could make the two-way street a superhighway. Tom Callaghan has warned of what he calls the “structural disarmament” of NATO—the curse of ever costlier weapons, generation by generation—and has proposed a division of labor, together with closer industrial collaboration within the Atlantic industrial market, as ways to maintain a credible but affordable Alliance defense posture.

Senator Nunn has taken steps to promote common weapons programs, “fencing” \$200 million of US FY 1986 defense research and development (R&D) funds for cooperative development or emerging technology projects with other NATO Allies, and removing a number of legal impediments to US cooperation with its NATO partners.

Although Nunn has been in the forefront of efforts to stimulate closer cooperation and greater efficiency in NATO, his attitude toward some of the Allies has become increasingly critical. Long one of the Senate’s staunchest NATO supporters, Nunn signaled his dissatisfaction over allied complacency by attempting, unsuccessfully, in 1984 to link allied performance on rectifying ammunition shortages and infrastructure deficiencies with a possible drawdown of US forces in Europe.

Senator Nunn's message was not lost on the European Allies, who quickly undertook a number of important measures in these areas to enhance conventional capabilities of allied forces in Europe.

Technology Transfer Closely connected with defense cooperation is the use of defense-related technology for industrial production outside the national security field. Part of the attractiveness of SDI and cooperative R&D programs to the European Allies is the associated access to new types of technology, many of which could have widespread non-defense commercial application. The boost given US industry by technology gained from the US Space Program is indelibly etched on the European consciousness.

Unfortunately, US and European attitudes, especially in Germany, differ sharply regarding control of such technology. US officialdom, in particular the DOD, believes that the Soviet Union has improved its defense programs significantly and compromised many of the West's key military developments by stealing or purchasing technology from US and European firms.

As a result, Washington has adopted highly restrictive policies to minimize the transfer of defense-related technology outside NATO. This attitude contrasts sharply with the attitudes of other NATO governments, many of which want to bar from industrial use only that technology having direct application to Warsaw Pact weapon systems. European governments believe that a restrictive technology transfer policy would effectively deprive European industry of much of the technological gain it hopes to obtain.

These points are particularly germane for the Federal Republic, whose export-oriented industry hopes to gain technologically from cooperation with the United States

on SDI and other high-technology programs. If this gain does not materialize, widespread disillusion and bitterness could develop in commercial and industrial circles. Additionally, enforcement of technology transfer restrictions could prove difficult. The West German government has been highly reluctant in the past to interfere with sales contracts between foreign buyers and German firms.

Bonn's narrowly legalistic approach to contracts could prove a major frustration to those charged with enforcing technology transfer restraints.

Political-Military Matters

The catalog of political-military matters important for the US-German relationship is long and dynamic. Still, a few key issues stand out. One major issue involves nuclear weapons, their location, and the situations in which they might be used. These nuclear questions, key to any discussion of German security, have been woven tightly into the fabric of this dissertation on German security and the Federal Republic's place in NATO.

Several other key issues, such as the items listed below, also appear likely to command increasing attention over the next decade or so.

- Armaments and arms control.
- "Out of area" matters.
- Nuclear and chemical storage in the Federal Republic.
- The status of US forces in Germany.

Armaments and Arms Control The German security community prides itself on the quality of the *Bundeswehr*—arguably the best-trained, best-equipped,

and best-led armed force in NATO Europe. The Federal Republic's long-term defense plans are geared to maintaining the superiority of the *Bundeswehr's* personnel and equipment, as well as its present force levels for the foreseeable future. This task promises to be difficult, given the demographic outlook and keen competition for available funds from other sectors of German society. Moreover, even if a manpower crunch can be averted, escalating costs of recruiting and retaining quality personnel and equipping them with modern weaponry are likely to increase domestic pressures to trim the size of Germany's armed forces.

But NATO authorities and some allied officials consider the Federal Republic's plans for maintaining the present size and quality of the *Bundeswehr* inadequate to provide deterrence or defense over the longer term. They argue that, as NATO has too few forces to meet the non-nuclear threat posed by the Soviets, Germany, together with other relatively prosperous and populous Allies, must increase conventional capabilities of its forces to help meet the growing NATO-Warsaw Pact military imbalance.

A variety of actions has been suggested. Some, like the so-called Rogers Plan for Follow-on Forces Attack, are doctrinal. Others, like David Greenwood's specialization initiative of 1984, seek more efficient use of allied resources through a division of tasks and labor within NATO.¹⁹

More recently, attention has focused on possible applications of Emerging Technologies (ET), endorsed conceptually at NATO's May 1985 Defense Planning Committee ministerial meeting. The German government, a co-sponsor of the so-called "Weinberger Plan" for exploiting ET to improve NATO's conventional defenses, has carefully qualified its support, however, to remove any possible misunderstandings about availability

of additional German resources for defense. What Bonn envisions is better use of funds already programmed, not increased defense spending.

German planners also have emphasized their reluctance to focus on an attacker's follow-on forces until they can be assured of stopping his initial thrust. Neither caveat is likely to please US defense officials promoting ET projects, for they likely will involve major new financial outlays and be oriented principally toward deep interdiction.

Central to the German reaction to ET, as well as to most NATO-sponsored initiatives for righting postulated force imbalances, are two convictions. The first is Bonn's belief that German defense forces already are fully adequate to play the role assigned them by NATO. If the Allies want to do things differently, to attain a better overall defense posture, well and good; but no additional costs should fall to the Federal Republic, which already does its part.

Secondly, most Germans think that too many arms now are arrayed on the two sides of the inner-German border. This belief has led to a widespread desire to find an East-West balance at lower, not higher, levels of armaments. Pershing II and GLCM deployment gained *Bundestag* approval in November 1983 only after the Soviet Union had demonstrated that it would not reduce its SS-20s in Europe to a level acceptable to the United States and other NATO member nations.

Similarly, the Federal Republic's strong advocacy of asymmetrical troop reductions in the Vienna Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks reflects Bonn's aim of securing a better ground force balance in central Europe at reduced levels.

For Germany, less almost always would be better, provided the force imbalance is reduced. Less also is likely to be cheaper, a development most Germans certainly would applaud.

Western Security Interests Outside the NATO Area

NATO's institutional resistance to US attempts to involve the Alliance in security challenges outside the formal treaty area already has been discussed here. Germany has supported these US initiatives as a matter of principle, but the extent to which Bonn would be willing to provide material assistance in such contingencies is highly uncertain.

Unquestionably, the German government would consult with the United States or other NATO Allies on out-of-area crises. Federal armed forces also might be able to assume, temporarily, certain NATO defense tasks normally assigned to US military units that would be diverted to Southwest Asia or other trouble spots. To the extent the German government or German industry had influence in the area, the Federal Republic also could be expected to help defuse a crisis or confrontation that imperiled western interests.

Direct German military intervention outside the NATO area, however, clearly is not a possibility.

German officials contend that military activities by the Federal Republic outside the NATO area are precluded by Western European Union (WEU) limitations. US Government legal experts who have examined the WEU restrictions dispute this contention, believing that the limitation is self-imposed—a matter of policy, not of law. Moreover, skeptics argue, a number of anachronistic WEU restrictions on German activity have been removed without difficulty in the past. If Bonn feels restrained by provisions of the WEU agreement, an amendment could be sought.

Most likely, the German government has used the WEU treaty as a convenient way to avoid a politically sensitive decision on out-of-area activities. Bonn has found not choosing sides in the Arab-Israeli quarrel convenient, given the Federal Republic's dependence on oil

imports from North Africa and the Persian Gulf, the lure of Arab arms sales, and the pervasive memory of the Nazi holocaust. Although the Germans have tried to maintain an even-handed approach toward Middle Eastern developments, the interaction of these contradictory policy elements makes the process particularly difficult.²⁰

Hiding behind alleged WEU restrictions also has served the government well in blocking attempts by some elements in the *Bundeswehr* to use "out-of-area" contingencies as a justification for seeking additional forces.²¹

Nuclear and Chemical Weapon Storage in the Federal Republic Germany has renounced the production of nuclear and chemical weapons. Moreover, much of Germany's populace is firmly opposed to the use of either type of weapon, even in retaliation for their use by an aggressor. Ironically, more nuclear warheads are stored on German soil than in any other nation in NATO Europe, and Germany is the only European nation in which US chemical agents are deployed.

Nuclear warheads are part of the theater nuclear stockpile supporting NATO's Flexible Response doctrine. Chemical agents represent a modest deterrent against the use of chemical weapons by Warsaw Pact nations in an attack on Western Europe. An accident of geography has juxtaposed these weapons to a people opposed to their use and uncomfortable with their presence. Over the years, this juxtaposition has been the source of increasing disquiet; many observers expect this situation to become more controversial in the years ahead.

The United States introduced battlefield nuclear weapons into Germany and other NATO countries in the late 1950s. By 1975, more than 7,000 US warheads were

stored in Europe, the vast majority of them in the German Federal Republic. All are under US custody in peacetime, but many would be passed to British, Dutch, Belgian, Canadian, and German forces if a decision were taken to use nuclear weapons. NATO's forward defense strategy and the deployment of forces from six allied countries near the inner-German border led NATO and US officials to position these nuclear warheads in Germany, close by the forces that might have to use them.

In the early years, nuclear storage was not a major issue in the Federal Republic. Only after the "neutron bomb" controversy of 1976-77 sensitized the German population to the implications of battlefield nuclear weapon use did concern over the NATO nuclear stockpile become widespread. By the early 1980s, concerns over the possibility of nuclear accident or attacks on storage sites in wartime—standard elements of the anti-nuclear gospel preached by the Greens and other German leftists—had gained widespread currency in the Federal Republic.

NATO's decision to remove some 2,400 obsolescent nuclear warheads from Europe and modernize the remaining NATO tactical weapon stockpile has served to placate more conservative elements in the Federal Republic, but these concerns appear certain to persist. Public opinion remains highly volatile, because of widespread apprehension over the possibility of a nuclear accident or incident.

The depth of this concern was apparent in the near-hysterical reaction in some quarters to a January 1985 fire that destroyed parts of an unassembled Pershing II missile, killing two US servicemen and hurling missile components well beyond the assembly area where the accident occurred. Media coverage was intense, with some scientists charging that such a fire could ignite an armed missile and create a plutonium cloud that would

spread toxic fallout over a wide area. Managing German reactions to the 1985 Pershing II accident, investigating its causes, and modifying the system to preclude any recurrence monopolized US-German political-military energies for much of 1985.

Despite the thoroughness of the investigation and the success of steps taken to assure the future safety of the Pershing II System, large numbers of West Germans remain fearful that a serious nuclear accident could occur on German soil. They would much prefer that all such weapons be withdrawn.

Less widely publicized and until recently of less acute concern to most Germans is the storage of US chemical agents in the Federal Republic. Since 1982, however, the German press has carried a number of reports alleging that US chemical stocks in Germany are unsafe, and the Social Democrats and the Greens have called for the removal of the chemical agents from the Federal Republic. The secrecy in which both the German and US governments have wrapped the question of chemical storage has fed public unease.²²

The same sort of secrecy fueled press reports of leaking chemical munitions and clouded testimony before the US Congress on the obsolescence and danger of DOD chemical agents stockpiled in the United States.²³

The quickened public interest in chemical storage seems certain to trigger increasingly firm demands that aging US chemical agents be withdrawn. Indeed, if the United States produces new "safe" binary weapons, which become toxic only when the agents are mixed during active employment, and these agents could be deployed to Europe in wartime, the question in Germany will not be whether but when US unitary stocks will be withdrawn and destroyed.

German critics argue that, if existing unitary stocks are more dangerous than the binaries that would replace

them, the logic for removing older chemical agents is inescapable. Further, the limited stock of obsolescent chemicals now in Germany represents a decreasingly credible deterrent to Warsaw Pact units heavily armed with modern chemical weapons and well protected against a retaliatory strike.

Would it not make better sense, they ask, to remove the existing stockpile and rely on new chemical weapons stored in the United States or, as frequently proposed in military circles, on nuclear weapons to deter any Soviet recourse to chemical warfare? As NATO military authorities, the US Congress, and allied governments discuss chemical munitions modernization, storage, and employment, the German debate can be expected to intensify, with its tone becoming progressively shriller.

US Forces Issues After the Missile Deployment Debate

The great missile debate of 1982-83 sensitized the German population to security questions to an extent rarely reached in the past. In the course of organizing local protests, rallies, peace marches, demonstrations, and antimissile "actions," many West German citizens rediscovered the power of popular democracy.

While the demonstrators of 1983 failed to block Pershing II and cruise missile stationing in the Federal Republic, their actions left a residue of—

Sensitivity to military activities.

Public concern over the extent of allied weapons programs in the Federal Republic.

And a heightened appreciation for the power of local groups to influence decisions taken in Bonn.

Unfortunately for US troops and their dependents, the weight of this new local awareness has fallen hard on programs designed to improve force readiness and the quality of US dependent life. The German government

historically has approved most US requests for land on which military facilities and dependent housing could be constructed. Despite the density of Germany's population and the country's limited geographic area, the Federal government has set aside more than a million acres (404,694 hectares) for NATO military activities, over a quarter of it for exclusive US use. The FRG also provides more than 64,000 housing units for US families, some 50,000 of them without charge. Hundreds of requests for land or facilities have been approved by Federal Ministries annually to meet US troop-stationing needs.

In recent years, local communities have started to play a larger part in considering US stationing requests. Since 1983, US military authorities have encountered a striking number of instances in which German towns, cities, and *Länder* either have refused to permit US forces to expand or relocate their facilities or have worked through *Bundestag* representatives to block US military construction. Requests that formerly would have won quick approval are now being denied routinely after local expressions of opposition to the congestion or noise the new facilities would involve.

Many Germans seem less and less willing to have the military as a neighbor. This problem threatens to become a major one for US forces in Germany, some of whom are being redeployed closer to the inner-German border or reequipped with advanced weapons that require more space for operations or training.

Local initiative has been particularly successful in blocking US efforts to expand weapon-firing ranges to accommodate new equipment being issued to US forces. Local political pressure was so great in 1985-86 that the US Army was forced to revise its weapon-firing procedures and rebuild sound baffles on firing ranges before Bonn would agree to consider US requests for additional firing areas. Since 1983, local authorities also have denied

a number of US requests for land on which to build dependent housing or schools; in earlier years, these requests would have received routine approval.

A majority of the German people still support NATO firmly and want US troops to stay in the Federal Republic. But the ease of securing troop stationing needs has evaporated, in large part as a spin-off from anti-missile-stationing activities. With US ground forces in Germany scheduled for major equipment modernization over the next decade, the potential for political-military confrontation over US stationing issues remains high.

Toward the Future

THE HISTORY OF NATO HAS BEEN DYNAMIC, filled with examples of national and institutional flexibility in dealing with both internal and external change. This dynamism has let the Alliance add new members—Greece and Turkey (1952), Germany (1955), and Spain (1982).^{*} It has helped one member, Portugal, overcome the trauma and internal strife of revolution. And it has permitted adjustment of allied military strategies and programs to accommodate a major evolution in the Soviet threat, capped by Moscow's achievement of strategic nuclear equivalency with the United States.

These developments have raised a number of problems for the NATO Allies collectively and for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in particular.

Despite the many changes Germany has witnessed since 1949, however, it has chosen—perhaps has been compelled—to seek answers to its security needs exclusively in the Atlantic Alliance, the composition, dynamics, and strategies of which have changed significantly over the years.

^{*}Charter members of NATO are the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Italy.

Have the changes in NATO altered its fundamental character? What really has changed and what remains the same? Has NATO's evolution created problems for the Federal Republic that could weaken its attachment to the West?

And, most fundamentally, is NATO likely to continue meeting Germany's security needs for the foreseeable future?

NATO—Political and Military

Through nearly 40 years, the North Atlantic Alliance has endured, even prospered, less as a military arrangement designed to counter a common threat than as a grouping of like-minded states united by a common heritage of freedom grounded on democratic principles and determined to stand together for the preservation of a just, democratic way of life.

Indeed, one can argue that, had military expediency been the sole driving force behind NATO, the Alliance might well have withered as the Soviet military threat lost its immediacy, just as Europe's "strange bedfellows" abandoned military arrangements as disparate as the late seventeenth century anti-French alliances of Dutch William,* or the twentieth century anti-German coalitions, when the military threat that united them had passed.

*Prince of Orange (1650-1702), who governed the United Provinces of the Netherlands from 1672 as stadtholder (chief magistrate), and reigned in Great Britain as King William III from 1685. On the Continent, he organized opposition to the war of aggrandizement of King Louis XIV of France, and in Great Britain, he assured the supremacy of Protestantism and Parliament.

NATO is much more than just a loose grouping of like-minded states—it truly is a political-military alliance in which security measures are important but, in the last analysis, less important than the common political outlook and shared objectives that are likely to govern how long the Alliance endures.

NATO's unique political-military character produces both opportunities for longer-term cooperation and a range of problems not found in most other types of military alliances. The multiplicity of bonds between member nations has made NATO very much like a family, intimate but not without divergent opinions, internal bickering, sibling rivalries, and occasional generational misunderstandings. Because the group dynamics of an evolving NATO often have been tricky, managing the problems of the NATO family has never been easy. Alliance management or leadership rests of necessity with the United States, the NATO superpower and nuclear guarantor.

The wisdom, understanding, and imagination with which US officials lead the Alliance will determine in large part how the western nations handle problems facing them, and whether NATO—arguably the most successful voluntary alliance of nation states ever formed—will continue to play the dynamic role it has performed so successfully for the past four decades.

The North Atlantic Alliance was designed to address the mutual security of its members against a threat of Soviet aggression. It also was concerned from its inception with resolving the German problem, which for France and the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) meant ending the threat of German aggression by binding West Germany into West European political, economic, and security systems. The Alliance, complemented by the European Economic Community (EEC) and other European organizations, has proved fully equal to both tasks.

One suspects that many observers in Moscow would agree that German membership in NATO also has served Soviet interests reasonably well. It blocks any possibility of German reunification or a revival of independent German power in Central Europe, contributes to the European status quo, and gives the Soviets a common danger against which to organize their East European satellites.¹

For the Federal Republic of Germany, NATO always has been the key to German national security. Alliance membership was West Germany's "birth certificate" as a modern independent state. German national security since 1949 has depended entirely on NATO, specifically on the US nuclear guarantee that is the Alliance's ultimate deterrent. Although Germany maintains central Europe's largest and most powerful armed forces, and anchors NATO's central regional defenses against possible attack across the inner-German border, Bonn knows only too well that NATO conventional forces are no match for the more numerous and better-equipped Warsaw Pact units. It knows, too, that NATO could contain a well-prepared Soviet attack only with great difficulty or enormous luck—and even then for only a limited time.

German security will depend, for the foreseeable future, on the credibility of extended deterrence—unbroken linkage of European defense forces to US central nuclear systems, the means for which rest in the continued forward deployment of US troops in Germany.

But this exposition of German security is too simplistic.

It fails to give proper perspective or full justice to Germany's position as the leading exponent of NATO in Europe—possibly throughout the Alliance. Germany has identified its security totally with the West, opting consciously for Europeanism and Atlanticism over early reunification, committing all its active military units to NATO, orienting its defense planning to securing the



National Archives

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer reiterates, before an audience of 13,000 in Berlin on 23 February 1954, his government's stand for free West German elections and support of the European Defense Community. With him here are members of his Cabinet and leading West Berlin officials.

inner-German and German-Czech borders, and accepting permanent dependence on its Allies in key deterrent and defense matters by agreeing to forgo production of atomic, biological, or chemical weapons.

The Bonn government thus has become both the leading advocate of the Alliance and, in the best sense, its conscience. As a result, assessments of how various proposed courses of action are likely to affect NATO are important—often critical—elements in German policymaking. While they are by no means immune to certain elements of the “countryitis” that infects many national representatives, German delegates to various NATO organizations and committees often can be induced to adopt more forthcoming positions on issues important to major programs

or to the Alliance's general health than narrower national German interests might dictate.²

Similarly, Bonn's attitudes toward recent efforts to increase European arms cooperation or to enhance defense consultation through the European Defense Improvement Plan or the Western European Union have been conditioned by the Federal Republic's determination to use such initiatives to strengthen NATO not to compete with it.

NATO Forty Years On

During the more than three decades Germany has identified its security with the North Atlantic Pact and the Western Allies, NATO has changed. Like any organism dynamic enough to sustain itself in a changing environment, the Alliance has evolved—a process that has kept it abreast of its challengers, but also created a number of problems, some of which have not been resolved to the satisfaction of all member states.

What really has changed in NATO? What are the implications of these developments for German security?

Militarily, much has changed. Aside from the surface navy, in which the United States always has dominated, NATO's conventional forces in the early 1950s were vastly outnumbered by forces of the Soviet Union. Only the deterrent threat of US nuclear weapons served to offset the force imbalance that characterized NATO's early years.

Today, a conventional imbalance still exists, but it has been reduced significantly. Through the years, NATO's conventional forces have been strengthened, re-equipped, and retrained. New, highly capable ground and air weapons have been introduced. Although France withdrew from most military aspects of NATO in 1966, its military and leadership roles have been assumed most



US Navy Photo

Vessels of NATO's Standing Naval Force cruise in formation in the Atlantic Ocean. From the foreground are: the Canadian Destroyer Escort *SKEENA* (DDE 207); the Netherlands Navy Frigate *EVERTSEN* (F 815); the West German Fast Frigate *BRAUNSCHWEIG* (F 225); the British General Purpose Frigate *HMS AURORA* (F 10); and the guided missile destroyer, *USS CHARLES F. ADAMS* (DDG 2).

effectively by the Federal Republic of Germany, whose 12 heavy divisions and 13 wings of aircraft provide the bulk of NATO's in-place defense forces in the Central European theater.

In fact, France continues to station in Germany a three-division Army corps which, while not committed to NATO, exercises regularly with German units and probably would cooperate with allied defense forces in the event of eastern aggression.³

NATO's conventional situation is no longer desperate, as was the case in the Alliance's early years. Allied military authorities continue to be concerned over the "staying power" of NATO's in-place and reinforcement forces—their ability to resist or repel aggression for a prolonged period—but many military analysts believe that NATO's present military forces could, under a number of scenarios, defeat a Soviet attack, or at least contain it for a limited period.

The steady improvement in NATO's conventional force capabilities supports the current NATO strategy of flexible response. The Flexible Response doctrine calls for a variety of possible military responses, across a wide spectrum, from limited conventional action through threatened use or actual employment of theater nuclear weapons and, if necessary, strategic nuclear forces.

Here, too, the situation has changed radically—but to the West's disadvantage.

Flexible response was adopted as NATO strategy in 1967, after the Soviet development of intercontinental ballistic missiles brought to an end the US strategic sanctuary, and undermined the credibility of NATO's strategy of massive retaliation. The steady build-up of Soviet strategic forces after 1970 had a similar effect: When the Soviet Union achieved strategic "equivalence" or selective superiority to the United States in 1977–78, the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee began to be questioned.

Moscow's deployment of 5,000-kilometer- (3,100-mile)-range SS-20 mobile missiles in Eastern Europe without a satisfactory Western Allied counter—the danger cited by Helmut Schmidt in 1977—challenged NATO's "seamless web of deterrence" doctrine. Skeptics were led to question whether the United States really would risk the destruction of New York to defend Hamburg or Amsterdam.⁴

With the breakdown in November 1983 of the US-Soviet Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and the resultant deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe, doubts over the credibility of extended deterrence appeared to recede. Nevertheless, Soviet strategic equivalence remains a fact, and the question of "linkage" in NATO's Flexible Response doctrine remains close to the surface. Linkage appears certain to reemerge during NATO considerations of new conventional defense initiatives (which some fear could make limited conventional conflict more thinkable, thereby weakening the "seamless web" of deterrence) or as a result of periodic attempts to remove the ambiguity from such usefully vague concepts as Flexible Response.⁵

While insufficient to satisfy NATO's military authorities, the slow improvement in NATO's conventional forces has served to buttress deterrence without providing enough military capability for allied military planners to contemplate waging non-nuclear war in Europe.

Unfortunately, many Europeans have seized on NATO's conventional force improvement and the attendant reduction of the East-West military imbalance to press for cutbacks in national defense outlays. Such attitudes, combined with a persistent faith in extended deterrence, have served to dull European perceptions of the Warsaw Pact threat and to reduce governmental willingness to

devote scarce national resources to military programs that many of their citizens view as thoroughly unnecessary.

NATO's military inadequacies remain, but the European perception is that things have changed for the better.

Politically, NATO also has evolved. Problems generated by the invasion of the Suez Canal, France's partial disengagement and its decision to build an independent nuclear force, the Greek-Turkish crises over Cyprus, and the great missile debates have been faced squarely and generally contained, if not solved.

The Allies appear to have managed detente rather well, although differing goals on the two sides of the Atlantic proved troublesome until the Afghan and Polish crises released much of the steam from the engine of East-West intercourse. Still, most political challenges over the past four decades have proved manageable, with the depth and breadth of shared philosophies and traditions more than sufficient to keep disagreements "within the family."

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, the United States began to chafe under NATO's geographic limitations. Colonial matters that had played so large a part in establishing a finite treaty area no longer were as relevant; Washington believed the NATO nations no longer could afford to ignore their collective security interest in developments outside the treaty area. Before 1982, these concerns lay mostly in Southwest Asia, where Soviet activities, and the activities of several leftist regimes, threatened stability and, with it, the free flow of oil on which European economies depended.

After 1982, American out-of-area interests shifted increasingly to the vexing problem of terrorism, much of which appeared to come from Iran, Syria, and Libya. The April 1986 US air attacks on Libya exposed the deep differences between the United States and several of its allies, as well as strikingly dissimilar public attitudes in

Europe and America over the wisdom of attacking Libya. US media castigated Spain and France for refusing to let US aircraft fly over their territories; European commentators expressed concern that disillusioned US legislators might decide the time had come to bring home US troops who were defending cowardly Europeans unwilling to take a common stance against terrorism.⁶

The "out-of-area" problem—like the military threat—is less a question of fact than of perception. Observers familiar with the North Atlantic Treaty and the history of its formation appreciate how carefully the definition of NATO's Treaty Area was crafted. They also recognize both the historic worth of literal definition in this area, and the dogged resistance of certain Allies to recent US efforts to relax past limitations.

Accordingly, many observers on both sides of the Atlantic understood the reluctance of a number of European governments to endorse and support US activities in Southwest Asia that *threatened to involve the Allies in matters in which they did not wish to take sides* (such as the Arab-Israeli dispute or intra-Muslim quarrels), or which did not appear to be proper NATO business.

Logic notwithstanding, US officials were bitterly disappointed that the European Allies offered such tepid support in past years to US "out-of-area" activities that Washington felt were as beneficial to the Europeans as to the United States. Disappointment has turned to disillusion, as Europeans have shown little more willingness to contemplate common measures against terrorism. Some Europeans justify their responses by terming proposed measures incomplete and more likely to upset important commercial ties to the Arab world than to root out terrorism; others say the situation is complicated by intra-Arab disputes and note that Libya and Syria (considered the principal sources of funding and training for terrorists operating in Europe and the Middle East) are closely tied to

the Palestinian cause and the Palestine Liberation Organization-Israeli struggle, on which allied views differ sharply.

Still, US belief that America has been abandoned by a number of its allies remains strong. Some vocal critics even suggest that the United States should pack up its military forces in Europe, pick up its nuclear marbles, and go home.⁷

Even if US views on out-of-area problems are unable to secure an official broadening of the Alliance, they clearly reflect an American perception that the threat to the Atlantic Allies has expanded. If NATO is to meet this challenge, it needs to address and, if possible, accommodate US concerns in this area without delay.

NATO also has clearly changed its focus over the past four decades. The force build-up in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been striking and, in the case of NATO's conventional arms, highly promising for both deterrence and stability. Moscow's achievement of strategic equivalency also has major military and political significance. Moreover, the German agreements of 1970-72 and the detente that followed transformed the political framework of postwar Europe. Despite the presence of large, well-equipped military forces and nuclear-capable delivery systems in border areas across the European continent, citizens of most allied countries feel no real threat of military attack and now focus their concerns primarily on social and economic matters.

These changes are important, indeed. Beneath this shifting surface, however, basic principles and fundamental security needs of most Allies remain familiar and unaltered. NATO countries retain the same basic principles—freedom, justice, and collective self-defense—and the same common values and shared traditions that led them to band together in 1949. NATO has succeeded in preventing aggression within the North Atlantic area, as

well as in promoting political, economic, and military cooperation among member states.

The democratic character of the Alliance has been reaffirmed regularly, both by consultation and deliberations in allied councils and by constructive political change within several allied nations. Since 1974, dictatorships have been succeeded by popularly elected governments in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, and Turkey has begun the process of returning political power to popularly elected officials.

NATO's twin pillars of democracy and collective self-defense have proved strong and unshakable.

The current military situation would be familiar to most North Atlantic pioneers. Soviet military capabilities remain strong, having improved steadily since the 1950s in all military fields. Indeed, Moscow's calculated use of its military power in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Afghanistan reminded all but the soundest sleepers among those lulled by decades of European peace and East-West détente that the Russian Bear has not been tamed and will not hesitate to use its strength when challenges or opportunities arise.

Furthermore, the erosion of NATO's qualitative edge in advanced weaponry may be expected to reduce the deterrent effect of allied conventional formations and enhance the importance of US strategic systems to the Alliance's deterrent posture.

Clearly, the Warsaw Pact's military posture remains sufficiently strong and menacing to give NATO and all its member states pause.

German Security and the Mutable Alliance

As NATO has evolved over the decades to accommodate changing circumstances and major developments in

the East and West, little has truly changed in German security. Without doubt, the East-West military situation has altered, with forces on both sides of the inner-German border better trained and better equipped than ever before. Both sides have produced and deployed large numbers of nuclear weapons, and the Soviets have acquired major new capabilities to strike targets in Europe and North America.

Doubtless, too, Moscow's attainment of strategic equivalence has transformed the East-West nuclear equation.

Concurrently, detente and the quickened East-West intercourse that accompanied it have helped alter perceptions of the Soviet military threat among the Europeans. For most West Germans who deal with national security questions, however, none of the elements vital to Germany appear to have changed. Deterrence remains the highest priority in the Federal Republic, and the doctrinal triad of Flexible Response, Forward Defense, and Extended Deterrence is credible and healthy. Germany's security *sine qua non*, the assurance of firm linkage to US strategic nuclear systems, also appears secure.

Because the Federal Republic's access to the US nuclear umbrella comes through the American troop presence under NATO, the health and institutional strength of the Alliance are of unusual concern to Bonn. No doubt exists that most allied governments consider Germany just as important to the Alliance as NATO is to the Federal Republic. Still, no other member nation has cast its lot with the Alliance so irreversibly as Germany; all of the Federal Republic's principal Allies—Britain, France, and the United States—maintain strategic nuclear arsenals of last resort, a security option Bonn has renounced.

With its full spectrum of deterrent forces, the Alliance is vitally important to the Federal Republic, which can be expected to continue to pay particular attention to

NATO's health and viability. As one NATO official recently said,

Some western officials contend the Germans have no place else to go and that, therefore, we can afford to squeeze them, politically and financially. But this really misses an important and highly positive point: The Federal Republic is the home of NATO's real enthusiasts, most of them having bought the European and Atlantic concepts fully after 1945. These Germans are the Alliance's staunchest supporters and, in the most constructive sense, its conscience, as well.⁸

The Decades Ahead

Although NATO still appears to meet the Federal Republic's basic security requirements, West German officials are acutely aware that, as in the past, alterations—some of them unfavorable to Germany's interests—could occur at any time. With so much at stake, they are certain to be alert to challenges that will have to be met, as well as to opportunities for strengthening the Alliance.

Future challenges, by their very nature, are hard to predict.

Nevertheless, they could be expected to involve technological "breakouts" in NATO or Soviet weapon systems, membership changes in NATO or the Warsaw Pact, or internal political shifts within the Alliance. NATO strategy is certain to be called into question from time to time, and a variety of tactics probably will be proposed to support present or future strategies. NATO nuclear doctrine undoubtedly will be debated, as will possible alternatives to nuclear weapons for both deterrence and defense.

Finally, as weapon systems become more complicated, more expensive, and less numerous, the Western

Allies will be certain to look for ways to improve NATO's deterrent and defense postures without excessive cost and, where possible, with fewer personnel. How the Allies handle weapon selection and procurement—through cooperation or unrestrained competition—will be important, for these issues have potential either to bind NATO closer together or tear the fabric of allied industrial cooperation and close the two-way street.

For its part, the Federal Republic can be expected to seek constructive answers to these challenges, using Atlantic and supportive European institutions. Although a left-wing Social Democratic-Greens liaison could complicate Germany's traditional pro-NATO stance, the Federal Republic is not likely to forsake its long-standing policy goals, which feature deterrence by conventional strength beneath a watertight American nuclear umbrella.

Concurrently, Federal Republic officials are certain to be looking for ways to strengthen the Alliance. Here, two areas have attracted German attention in the past and likely will have prominence in the future:

- Franco-German cooperation.
- Construction of a strong European Pillar in NATO.

Progress in these areas could facilitate some sort of coordination or cooperation between French military forces and NATO defense formations, as well as make Europe a more cohesive, effective, and responsible Alliance partner for the United States.

Franco-German Military Cooperation Security cooperation with France long has represented both a goal and a challenge for German policy. Bonn and Paris have had regular military-to-military contact since the Franco-German Friendship Treaty was concluded in 1963, although de Gaulle's 1965 withdrawal of French forces from NATO's integrated military system caused military leaders of both countries to mute their consultations somewhat.

Throughout these exchanges, both sides have recognized their potential importance for western security: Without French units, NATO's defense formations are less able to deter or defend against attack; without the use of French territory, reinforcement and resupply would be vastly more difficult, and a defense in depth becomes unthinkable.

Although France no longer takes part in most NATO military bodies, it has continued to station the Second French Army Corps of three divisions within Germany's borders. Over the years, these troops have held a number of joint exercises with neighboring German units. Many German military officials are convinced that, were war to come, the Second French Corps would cooperate in defending the Central Front. This possibility, of necessity a consideration for Soviet military planners, buttresses NATO's deterrent and defense capabilities. Any moves to tighten Franco-NATO military cooperation would improve this situation even further. Chancellor Kohl's June 1987 proposal to create a Franco-German brigade is of particular interest in this regard.

Bonn also has been alert to other ways in which France might be induced to cooperate more closely with the Allies. Such considerations clearly have played a role in bi- and multi-lateral armaments projects. They also apparently account for the German government's somewhat stronger support for the Independent European Project Group (of which France is a member) than for NATO's EUROGROUP, in which France does not participate.

The German Federal Republic's desire to involve France more closely in European security matters explains in large part Germany's interest in exploring the 1984 French initiative to strengthen the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU case illustrates some of the difficulties that must be overcome before European cooperation in NATO can be more than a goal.

In 1984 and 1985, France proposed expanding the scope of the WEU to give it a larger and more active role in European security coordination and cooperation. This initiative fell on fertile soil in Bonn and several other European capitals, where leaders had been seeking ways to bring France back into Western Defense Councils and erect a European structure within NATO that could give a more healthy balance to the transatlantic relationship. Although the WEU has limited membership, most important Western European nations are represented, and all parties—unlike in the EEC and in other European entities—are NATO members. (See figure 6 on page 201 for an outline of the structure of the Western European Union.)

A series of WEU meetings followed, with Defense Ministers attending for the first time. But an impasse quickly surfaced over the WEU's future relationship with the Atlantic Alliance. Most member nations—including the Federal Republic—were adamant that WEU activities in the security field must be designed to support and strengthen NATO, not compete with it.

France disagreed, ruling out any such role for the organization, and reportedly implying that it wanted a strong WEU under French leadership, independent of existing Alliance relationships. This disagreement quickly sapped the initiative's strength. By 1987, the WEU still was holding reinforced meetings, but member states remained widely divided over the WEU's possible future roles.

Strengthening NATO's "European Pillar" The Federal Republic's effort to bring France closer to, if not back into, NATO's military structure is one of the longer-term tasks it has undertaken to improve the Alliance's military posture and its capability to deter and defend.

German leaders also have been looking closely at the future of NATO. How, they ask, can the Alliance best




Figure 6. Structure of the Western European Union (WEU)

The WEU's Foreign and Defense Ministers decided at their meeting of 22-23 April 1985 in Bonn that the Agency for the Control of Armaments, the International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee, and the Standing Armaments Committee would be comprehensively reorganized. They agreed to establish the following three new structures, under the collective title "Agencies for Security Questions": an Agency for the Study of Arms Control and Disarmament Questions, an Agency for the Study of Security and Defense Questions, and an Agency for the Development of Cooperation in the Field of Armaments.

(Source: *White Paper 1985*. Bonn: The Federal Ministry of Defence)

maintain its dynamism over the longer term, as well as retain the will and capability to identify requirements and undertake programs necessary to safeguard western security? No single answer has yet emerged. But many suggested answers contain a common element: A stronger, more responsible, better-coordinated European voice within the Alliance—in current parlance, a stronger “European Pillar” in NATO.

The twin pillar approach to Atlantic security, originally set forth by John Kennedy in 1962, envisioned a strong and united European partner in NATO that would share in creating a common defense, attacking a broad range of international problems and responding to the needs of the Third World.⁴

Unfortunately, the European unity movement lost momentum in the 1950s and needs a major push to set it back in motion. Much as most Atlanticists would wish it, European unity—central to Kennedy’s twin-pillared Atlantic partnership—still appears, at best, many years distant. For many Germans, the European Pillar concept retains considerable appeal. It could revive the European unification movement, and promote a heightened European role in a strengthened Atlantic Alliance.

European unification is a basic goal of most citizens of the Federal Republic, who opted consciously in 1949 for European integration and the Atlantic security tie. The concept of a heightened European role in a strengthened Atlantic Alliance reflects a widely held judgment that NATO will be stronger, healthier, and longer-lived if Europeans cooperate to play a larger and more responsible role in Alliance affairs.

Constructing a viable European Pillar will not be easy.

Despite political and economic consultations in the EEC, the Council of Europe, and other “European” organizations, such exchanges still are relatively primitive, falling well short of the close policy coordination that would

be required before effective give-and-take discussions can be held with the United States on Atlantic matters.

Recognizing these problems, many Germans—and to a lesser extent citizens of other European countries—view European arms cooperation as an important way to begin strengthening the European Pillar. Indeed, a former NATO Assistant Secretary General says he considers arms cooperation particularly important for enhancing Europe's image and voice: It would involve not just governments, but also all levels of industry, the research and development (R&D) community, and a wide range of commercial concerns.¹⁰

Such arms projects do more than produce weapon systems. Arms production means jobs, maintaining industrial capacity, enhancing technical know-how and—as with the Anglo-French *Concorde* project—keeping abreast of new concepts, and maintaining R&D capabilities. For these reasons, Germany and the other European Allies have made special efforts to mount collaborative programs in Europe to produce tanks, helicopters, antiaircraft and antitank missiles, and combat and transport aircraft.

The new European fighter aircraft project is particularly important to consortium members, who hope it will enhance European technical and production capabilities.

Another area of promise for arms development and production is antimissile or "extended air" defense. In 1985, West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner drew attention to what he believes is an important gap in western air defenses. Woerner said NATO has focused on attack aircraft, ignoring the threat of short-range Soviet missiles that could perform many of the same tasks as aircraft, such as precision conventional strikes on allied airfields, ports, or command-and-control facilities. Some observers have questioned whether Woerner envisioned a European system that, like the American Strategic Defense Initiative, would feature a boost-phase destruction

capability, or one that could intercept missiles on terminal approach.¹¹

But Britain and France have shown interest only in the latter concept, called Extended Air Defense (EAD), for which feasibility studies are being undertaken. As a result, some experts think that EAD program decisions may not be made before the late 1990s.

Nevertheless, a number of potential problems already can be identified. The chief one is cost, for EAD would require state-of-the-art technology, which tends toward very high prices and unexpected cost overruns. As none of the potential European participants has budgeted for EAD, and little additional monies are likely to be available for weaponry, other sources of funding appear necessary. The most logical contributor is the United States, whose troops and facilities in Europe are vulnerable to missile attack and who presumably would want to take part in EAD to protect them.

At the same time, US participation would significantly lessen EAD's value for the European pillar, if it led to selection of a US-designed or -produced weapon system.¹² Predicting the future of Extended Air Defense is too difficult this early in the development process. Neither do we know whether other approaches to NATO's vulnerability to theater missile attack—perhaps involving force dispersal or facilities hardening—are feasible or cost-effective. Equally premature would be speculation on whether this project or others like it can foster the cooperation required to construct a viable "European Pillar." Although the degree of Europeanism implied by the undertaking is considerable, no one knows if European integration is an idea whose time has not yet come, or already has passed.

The Federal Republic can be expected to remain in the vanguard of the movement, however, for Bonn views the idea as complementary to NATO and highly important to the Alliance's long-term health.

Ultimate Security Tie As we have seen, German security since 1949 has been identified exclusively with the North Atlantic Alliance. In fact, Germany's military integration into NATO and its total nuclear dependence on the United States leave Bonn no viable security alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. The Federal Republic's reaction to this situation has been refreshingly free of resignation or frustration. Successive German governments have accepted Germany's security fetters gracefully, and have tried to turn them to positive advantage, becoming Europe's leading NATO advocate and a promoter of institutional progress and allied cooperation.

For most of the Allies, this posture is fully acceptable.

Germany takes part fully and enthusiastically in NATO, giving the Alliance political strength and dynamism that enable the Allies to present a credible deterrent and defense posture in Central Europe. Remarkably, Bonn's important contributions to the Alliance have not been accompanied by German insistence on exercising political or military leadership.¹³ Although the Federal Republic is playing a larger role in some areas, slowly assuming more important military posts and promoting European arms cooperation, many observers expect Bonn's reticence to continue as long as latent allied hostility or sensitivities persist.¹⁴

Finally, any Europeans who remain concerned that a reunited Germany could again become a threat can take comfort in Germany's participation in an Alliance that makes reunification a virtual impossibility, thereby effectively answering the long-standing German question.

Changes in NATO over the past four decades are apparent. Solving secondary problems that have emerged during NATO's evolution is the common task of all NATO nations. This task must be approached in a spirit of cooperation, candor, and compromise that will not undermine the mechanism nor the basic principles on which German and western security are based.

For the West Germans, however, things that have not changed are more important than those that have. The principles of democracy, justice, and mutual defense, on which the Western Alliance is grounded, are basic to German security and the security and welfare of the free world.

Safeguarding these principles—and the Alliance that proclaims them—remains the Federal Republic's first priority.

Appendix A

The Brussels Treaty

1

Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as amended by the 'Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty'

Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954

[The High Contracting Parties]

Resolved:

To reaffirm their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations;

To fortify and preserve the principles of democracy, personal freedom and political liberty, the constitutional traditions and the rule of law, which are their common heritage;

To strengthen, with these aims in view, the economic, social and cultural ties by which they are already united;

To co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery;

To afford assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression;

To promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe;¹

To associate progressively in the pursuance of these aims other States inspired by the same ideals and animated by the like determination;

Desiring for these purposes to conclude a treaty for collaboration in economic, social and cultural matters and for collective self-defence;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I²

Convinced of the close community of their interests and of the necessity of uniting in order to promote the economic recovery of Europe, the High Contracting Parties will so organise and co-ordinate their economic activities as to produce the best possible results, by the elimination of conflict in their economic policies, the coordination of production and the development of commercial exchanges.

The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII, as well as through other bodies, shall not involve any duplication of, or prejudice to, the work of other economic organisations in which the High Contracting Parties are or may be represented but shall on the contrary assist the work of those organisations.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common, both by direct consultation and in specialised agencies, to promote the attainment of a higher standard of living by their peoples and to develop on corresponding lines the social and other related services of their countries.

The High Contracting Parties will consult with the object of achieving the earliest possible application of recommendations

1. Amended by Article II of the Protocol.

2. Amended by Article II of the Protocol.

of immediate practical interest, relating to social matters, adopted with their approval in the specialised agencies.

They will endeavor to conclude as soon as possible conventions with each other in the sphere of social security.

Article III

The High Contracting Parties will make every effort in common to lead their peoples towards a better understanding of the principles which form the basis of their common civilisation and to promote cultural exchanges by conventions between themselves or by other means.

Article IV³

In the execution of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters.

Article V⁴

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power.

3. New Article inserted under Article III of the Protocol.

4. Formerly Article IV.

*Article VI*⁵

All measures taken as a result of the preceding Article shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. They shall be terminated as soon as the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

The present Treaty does not prejudice in any way the obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. It shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

*Article VII*⁶

The High Contracting Parties declare, each so far as he is concerned, that none of the international engagements now in force between him and any other of the High Contracting Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of the present Treaty.

None of the High Contracting Parties will conclude any alliance or participate in any coalition directed against any other of the High Contracting Parties.

*Article VIII*⁷

1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider

5. Formerly Article V.

6. Formerly Article VI.

7. Formerly Article VII, as amended by Article IV of the Protocol.

matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and their Annexes.

2. This Council shall be known as the "Council of Western European Union"; it shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments.

Article IX⁸

The Council of Western European Union shall make an annual report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Article X⁹

In pursuance of their determination to settle disputes only by peaceful means, the High Contracting Parties will apply to disputes between themselves the following provisions:

8. New Article inserted under Article V of the Protocol.

9. Formerly Article VIII.

The High Contracting Parties will, while the present Treaty remains in force, settle all disputes falling within the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, by referring them to the Court, subject only, in the case of each of them, to any reservation already made by that Party when accepting this clause for compulsory jurisdiction to the extent that that Party may maintain the reservation.

In addition, the High Contracting Parties will submit to conciliation all disputes outside the scope of Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.

In the case of a mixed dispute involving both questions for which conciliation is appropriate and other questions for which judicial settlement is appropriate, any Party to the dispute shall have the right to insist that the judicial settlement of the legal questions shall precede conciliation.

The preceding provisions of this Article in no way affect the application of relevant provisions or agreements prescribing some other method of pacific settlement.

Article XI¹⁰

The High Contracting Parties may, by agreement, invite any other State to accede to the present Treaty on conditions to be agreed between them and the State so invited.

Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing an instrument of accession with the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government will inform each of the High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of accession.

Article XII¹¹

The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.

10. Formerly Article IX.

11. Formerly Article X.

It shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the last instrument of ratification and shall thereafter remain in force for fifty years.

After the expiry of the period of fifty years, each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to cease to be a party thereto provided that he shall have previously given one year's notice of denunciation to the Belgian Government.

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties of the deposit of each instrument of ratification and of each notice of denunciation.

2

Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty

Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954; entered into force on May 6, 1955

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on March the 17th, 1948, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, on the one hand,

and the President of the Federal Republic of Germany and the President of the Italian Republic on the other hand,

Inspired by a common will to strengthen peace and security;

Desirous to this end of promoting the unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe;

Convinced that the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic to the Treaty will represent a new and substantial advance towards these aims;

Having taken into consideration the decisions of the London Conference as set out in the Final Act of October the 3rd, 1954, and its Annexes;

Have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the Belgians

His Excellency M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The President of the French Republic, President of the French Union

His Excellency M. Pierre Mendès-France, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The President of the Federal Republic of Germany

His Excellency Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Federal Chancellor, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs

The President of the Italian Republic

His Excellency M. Gaetano Martino, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg

His Excellency M. Joseph Bech, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands

His Excellency M. Johan Willem Beyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Her Majesty The Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The Right Honourable Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., M.C., Member of Parliament, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Who, having exhibited their full powers found in good and due form,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Italian Republic hereby accede to the Treaty as modified and completed by the present Protocol.

The High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol consider the Protocol on Forces of Western Europe Union

(hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. II), the Protocol on the Control of Armaments and its Annexes (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. III), and the Protocol on the Agency of Western European Union for the Control of Armaments (hereinafter referred to as Protocol No. IV) to be an integral part of the present Protocol.

Article II

The sub-paragraph of the Preamble to the Treaty: "to take such steps as may be held necessary in the event of renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression" shall be modified to read: "to promote the unity and to encourage the progressive integration of Europe."

The opening words of the 2nd paragraph of Article I shall read: "The co-operation provided for in the preceding paragraph, which will be effected through the Council referred to in Article VIII. . ."

Article III

The following new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IV: "In the execution of the Treaty the High Contracting Parties and any organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

"Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the Military Staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate Military Authorities of NATO for information and advice on military matters."

Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the Treaty will become respectively Articles V, VI, VII and VIII.

Article IV

Article VIII of the Treaty (formerly Article VII) shall be modified to read as follows:

"1. For the purposes of strengthening peace and security and of promoting unity and of encouraging the progressive integration of Europe and closer co-operation between Them and with other European organisations, the High Contracting Parties to the Brussels Treaty shall create a Council to consider matters concerning the execution of this Treaty and of its Protocols and other Annexes.

"2. This Council shall be known as the 'Council of Western European Union'; it shall be so organised as to be able to exercise its functions continuously; it shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be considered necessary: in particular it shall establish immediately an Agency for the Control of Armaments whose functions are defined in Protocol No. IV.

"3. At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit Them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.

"4. The Council shall decide by unanimous vote questions for which no other voting procedure has been or may be agreed. In the cases provided for in Protocols II, III and IV it will follow the various voting procedures, unanimity, two-thirds majority, simple majority, laid down therein. It will decide by simple majority questions submitted to it by the Agency for the Control of Armaments."

Article V

A new Article shall be inserted in the Treaty as Article IX: "The Council of Western European Union shall make an Annual Report on its activities and in particular concerning the control of armaments to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe."

The Articles VIII, IX and X of the Treaty shall become respectively Articles X, XI and XII.

Article VI

The present Protocol and the other Protocols listed in Article I above shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Belgian Government.*

*RATIFICATIONS	Date of Deposit
Italy.....	April 20, 1955
Belgium.....	April 22, 1955
Netherlands.....	May 1, 1955
Luxembourg.....	May 4, 1955
France.....	May 5, 1955
Federal Republic of Germany.....	May 5, 1955
United Kingdom.....	May 5, 1955

They shall enter into force when all instruments of ratification of the present Protocol have been deposited with the Belgian Government and the instrument of accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty has been deposited with the Government of the United States of America.[†]

The Belgian Government shall inform the Governments of the other High Contracting Parties and the Government of the United States of America of the deposit of each instrument of ratification.

In witness whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris this twenty-third day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other signatories.

[†]May 6, 1955.

For Belgium:

(L.S.) P.-H. SPAAK.

For France:

(L.S.) P. MENDES-FRANCE.

For the Federal Republic of Germany:

(L.S.) ADENAUER.

For Italy:

(L.S.) G. MARTINO.

For Luxembourg:

(L.S.) JOS. BECH.

For the Netherlands:

(L.S.) J.W. BEYEN.

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.

3

**PROTOCOL NO. II ON FORCES OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

Paris, 23 October, 1954

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, and Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Having consulted the North Atlantic Council,

Have appointed . . . ,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The land and air forces which each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall place under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in peacetime on the mainland of Europe shall not exceed in total strength and number of formations:

- a. for Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the maxima laid down for peacetime in the Special Agreement annexed to the Treaty on the Establishment of a European Defence Community signed at Paris, on 27 May, 1952; and
- b. for the United Kingdom, four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force;
- c. for Luxembourg, one regimental combat team.

2. The number of formations mentioned in paragraph 1 may be brought up to date and adapted as necessary to make them suitable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, provided that the equivalent fighting capacity and total strengths are not exceeded.

3. The statement of these maxima does not commit any of the High Contracting Parties to build up or maintain forces at these levels, but maintains their right to do so if required.

Article II

As regards naval forces, the contribution to NATO Commands of each of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be determined each year in the course of the Annual Review (which takes into account the recommendations of the NATO military authorities). The naval forces of the Federal Republic of Germany shall consist of the vessels and formations necessary for the defensive missions assigned to it by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation within the limits laid down in the Special Agreement mentioned in Article I, or equivalent fighting capacity.

Article III

If at any time during the Annual Review recommendations are put forward, the effect of which would be to increase the level of forces above the limits specified in Articles I and II, the acceptance by the country concerned of such recommended increases shall be subject to the unanimous approval of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol expressed either in the Council of Western European Union or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

Article IV

In order that it may establish that the limits specified in Article I and II are being observed, the Council of Western European Union will regularly receive information acquired as a result of inspections carried out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Such information will be transmitted by a high-ranking officer designated for the purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

Article V

The strength and armaments of the internal defence and police forces on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties to the present Protocol shall be fixed by agreements within the Organisation of Western European Union, having regard to their proper functions and needs and to their existing levels.

Article VI

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, that is to say four divisions

and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regards as having equivalent fighting capacity. She undertakes not to withdraw these forces against the wishes of the majority of the High Contracting Parties who should take their decision in the knowledge of the views of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. This undertaking shall not, however, bind her in the event of an acute overseas emergency. If the maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too great a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, she will, through Her Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the United Kingdom formations are maintained.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris this twenty-third day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each of the other Signatories.

4

PROTOCOL NO. III ON THE CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS

Paris, 23 October, 1954

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, President of the French Union, the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, the President of the Italian Republic, Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland and of Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, Signatories of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Brussels Treaty,

Have appointed . . . ,

Have agreed as follows:

Part I. Armaments not to be manufactured

ARTICLE I

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, take note of and record their agreement with the Declaration of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3 October, 1954, and annexed hereto as Annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are defined in Annex II. These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the Council of Western European Union.

ARTICLE II

The High Contracting Parties, members of Western European Union, also take note of and record their agreement with the undertaking given by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in the same Declaration that certain further types of armaments will not be manufactured in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, except that if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a recommendation for an amendment to, or cancellation of, the content of the list of these armaments is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and if the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany submits a request accordingly, such an amendment or cancellation may be made by a resolution of the Council of Western European Union passed by a two-thirds

majority. The types of armaments referred to in this Article are listed in Annex III.

Part II. Armaments to be controlled

ARTICLE III

When the development of atomic, biological and chemical weapons in the territory on the mainland of Europe of the High Contracting Parties Who have not given up the right to produce them has passed the experimental stage and effective production of them has started there, the level of stocks that the High Contracting Parties concerned will be allowed to hold on the mainland of Europe shall be decided by a majority vote of the Council of Western European Union.

ARTICLE IV

Without prejudice to the foregoing Articles, the types of armaments listed in Annex IV will be controlled to the extent and in the manner laid down in Protocol No. IV.

ARTICLE V

The Council of Western European Union may vary the list in Annex IV by unanimous decision.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol, being one of the Protocols listed in Article I of the Protocol Modifying and Completing the Treaty, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at Paris on the twenty-third day of October, 1954, in two texts, in the English and French languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Belgian Government and of which certified copies shall be transmitted by that Government to each

of the other Signatories.

Annex I

The Federal Chancellor declares:

that the Federal Republic undertakes not to manufacture in its territory any atomic weapons, chemical weapons or biological weapons, as detailed in paragraphs I, II, and III of the attached list;¹

that it undertakes further not to manufacture in its territory such weapons as those detailed in paragraphs IV, V and VI of the attached list.² Any amendment to or cancellation of the substance of paragraphs IV, V and VI² can, on the request of the Federal Republic, be carried out by a resolution of the Brussels Council of Ministers by a two-thirds majority, if in accordance with the needs of the armed forces a request is made by the competent Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation;

that the Federal Republic agrees to supervision by the competent authority of the Brussels Treaty Organization to ensure that these undertakings are observed.

Annex II

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraphs I to III and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

1. Reproduced in Annex II

2. Reproduced in Annex III

I. Atomic Weapons

a. An atomic weapon is defined as any weapon which contains, or is designed to contain or utilise, nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes and which, by explosion or other uncontrolled nuclear transformation of the nuclear fuel, or by radioactivity of the nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes, is capable of mass destruction, mass injury or mass poisoning.

b. Furthermore, any part, device, assembly of material especially designed for, or primarily useful in, any weapon as set forth under paragraph a., shall be deemed to be an atomic weapon.

c. Nuclear fuel as used in the preceding definition includes Plutonium, Uranium 233, Uranium 235 (including Uranium 235 contained in Uranium enriched to over 2.1 per cent by weight of Uranium 235) and any other material capable of releasing substantial quantities of atomic energy through nuclear fission or fusion or other nuclear reaction of the material. The foregoing materials shall be considered to be nuclear fuel regardless of the chemical or physical form in which they exist.

II. Chemical Weapons

a. A chemical weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use for military purposes, the asphyxiating, toxic, irritant, paralyrant, growth-regulating, anti-lubricating or catalysing properties of any chemical substance.

b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph c., chemical substances, having such properties and capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in paragraph a., shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

c. Such apparatus and such quantities of the chemical substances as are referred to in paragraphs a. and b. which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from this definition.

III. Biological Weapons

a. A biological weapon is defined as any equipment or apparatus expressly designed to use, for military purposes, harmful insects or other living or dead organisms, or their toxic products.

b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph c., insects, organisms and their toxic products of such nature and in such amounts as to make them capable of being used in the equipment or apparatus referred to in a. shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

c. Such equipment or apparatus and such quantities of the insects, organisms and their toxic products as are referred to in paragraphs a. and b. which do not exceed peaceful civilian requirements shall be deemed to be excluded from the definition of biological weapons.

Annex III

This list comprises the weapons defined in paragraph IV to VI and the factories earmarked solely for their production. All apparatus, parts, equipment, installations, substances and organisms, which are used for civilian purposes or for scientific, medical and industrial research in the fields of pure and applied science shall be excluded from this definition.

IV. Long-range Missiles, Guided Missiles and Influence Mines.

a. Subject to the provisions of paragraph d., long-range missiles and guided missiles are defined as missiles such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile, including V-type weapons developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

b. Subject to the provisions of paragraph d., influence mines are defined as naval mines which can be exploded automatically by influences which emanate solely from external

sources, including influence mines developed in the recent war and subsequent modifications thereof.

c. Parts, devices or assemblies specially designed for use in or with the weapons referred to in paragraphs a. and b. shall be deemed to be included in this definition.

d. Proximity fuses, and short-range guided missiles for anti-aircraft defence with the following maximum characteristics are regarded as excluded from this definition:

Length, 2 metres;
Diameter, 30 centimetres;
Speed, 660 metres per second;
Ground range, 32 kilometres;
Weight of War-head, 22.5 kilogrammes.

V. Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes

"Warships, with the exception of smaller ships for defence purposes, are:

a. Warships of more than 3,000 tons displacement;
b. Submarines of more than 350 tons displacement;
c. All warships which are driven by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or by gas turbines or by jet engines."

VI. Bomber aircraft for strategic purposes

Annex IV

LIST OF TYPES OF ARMAMENTS TO BE CONTROLLED

1. a. Atomic
- b. biological, and
- c. chemical weapons

In accordance with definitions to be approved by the Council of Western European Union as indicated in Article I of the present Protocol.

2. All guns, howitzers and mortars of any types and of any roles of more than 90 mm. calibre including the following component for these weapons, viz., the elevating mass.

3. All guided missiles.

Definition: Guided missiles are such that the speed or direction of motion can be influenced after the instant of launching by a device or mechanism inside or outside the missile; these include V-type weapons developed in the recent war and modifications thereto. Combustion is considered as a mechanism which may influence the speed.

4. Other self-propelled missiles of a weight exceeding 15 kilogrammes in working order.

5. Mines of all types except anti-tank and anti-personnel mines.

6. Tanks, including the following component parts for these tanks, viz:

- a. the elevating mass;
- b. turret castings and/or plate assembly.

7. Other armoured fighting vehicles of an overall weight of more than 10 metric tons.

- 8. a. Warships over 1,500 tons displacement;
- b. submarines;

c. all warships powered by means other than steam, Diesel or petrol engines or gas turbines;

d. small craft capable of a speed of over 30 knots, equipped with offensive armament.

9. Aircraft bombs of more than 1,000 kilogrammes.

10. Ammunition for the weapons described in paragraph 2 above.

11. a. Complete military aircraft other than:

- (i) all training aircraft except operational types used for training purposes;
- (ii) military transport and communication aircraft;
- (iii) helicopters;

b. air frames, specifically and exclusively designed for military aircraft except those at (i), (ii) and (iii) above;

c. jet engines, turbo-propeller engines and rocket motors, when these are the principal motive power.

Appendix B

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

Article 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

Article 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article 6¹

For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France,² on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of the Parties.

Article 7

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

1. The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies has been revised by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (see Part 10. Section 3).

2. On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council has heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on July 1, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on July 3, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the 'Algerian departments of France' no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.

Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from July 3, 1962.

Article 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

Article 9

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 4.

Article 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

Article 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as

soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

Article 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

Article 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of other signatories.

Appendix C

The Future Tasks of the Alliance (The Harmel Report)

Report to the Council

Annex to the Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting

December, 1967

1. A year ago, on the initiative of the Foreign Minister of Belgium, the governments of the fifteen nations of the Alliance resolved to 'study the future tasks which face the Alliance, and its procedures for fulfilling them in order to strengthen the Alliance as a factor for durable peace'. The present report sets forth the general tenor and main principles emerging from this examination of the future tasks of the Alliance.

2. Studies were undertaken by Messrs. Schütz, Watson, Spaak, Kohler, and Patijn. The Council wishes to express its appreciation and thanks to these eminent personalities for their efforts and for the analyses they produced.

3. The exercise has shown that the Alliance is a dynamic and vigorous organisation which is constantly adapting itself to changing conditions. It also has shown that its future tasks can be handled within the terms of the Treaty by building on the methods and procedures which have proved their value over many years.

4. Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949 the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major

part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe; the USSR has become one of the two world super powers but the Communist world is no longer monolithic; the Soviet doctrine of 'peaceful co-existence' has changed the nature of the confrontation with the West but not the basic problems. Although the disparity between the power of the United States and that of the European states remains, Europe has recovered and is on its way towards unity. The process of decolonisation has transformed European relations with the rest of the world; at the same time, major problems have arisen in the relations between developed and developing countries.

5. The Atlantic Alliance has two main functions. Its first function is to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Since its inception, the Alliance has successfully fulfilled this task. But the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded as long as the central political issues in Europe, first and foremost the German Question, remain unsolved. Moreover, *the situation of instability and uncertainty still precludes a balanced reduction of military forces.* Under these conditions, the Allies will maintain as necessary a suitable military capability to assure the balance of forces, thereby creating a climate of stability, security and confidence.

In this climate the Alliance can carry out its second function, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Military security and a policy of detente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defence is a stabilising factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. *The way to peace and stability in Europe rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interest of detente.* The participation of the USSR and the USA will be necessary to achieve a settlement of the political problems of Europe.

6. From the beginning the Atlantic Alliance has been a co-operative grouping of states sharing the same ideals and with a high degree of common interest. Their cohesion and solidarity provide an element of stability within the Atlantic area.

7. As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus, each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved. Each Ally should play its full part in promoting an improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe, bearing in mind that the pursuit of detente must not be allowed to split the Alliance. The chances of success will clearly be greater if the Allies remain on parallel courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions will thus be all the more effective.

8. No peaceful order in Europe is possible without a major effort by all concerned. The evolution of Soviet and East European policies gives ground for hope that those governments may eventually come to recognise the advantages to them of collaborating in working towards a peaceful settlement. But no final and stable settlement in Europe is possible without a solution of the German question which lies at the heart of present tensions in Europe. Any such settlement must end the unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany.

9. Accordingly the Allies are resolved to direct their energies to this purpose by realistic measures designed to further a detente in East-West relations. The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-term process to promote better relations and to foster a European settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by appropriate security guarantees.

10. Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis. Certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution.

11. The problem of German reunification and its relationship to a European settlement has normally been dealt with in

exchanges between the Soviet Union and the three Western powers having special responsibilities in this field. In the preparation of such exchanges the Federal Republic of Germany has regularly joined the three Western powers in order to reach a common position. The other Allies will continue to have their views considered in timely discussions among the Allies about Western policy on this subject, without in any way impairing the special responsibilities in question.

12. The Allies will examine and review suitable policies designed to achieve a just and stable order in Europe, to overcome the division of Germany and to foster European security. This will be part of a process of active and constant preparation for the time when fruitful discussions of these complex questions may be possible bilaterally or multilaterally between Eastern and Western nations.

13. The Allies are studying disarmament and practical arms control measures, including the possibility of balanced force reductions. These studies will be intensified. Their active pursuit reflects the will of the Allies to work for an effective detente with the East.

14. The Allies will examine with particular attention the defence problems of the exposed areas, e.g. the south-eastern flank. In this respect the present situation in the Mediterranean presents special problems, bearing in mind that the current crisis in the Middle East falls within the responsibilities of the United Nations.

15. The North Atlantic Treaty area cannot be treated in isolation from the rest of the world. Crises and conflicts arising outside the area may impair its security either directly or by affecting the global balance. Allied countries contribute individually within the United Nations and other international organisations to the maintenance of international peace and security and to the solution of important international problems. In accordance with established usage the Allies, or such of them as wish to do so, will also continue to consult on such problems without commitment and as the case may demand.

16. In the light of these findings, the Ministers directed the council in permanent session to carry out, in the years ahead, the detailed follow-up resulting from this study. This

will be done either by intensifying work already in hand or by activating highly specialised studies by more systematic use of experts and officials sent from capitals.

17. Ministers found that the Special Group confirmed the importance of the role which the Alliance is called upon to play during the coming years in the promotion of detente and the strengthening of peace. Since significant problems have not yet been examined in all their aspects, and other problems of no less significance which have arisen from the latest political and strategic developments have still to be examined, the Ministers have directed the Permanent Representatives to put in hand the study of these problems without delay, following such procedures as shall be deemed most appropriate by the Council in permanent session, in order to enable further reports to be subsequently submitted to the Council in Ministerial Session.

Endnotes

Chapter 1

1. During negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, the seven had put out diplomatic feelers to Ireland and Sweden, as well. Neither opted to join the new pact. See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs (Vol. 2) Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 246; and *Foreign Relations of the United States—1949*, Vol. IV (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 22, 69-70.

2. Harlan Cleveland, *NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970). Cleveland identified the basic bargain as Western Europe's pledge (in the 1948 Brussels Treaty) of cooperation to encourage internal stability and defend against external threats, in exchange for a US mutual security commitment under NATO, and general agreement that the United States would provide military assistance to the NATO Allies.

3. Lucius Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1950), pp. 109-16; and Clay, *Germany and the Fight for Freedom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 14-15.

4. The Western Allies offered Moscow this concession in the revised arrangement, under which each ally was to draw reparations from its own zone. Only 40 percent of Germany's industrial production capacity came from the Soviet Zone.

5. Clay, *Decision*, p. 154.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

7. One item in good supply in the Bonn area was the *Steckruebe*, or rutabaga, a large yellowish-purple turnip. I

discovered this fact when serving a Thanksgiving dinner to some German friends in 1983. Noting the reluctance of several guests to eat their rutabaga, which was served as one of the harvest vegetables, I suggested that perhaps this turnip was new to them. "No indeed," one replied, "we know it well, perhaps too well." Many of the wealthy Bonners had subsisted during the first winter after Hitler's defeat largely on this humble turnip, which was available locally at highly inflated prices. Its taste, my friends said, would always be with them as a reminder of the difficult postwar years.

8. Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs, 1945-53*, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago: Regnery, 1966), pp. 148-9.

9. The French opposed the US-UK bizonal economic arrangements of 1946-48, as they were considered to give the Germans too much administrative responsibility. See Clay, *Decision*, pp. 179-80.

10. Quoted in Michael Balfour, *West Germany: A Contemporary History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 131.

11. Clay, *Decision*, p. 348.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 367.

13. Rudolf Augstein, *Konrad Adenauer* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1964), p. 39.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

15. C.L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, 22 June 1952.

16. Philip Windsor, *Germany and the Management of Detente* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 36.

17. J.J. McCloy, *The Challenge to American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 29.

18. Stanley Sloan, *NATO's Future: Toward a New Trans-Atlantic Bargain* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1985). Sloan's excellent book calls for a new departure for NATO, including preparation of a comprehensive European security assessment that could be the first step toward formulating a comprehensive European security policy, broadening European arms co-operation, and constructing a true "European Pillar" in NATO.

19. Stanley M. Kanarowski, *The German Army and NATO Strategy* (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1982), p. 12.

20. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, p. 279.

21. Quoted in Augstein, *Adenauer*, pp. 32-35.
22. John P. Leacacos, *The Cleveland Plain Dealer*, 3 December 1949.
23. *The Daily Telegraph* (London), 5 December 1949. Also quoted in Adenauer, *Memoirs*, p. 269.
24. Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 435.
25. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, *Hearings on Proposals to Amend the Mutual Assistance Act of 1949*, p. 22.
26. Robert McGeehan, *The German Rearmament Question* (Urbana: Illinois University Press, 1971), p. 289.
27. Clay, *Fight for Freedom*, pp. 77-78.
28. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 253.
29. Clay, *Decision*, p. 416.
30. Acheson, *Creation*, p. 45.
31. Quoted in McGeehan, *Rearmament Question*, p. 69.
32. *The New York Times*, 5 November 1950.
33. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, p. 270.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
35. Martin J. Hillenbrand, *Germany in an Era of Transition* (Paris: Atlantic Institute of International Affairs, 1983), p. 11.
36. An important aspect of these arrangements often is overlooked. Adenauer knew the psychological importance of entering NATO as an equal partner with the other Allies, so he worked to attach all security reservations (such as equipment limitations, prohibitions against atomic and chemical weapons production, and military staff/command arrangements) to Germany's relatively less-important Western European Union membership. In this way, the German Chancellor divorced the basic security ties of NATO and Germany from potentially sensitive sovereignty issues that might pose future problems.

Chapter 2

1. Commitment of the major parties to German unity was only natural. In a series of polls taken between 1952 and 1966,

reunification consistently was the number one issue for most West Germans. See Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erich P. Neumann (eds.), *The Germans: Public Opinion Polls, 1947-66* (Konstanz: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1967), p. 459.

2. Robert Hunter, *Security in Europe*, 2nd Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 66.

3. Quoted in Augstein, *Adenauer*, p. 74.

4. Balfour, *West Germany*, p. 144.

5. Ambassador Burns was fond of contrasting this experience with more recent ones, which he feared were characteristic of a Germany of the 1980s that has forgotten the virtues of hard work and has chosen leisure over industry. See Arthur F. Burns, *The United States and Germany* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986), especially pp. 9, 49.

6. V.R. Bergahn, *Modern Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 212.

7. W.F. Hanrieder and G.P. Auton, *The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Britain* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980), p. 77.

8. For a discussion of support for and opposition to the European Defense Community, Western European Union, and the Paris Agreements of 1954, see Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 166-7.

9. Hans Speier, *German Rearmament and the Old Military Elite* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Report P-458, 15 November 1963), p. 22.

10. Erich Dethleffsen and Karl H. Helfer, *Soldatische Existenz Morgen* (Bonn, 1953), p. 20; also quoted in Speier, *German Rearmament*, p. 3.

11. McGeehan, *Rearmament Question*, p. 69.

12. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, p. 352.

13. Gordon Craig, *NATO and the New German Army* (Princeton, N.J.: International Studies Memorandum #8, 1955), p. 4.

14. Members of the US Military Assistance and Advisory Group, France were detailed to assist Heusinger, Speidel, Kielmannsegg, and their colleagues.

15. A US military officer attached to the Heusinger group in 1953 recalls that the German delegation was low-key almost

to the point of obsequiousness. "Their usual arrogance," he reports, "was almost completely suppressed."

16. A 12-division German army had been envisioned by Adenauer and his colleagues under a defense concept drawn up by a secret conference of German defense experts late in 1950, and elaborated in the *Himmeroder Denkschrift*, which reported the results of that conference to the German Chancellor. Thereafter, 12 divisions was the generally accepted goal for a rearmed Germany. The goal was discussed in 1952 in Lisbon, where the French Premier reduced France's proposed European Defense Community (EDC) force contribution to 12 divisions, thereby satisfying Germany's desire for equality (see Acheson, *Creation*, p. 623). This parity also was included in the EDC Treaty. When the EDC aborted and led to German membership in NATO, the 12-division goal was retained, but the timetable for its achievement was extended. The stretch-out reflected US and NATO views that German troops would need more training than the Germans envisioned. More important, the change reflected limited availability of US equipment for provision to Germany and other Allies, especially France. See Kanarowski, *The German Army*, p. 43.

17. *The German Armed Forces* (Bonn: Federal Press and Information Office, 1961), p. 10.

18. Alfred Grosser, *Germany in Our Time* (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 224.

19. *Carte Blanche*, a June 1955 NATO tactical air force exercise, in which forces of 11 Allies took part, simulated large-scale nuclear air attacks in France, Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), and the German Federal Republic. Press accounts of the exercise reported that 335 nuclear bombs had been "dropped" between Hamburg and Munich, with "casualties" estimated at 1,700,000 killed and 3,500,000 wounded. This exercise and the inflammatory press commentary that accompanied it occurred at the height of the *Bundestag* debate on the conscription bill.

20. *The Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Bonn: Federal Press and Information office, 1965), p. 32.

21. Gernot Gather, *Die Stunde der Jugend* (Stuttgart, 1953), p. 21.

22. James L. Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 41.
23. C.R. Naef, *The Politics of West German Rearmament* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1979), pp. 511-16.
24. Ibid.
25. Eric Waldman, *The Goose Step is Verboten* (New York: Macmillan/Glencoe, 1964), p. 97.
26. *The German Armed Forces*, p. 41.
27. *Armed Forces of the FRG*, p. 32.
28. *Military Assistance Facts* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 1966), p. 14.
29. Naef, *Politics of Rearmament*, pp. 295-6.
30. C.J.E. Harlow, *The European Armaments Base: A Survey* (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967), Part I, p. 4.
31. Naef, *Politics of Rearmament*, p. 257.
32. Ibid., p. 258.
33. *Bulletin* (Bonn: Federal Press and Information Office), 12 January 1955.
34. *Nuernburger Nachrichten*, 15 December 1954 (quoted in Naef, *Politics of Rearmament*, p. 76).
35. Naef, *Politics of Rearmament*, pp. 255-6.
36. Helmut Schmidt reportedly considered the *Bundeswehr* second only to the Israeli Defense Force in combat capability. See W.F. Hanrieder, "Arms Control and Security: The Federal Republic and the European Order" in Stephan Bethlen and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Europe and the Superpowers* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 45.
37. EMNID polls, 1967-83, cited in Gebhard Schweigler, *West German Foreign Policy: The Domestic Setting*—CSIS Washington Papers, No. 106 (New York: Praeger, 1984), pp. 112-3.
38. A 1956 poll showed that 89 percent of all respondents considered skilled workers better respected in the German community than regular soldiers. Moreover, 70 percent of the people polled in 1956 would have advised against joining the new German army. See Noelle-Neumann, *The Germans, 1947-66*, p. 445. By 1980, this situation had changed markedly: Not only did a large majority of the public favor retaining the *Bundeswehr*, but three respondents in four said they had a good

opinion of German military forces. See Noelle-Neumann, *The Germans. Public Opinion Polls, 1967-80* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981), p. 142.

Chapter 3

1. Mathias Schonborn, "Perceptions on National Security" in *Allied Perceptions of Threat* (Munich: Bundeswehr Social Science Institute, 1983), p. 438.

2. Ulrich de Maziere, "How Can Germany Best Be Defended?" in *Foreign Policy and Defense Review*, Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4 (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), p. 11.

3. Schonborn, "Perceptions," p. 438.

4. Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann, *Allensbacher Jahrbuch der Demoskopie* (Munich: Saur, 1983), p. 63F.

5. As late as 1984, the Bonn government remained so concerned over relatively modest Federal debts and budgetary deficits that it chose to sell public housing units and reduce widows' pensions rather than increase Germany's public debt any further.

6. Interview in *The Times* (London), 18 October 1956.

7. Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975) contains an especially thorough treatment of the nuclear arming of the *Bundeswehr*.

8. For an example, see Strauss's remarks in *Die Zeit*, 10 May 1956.

9. Kelleher, *Germany*, p. 42.

10. *The New York Times*, 6 April 1957.

11. Kelleher, *Germany*, p. 76.

12. General Norstad's commentary on the 1957 Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe report and on MC-70 is reprinted in full in Malcolm Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," a part of Klaus Knorr, ed., *NATO and American Security* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 98-126. The specific reference is on p. 99.

13. This proposal was expounded publicly and somewhat undiplomatically by the US Defense Secretary at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in June 1962.

14. See, for example, Hunter, *Security in Europe*, pp. 89-96.

15. Walter F. Hahn, *Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views*, Foreign Policy Papers, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: SAGE Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1975), p. 18.

16. In October 1962, *Der Spiegel*, a sensational news magazine published in Hamburg, printed a long article on NATO's strategy, as revealed in the Alliance's FALLEX '82. The author, Conrad Ahlers, asserted that *Bundeswehr* war plans emphasized the use of tactical nuclear weapons at the expense of conventional defense and acquiesced in a NATO strategy that would permit enemy occupation of large portions of the Federal Republic, should war come. Two weeks after the article was published, police raided *Spiegel*'s offices and the homes of a number of *Spiegel* staffers, ostensibly in search of classified documents. Ahlers was arrested while on holiday in Spain; Rudolph Augstein, *Spiegel*'s publisher, was seized and jailed for 14 weeks. In the investigation and parliamentary inquiry that followed, Strauss emerged as organizer of the vendetta. In a series of statements to the *Bundestag*, the Defense Minister tried to minimize his part in the affair, but evidence was given that he personally authorized the raids and ordered Ahlers' arrest, without consultation with or approval by the Federal Minister of Justice. Although no judgment was made as to illegality of Strauss's actions, critics within and without the government coalition forced his dismissal from the Cabinet in December 1963. The affair sapped much of the vitality from the last Adenauer government, and was an important factor in the Chancellor's agreement to step down in October 1963. For a detailed account, see David Schoenbaum, *The Spiegel Affair* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968.)

17. Kelleher, *Germany*, p. 203.

18. *White Paper 1979* (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, 4 September 1979), pp. 125-6.

19. McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 60, No. 4-Spring 1982), pp. 753-68.

20. Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz Joseph Schulze, "Nuclear Weapons and the Preservation of Peace: A German Response," *Foreign Affairs* (Vol. 60, No. 5-Summer 1982), pp. 1157-70.

Chapter 4

1. Helmut Schmidt, *Defense or Retaliation* (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 14.

2. From my service in both Bonn and London, I am struck by the differences in *modus operandi* in the two capitals, as well as by the effects initial country reactions have in Washington. Most US proposals on NATO matters get a prompt, positive "in principle" British response, with certain reservations that "need to be discussed." Bonn typically reacts more slowly, pointing out problems and potential pitfalls in any US proposal. Discussions then begin. At their conclusion, the Germans almost always accept the US proposal and do their best to promote and implement it. Because of their initial reaction, however, they are thought of in Washington as the "bad guys." The British, on the other hand, invariably are considered the "good guys" because of their original agreement in principle, despite the fact that the "minor reservations" originally cited may in the end preclude meaningful British implementation of the concept.

3. *Report to the North Atlantic Council on the Future Tasks of the Alliance* (December 1967), paragraph 8. The division of Germany was identified as the clearest and most cruel manifestation of such barriers.

4. Hunter, *Security in Europe*, pp. 146-7.

5. Article 6 of The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949. The United States showed particular care in delineating the treaty area, with US military authorities anxious not to extend their commitment beyond the North Atlantic area. Robert Lovett, Acting Secretary of State, told conferees at the January 1949 Washington Exploratory Talks on

Security that the United States preferred to specify countries, not "map distribution," as a way to include Algeria but exclude all European colonial areas. See *Foreign Relations of the United States-1949*, Vol. IV, p. 27.

6. Hanrieder and Auton, *Foreign Policies*, p. 14.

7. Hunter, *Security in Europe*, p. 179.

8. Announced on 16 November 1980 during a peace forum at Krefeld, Germany, the Krefeld Appeal called for opposition to Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Force (LRINF) deployments in the Federal Republic. By August 1961, more than a million Germans had signed. Inspiration and planning for the protest allegedly originated at an early 1980 meeting in Moscow between members of the German Peace Union and the Soviet Committee of the World Peace Council. See John Cartwright and Julian Critchley, *Cruise, Pershing, and SS-20*, a North Atlantic Assembly Report (London: Brassey's, 1985), p. 103.

9. *NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution* (a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, April 1982), pp. 80-81.

10. *Report of the Commission on Long-Term Planning for the Federal Armed Forces* (Bonn, 21 June 1982), p. 125.

11. *White Paper 1985* (Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, 1985), pp. 28-29.

12. *Bulletin of the Federal Government* (Bonn: Federal Press and Information Office, 19 April 1985), p. 342.

13. *White Paper 1985*, pp. 30-32.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

15. An excellent account of political aspects of NATO burden-sharing is contained in Simon Lunn, *Burden-sharing in NATO* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1983).

16. A good discussion on technical considerations of cost sharing in NATO and the economics of military alliance is contained in Gavin Kennedy, *Burden-sharing in NATO* (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1979).

17. Lunn, *Burden-sharing*, p. 53.

18. Reports to the US Congress by the Secretary of Defense: *Allied Commitments to Defense Spending* (March 1981), p. 14; *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (March 1982),

p. 3; *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (March 1983), p. 42; *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (March 1984), p. 20; *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (March 1985), p. 18; and *Allied Contributions to the Common Defense* (March 1986), p. 22.

19. *DOD Report on Allied Contributions* (March 1985), p. 28.

20. *DOD Report on Allied Commitments* (March 1981), p. 3.

21. The Infrastructure Accounting Unit (IAU) is used by NATO to express infrastructure programs and expenditure levels in a common accounting unit. IAU values in national currencies are adjusted semiannually to reflect exchange variation. In July 1987, one IAU equalled \$3.77.

22. Communiqué of the 28 May 1969 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee.

23. Communiqué of the 7-8 December 1976 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee.

24. The commitment went on to recognize that for some members economic circumstances would affect what could be achieved. See communiqué of the 17-18 May 1977 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee.

25. R.W. Komer, "The Trick is How to Get It," *Armed Forces Journal*, August 1981.

26. This attitude surfaced repeatedly in 1979, when a Department of Defense delegation discussed NATO burdensharing with government officials in London, Brussels, and The Hague, at the International Institute of Strategic Studies and Chatham House, London, and with national delegations and staffers at NATO Headquarters. Except the German delegation at NATO, virtually everyone conceded that Europe was not pulling its fair share of the allied load and urged that Washington press the Germans to pay more.

27. NATO's definition of defense expenditures was fixed before the Federal Republic joined the Alliance. Had Germany been a party to determining which national expenditures were to be considered defense-related, most, if not all, subsidies designed to assure Berlin's economic viability, as well as the costs the Federal Republic bears to support British, French, and American troops stationed in Berlin, likely would have been included in the NATO definition of defense spending.

28. Statistics on German contributions to NATO have been extracted from *Germany's Contributions to Western Defense*, a 1984 publication of the German Information Center, New York.

Chapter 5

1. Wilfred Hofmann, "Is NATO Defense Policy Facing a Crisis?", *NATO Review* (No. 4, August 1984), p. 1.

2. At the Spring 1983 Ebert Foundation Conference, Hans Apel, who was Defense Minister in the Schmidt Cabinet, abruptly ended what had been an enthusiastic discussion on moving from a nuclear to a conventional strategy in NATO. Replying to a proposal by Horst Ehmke that the Alliance stop Pershing and cruise missile deployment unilaterally and reduce battlefield weapons as well, Apel noted that a major increase in conventional forces spending would be needed to assure deterrence without theater nuclear arms. Apel wondered how much more Ehmke and his friends would favor spending? When no reply was forthcoming, the discussion fizzled and the conferees moved on to other issues.

3. *White Paper* 1985, p. 237.

4. *White Paper* 1970, p. 89.

5. *Report of the Commission on Long-Term Planning for the Federal Armed Forces*, Bonn, 21 June 1982, p. 33.

6. Unpublished US Embassy, Bonn, Report on the German Population, 3 January 1984.

7. *Westdeutsche Allgemeine*, 31 October 1986.

8. As recently as 1982, potential conscripts were permitted to register their conscientious objection to military service merely by mailing a postcard to the appropriate Federal Office.

9. C. Krause, "What is a Military Threat?", in R. Steinke and M. Vale, eds., *Germany Debates Defense* (London/New York: Sharpe, 1983), pp. 5-13.

10. German defense spending has increased an average of only 0.8 percent annually in real terms since the Kohl government took office in October 1982. See *DOD Report on Allied Contributions-1986*, p. 52.

11. *Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Military Assistance Facts* (Washington, DC: Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1985), pp. 13, 39.

12. *Standardization of Equipment within NATO* (A Report to the Congress by the Secretary of Defense)—*Twelfth Report* (March 1986), p. 31.

13. The Franco-German helicopter project has been dubbed the "AH-32" by *Luftwaffe* critics, who contend that the product will be about half as effective as the US-designed and -produced AH-64 helicopter.

14. Interview at French Defense Ministry on 21 April 1986. German officials lay the blame for such changes on Paris, however, contending that most of these changes were required to meet France's export sales needs.

15. Excerpts from the Foreign Minister's 22 May 1985 press conference on Strategic Defense Initiative are quoted in Axel Krause, "France, Germany: Alliance within an Alliance," *EUROPE* (September/October 1985), p. 28.

16. See Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., *US/European Economic Cooperation in Military and Civil Technology*, revised edition, September 1975 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1975). Callaghan made a number of recommendations for eliminating defense inefficiencies, which he contended resulted in waste of more than \$10 billion annually. By eliminating waste, Callaghan said, NATO countries would free funds to improve conventional forces in Europe, raise the nuclear threshold, and lessen the danger of nuclear war.

17. Paragraph 302(c), Public Law 93-365 of 5 August 1974.

18. Paragraph 814(b), Public Law 94-106 of 7 October 1975.

19. "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence," *NATO Review* (Vol. 32, No. 4, August 1984), pp. 8-12.

20. The "on again, off again" status of post-1982 German arms sales to Saudi Arabia, transactions opposed strongly by the Israeli government, are an interesting case in point.

21. Some elements of the German Navy, which has chafed under post-World War II restrictions relegating it to coastal duty, have seen the out-of-area initiative as a way to regain the Navy's "blue water" role and expand its force structure. A German naval squadron was permitted to make a "training" visit

to the Persian Gulf area in 1982, but the government effectively blocked German Navy efforts to portray the cruise as part of a combined western operation in Southwest Asia.

22. Spokesmen have confirmed only that US chemical munitions are stored in the German Federal Republic. Exact locations, compositions, and quantities of such stores are very closely held.

23. An April 1985 *Report of the Senate Appropriations Committee (Report 99-14, accompanying S. 1029)*, issued after committee hearings on military appropriations authorization, stated categorically that US chemical stockpiles pose "safety and environmental hazards" (p. 33). Its conclusions were based at least in part on independent studies, like a 1984 National Science Foundation report, *Disposal of Chemical Munitions and Agents*, which noted that some "90 percent of the inventory of chemical agents and nearly as much of the munitions inventory has little or no military value and will require disposal regardless of future . . . [program] decisions." (p. 32).

Chapter 6

1. One western writer, Robert Hunter, contends that NATO has served to contain the German problem for the benefit of all Europeans, East and West. The Atlantic Alliance, he writes, "Has managed to reconcile and encompass remedies for the two competing forms of anxiety in Europe: About the Russians and about the Germans." See Hunter, *Security in Europe*, p. 67.

2. Bonn's 1984 agreement to accept a NATO infrastructure program level significantly higher than those adopted in previous years appears to have been based as much on a concern that the US Congress might react punitively to a smaller infrastructure program as on any analysis of what actually was needed to support NATO's military forces.

3. France's withdrawal from most of NATO's military activities (she still participates in NATO's integrated Air Defense

and Communications System) has been felt as acutely in logistics as in military forces. With the French withdrawal, NATO's logistic lines of communication were shifted to Benelux (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and North Germany. In crisis or wartime, these routes, ports, and depots would be much more vulnerable to interdiction or capture than those in France, making defense or reinforcement of the NATO area much more difficult.

4. Henry Kissinger lent his weight to this thought at a January 1984 security conference in Brussels. Much to the consternation of Washington officialdom, he called for a sweeping reexamination of NATO policy in light of the nuclear stalemate, what he sees as growing nuclear pacifism, and glaringly inadequate allied conventional forces. See Henry A. Kissinger, *Observations: Selected Speeches and Essays, 1982-84* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1985), pp. 167-87.

5. A western diplomat related in 1986 that many defense intellectuals with whom he has spoken are becoming highly concerned over deterrent linkage in NATO, which they consider increasingly incredible in light of Soviet strategic nuclear advances. He theorized that governments in NATO Europe—especially in Bonn—are unwilling to acknowledge this incredibility, precisely because they cannot conceive of a viable alternative at this time.

6. A thoughtful discussion of this matter appeared in *The Economist*, 26 April 1986, p. 14.

7. Philip Geyelin, "When the Allies Don't Salute," *The Washington Post*, 1 May 1986, p. A-23. Geyelin uses the Suez crisis of 1956 to show that the United States doesn't always have the same goals as its Allies. He argues that in the best of all possible worlds, reasonably like-minded, free nations ought to be able to engage together in defense of one of their members from whatever hostile source, whatever its location. In the real world, however, outlooks differ, even among the Europeans, making many common actions impossible. Geyelin concludes that "NATO's narrow focus is the price we have to pay for an alliance that has shouldered its proper burden with a degree of success unparalleled in history."

8. Interview at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 24 April 1986.

9. Speech at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on 4 July 1962.

10. Interview in April 1986. Others question the practicality of the concept. Several officials presently at NATO Headquarters say they give the European Pillar little chance of success in the foreseeable future. "It would require a great deal of new defense money," one planner noted early in 1986, "and the key countries—Britain and the Federal Republic—have nothing extra to spend."

11. Defense Ministry officials in London and Paris indicated during April 1986 interviews that they had difficulty initially understanding whether Bonn was promoting an Anti-Theater Ballistic Missile (ATBM) System—a sort of European SDI—or Extended Air Defense (EAD). Manfred Woerner's early 1986 article in *Strategic Review* ("A Missile Defense for NATO Europe,") Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 13-20, apparently was designed to clarify the EAD-ATBM question. By mid-1986, all parties reportedly were focusing on EAD.

12. French Defense Ministry planners seem most sensitive to this problem. One stated during a 1986 discussion that, were EAD to be based on some sort of a *Patriot* follow-on, it would amount to little more than another US arms sale.

13. One could argue that Bonn's seemingly relaxed attitude is not without its rewards. General Wolfgang Altenburg, German Army, became chairman of NATO's Military Committee in 1986, the third German to hold the post since 1963. Moreover, in mid-1987, Manfred Woerner was being mentioned as a front runner to succeed Lord Carrington when he steps down as Secretary General.

14. Chairman Mikhail S. Gorbachev's sharp rejoinder is instructive: His remark that Germany's egregious crimes during the Nazi era placed her in perpetual debt to all humanity (after Chancellor Kohl suggested compensation for damages caused by the Chernobyl disaster) elicited widespread understanding in the West, more than 40 years after the end of the Second World War. Many regarded the Soviet reaction as entirely reasonable, remarking instead on Kohl's political naivete and insensitivity in making such a suggestion.

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Germany and NATO

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
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NDU Press Editorial Clerk: Dottie Mack

Cover and title- and half-title-page mechanicals by Laszlo L. Bodrogi

Maps and figures drawn by Laszlo L. Bodrogi, Nancy Glover,
Rhonda Story, and Juan Medrano



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Ships of NATO's Standing Naval Force are moored at a pier in Halifax, Nova Scotia. From the left are the guided missile destroyer, USS CHARLIE F. ADAMS (DDG 2); the Canadian Destroyer Escort SKEENA (IDDE 207); and the West German Fast Frigate BRAUNSCHWEIG (F 225).

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